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ABSTRACT

This publication contains the proceedings of the 26th annual meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society in December, 1977. Eleven papers discussing the philosophy of education are presented. In the first paper "Philosophical Analysis: Whither or Thither?" the author discusses the drive towards systems analysis and logical planning and expresses the hope that this drive will not overwhelm the striving for human justice and the development of worthy social values. The second paper "Educational- - What For?" argues that those who claim that educational philosophy is of no use are wrong. The political function of educational philosophy and an integral view are discussed in the third and fourth papers respectively. The fifth paper discusses an approach to counteract the apathy felt by all age groups toward the learning of philosophy. In the sixth paper, the author demonstrates the usefulness of educational philosophy with regards to cultural pluralism. In the seventh and eighth papers Maurice Friedman and John Dewey are discussed. The ninth paper presents Lester Frank Ward's views on eugenics and racial struggle. Accountability is the topic of the tenth paper. The publication concludes with a description of the German system of secondary education and raises questions of particular interest to American educators. (Author/RM)

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JAMES JOHN JELINEK,
EMERITUS PROFESSOR,
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY,
EDITOR.

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1.

PART I. PAPERS.

CHAPTER 1.

PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS: WHITHER OR THITHER?

DAROLD BECKMAN.

A certain breed of professionals in philosophy with their ultra-emphasis on analysis and the consequent narrowing of the field of philosophy have both reflected the cultural dilemmas of the age and set the tone for study. Whereas this has proceeded in general philosophy with such men as A. J. Ayer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, and Gilbert Ryle, the profession of education has found able advocates of analysis in R. S. Peters, Israel Scheffler, Thomas F. Green, and Richard Preng. If this were a trend confined merely to the "academic" area of educational philosophy, we would pay it scant attention here, because we are now concerned with the future of education, its goals, perspectives, and basic orientations. But we are also aware of the practical fruit of analysis: behavioral objectives, competency-based programs, learner verification, program evaluation procedures, criterion-referenced testing and a whole new world of rationality called "scientific management." One can speak of an analysis-oriented tendency in American education today and only the historian needs to bother with whether the philosopher of analysis is the reflection or cause of the trend.

Logical or linguistic analysts do not pretend to advocate a set of doctrines and values or project an ideal state of mankind, in contrast to the classic "greats," like Plato, Aquinas, or Hegel, perhaps because they prefer the role of neutral observer whose only task is to clarify the meanings and relationships in situations. Such a noble role ought to be commended, yet there are many detractors. These detractors say a science of techniques is being built without a set of values to determine their use. In elementary school, reading is being taught and the outcomes are being evaluated without a depth of concern for humanistic values, as though the pupils were being rolled off an assembly line with minimum competencies to meet a production quota for the educational managers and legislative overseers. They say the goals of secondary schools have now been transformed into pure schooling in narrow career education, since

the measure of "success" of the school is the state of its programs, number of competent graduates, and the efficiency of its operation. Apparently, the policy-makers in education have succeeded in over-producing devices to measure and quantify results. They have set in motion personnel, computers, and systems to analyze the achievements of politically-motivated aims. The bureaucracy required to monitor these objectives is so overwhelming that there is blessed little opportunity for teachers to focus on objectives other than the mandated ones.

One does not have to be an acute observer to note the drift toward centralization of educational policy-making. The accountability legislation of the Stull Act, the requirements for proceeding to set up the state-funded Early Childhood Education Programs in primary grades, and the techniques for external evaluation of teacher education programs in colleges and universities are prominent examples in California of how internal decision-making is being gradually replaced by outside agencies. This is a new operational philosophy for a state with a past wedded to independent-thinking local school boards. The loss of power by the local authorities to legislatures, state and federal agencies, and the courts has become an established trend. It implies a loss of the ability to make philosophical decisions in the traditional manner.

The new manner of making philosophical decisions by local authorities is now a subservient role, far from the independent role of the fairly recent past. It began with the heavy criticism of teacher competency and the publicized failure of reading, mathematics, and science programs. The pressure for change built up with bond defeats, budget deficiencies, the need to cut programs and classes, and new legislative requirements. State compensatory programs of the past decade have conditioned local educational administrations to sources of funds to resolve economic problems. Court decisions regarding busing, integration, bi-lingualism/ bi-culturalism, methods of teacher dismissal, procedures of pupil suspension, and the treatment of handicapped children, despite their extremely commendable contribution to the welfare of students in the schools, have restricted the policy-making powers of local districts and institutions.

The gradual transition to a new set of bosses in education is not a completed process. Local boards may continue to meet in familiar chambers and the agendas may contain the recurrent items of budgets, staffing, and curriculum organization. But the restrictions on freedom of movement and relationships to the state have begun to be felt in myriad detail. Debates are becoming shorter on what the goals <u>ought</u> to

be and more time is being spent debating how the goals, which were externally determined, can be effectively achieved. The economic anxieties of local districts are forcing them into the position of the philosophic analysts. They have to think in terms of specific concepts and tools, to identify apparently feasible and measurable goals, and to use a rhetoric of minimal and narrow objectives which are subject to accountability standards. Non-measurable goals would be ambiguous, quite antithetical to the ideal of the analyst's criterion of clarity.

It is not the theme of this paper to take a purely sentimental outlook on local autonomy and decry the movement toward centralization. Obviously much of the past misery in schooling has been caused by narrow provincialism and unbridled racial and national chauvinism as expressed on the local level. The will of the citizenry had to find an avenue for opposition and the legislature and courts were the natural legal recourse for those who sought remedies to social problems in education. In an urbanized technological society the desires of a democratic people can no longer be fulfilled through the simple instrumentalities of the past such as the town hall meeting or local school board. One of the tasks of the philosopher is to show how wider participation in formulating the social contract can occur under conditions of humanized activity without falling under the spell of bureaucracy and smug "efficiency."

One solution to the problem of "bigness" has been to establish super-rationalized" processes. The assembly-line in industry has been our model of efficient operation for integrating divergent activities. For almost a century now schools have had this model lurking in the shadows, like an avaracious monster waiting to devour its prey. Mark Hopkins' view of education with the teacher and pupil at opposite ends of the log has been a potential victim. The dignity of the teaching act has not willingly been destroyed. Neither programmed learning and teaching machines nor all the planning outlooks of curriculum coordinators have given pseudo-realists absolute power. We reason that deep within the bourgeois culture, like the San Andreas fault under-rides California, lies the concept of a free market-place and this system of freedom has a way of asserting its earth-shaking power in the ideologies and practices of men. Teachers sense the threats to their individual academic freedom and do not want to give it up.

The most pronounced assertion of freedom has been through the voices of existentialists, but they are in the minority and they lack any organized effectiveness. On the other hand, the enormous National Education Association has campaigned against abusive aspects of teacher accountability schemes. Another bit of evidence that shows the analytic

philosopher will meet opposition in education arose out of the conference of the California Council on Teacher Education at Yosemite in October, 1976 when the delegates responded in an overwhelmingly positive fashion to the talk of Gary Fenstermacher of U.C.L.A. who decried the attempts at "sciencism" to take over the whole control of teacher education.

University professors of education too frequently have been opportunists in recent years seeking funds from the federal government and grants from private foundations to research, consult, travel, and widely advocate reformist postures on the novelties of performance contracting, modular scheduling, competency-based structures, and systems learning. The funding agencies have thought in terms of specific, concrete results and that outlook has lent itself to a philosophy that stressed schooling with unidimensional objectives that "insured" successful performance in limited areas. True, the university professors who have worked under these grants have not usually represented departments of philosophical foundations, but the public does not make fine discriminations. Therefore, it seems the education professors, selected from a group whose special skills emphasized analytic procedures of one sort or another, represent a rather common front of the university in the public mind.

Israel Scheffler has said that "critical precision rather than doctrine" has been the essence of the analytic philosophy. Any E.C.E. teacher in California who has spent innumerable committee hours defining objectives and establishing precise methods of meeting those objectives would certainly recognize the role of analytic philosophy in practice. Actually most of these reformist practices remind one more of Taylorism, or factory time-study, come to education rather than legitimate philosophy. The emphasis on efficiency is all-pervasive and inescapable. The administration is officially being tagged as "management" and the teacher is being classed more as a "director" of learning than as a "model" of learning. In a multi-dimensional classroom with its paraprofessionals, teacher aides, resource specialists, and reading clinicians, the identification of the "teacher" is often an educational enigma. The system is what determines success, although the teacher bears the brunt of the accountability evaluation. The non-measurable features of education, such as love, trust, and promotion of ideals, are not accountable by "efficiency" operations, so the skeletal remains of instruction, the facts and skills, become the criteria for determining successful instruction. Scheffler's "precision" has been winning many of the battles in the public school sector of practical educational philosophy, while "doctrine," as a constantly shifting reflection of the political, economic, moral, and legal forces of society, has become a fallen casualty.

The three main objectives of analytic philosophy in the Academy, (a) the systematic study of semantics, (b) the development of symbolic logic, and (c) the use of empirical definitions to provide a foundation for clear scientific thinking, have been transported to the real or "working" world of education with religious fervor. The results of this venture are yet unresolved, but some outcomes are becoming increasingly clear: increased paperwork for teachers and administrators, more involvement of non-professionals in education, extension of legal intervention into the educational process, elaboration of role differentiations, and delimitation of school objectives to those which are politically expedient. These are analogous to Kilpatrick's "concomitant learnings," an additional, unexpected outgrowth in the practice of living. At this state of society in America, analytic philosophy must be evaluated not only on the basis of its stated aims and academic achievements, but also upon its total impact in educational practice.

The appeal of these positivist aims to cautious middle-class intellectuals is powerful because they do not want to become involved in great social controversies and yet have consciences that accept the values of science, clarity, and objectivity. Their underlying idealism permits them to study semantics as a system of signs, a semiotic analysis of language in general, without studying the social development behind the meanings of words and language structures, thus leaving them with a barren interpretation of language itself. This same idealist foundation allows them to study formal logic in an innocent abstract sense, divorced from the physical sciences and mathematical research from which it arose. Finally, these intellectuals delude themselves with scholastic terms about "sense data," "rules of designation," "atomic facts," and so forth, which presume clarity and substitute for an adequate scientific interpretation of development in objective reality.

It is this kind of philosophical analysis which has flowered, and recently pollinated the whole educational jungle. Educators cannot look to this philosophy for direction, only for instrumentation. One can be sure that it will continue to grind out new instruments in quantity like the magic porridge bowl of the folktale. Its prolificacy is its curse. Already the concept of the teacher has been blasted by Flanders interactional analysis and by the various techniques that take apart the teaching act and hand over the separate responsibilities to paraprofessionals. The traditional teacher, who comes to the profession with high social responsibility and a commitment to his pupils, tended to welcome the analysis until it passed a point of personal anxiety, in which the analysis turned into dissection, like a boy probing at a grasshopper under a magnifying glass. The teacher now wonders whether the spirit of

objectivity in analysis has actually been a smokescreen for increased exploitation of the teaching profession because workload has increased, the market of unemployed teachers has grown, conflict between working teachers and managerial employers has sharpened, and the ragtail army of unemployed graduates from the schools threatens the image of having accomplished a successful job in education.

Philosophical analysis wants to be noncommital. That is its virtue and its vice. The philosophy is neatly suited for survival in a world of combative politics. But the teacher who has strong convictions and is guided by humanistic considerations must be cautioned that philosophical analysis can never be a friend forever. The world of philosophers has probably never seen a more fickle outlook, where old shoes are discarded because polish is more highly rated than comfort. It is difficult to believe that a philosophical position in which nothing is sacred can ride to ascendancy in education. Then, perhaps it never will. However, the culture of the marketplace in America is more noted for its callousness than its amicability. From one perspective it appears that the education profession will prosper and grow by analysis, but from another it appears that the teacher will become more of a cog in the hierarchy and bureaucracy of the learning systems.

The future is hard to predict. In the professional struggle itself the ties of comradeship and the teacher's concept of social service should be able to preserve old values and create new sensitivities. One can only hope that the drive toward systems analysis and logical planning will not overwhelm the striving for human justice and the development of worthy social values. If a new amalgam in education arises out of the impending conflict, it cannot be accomplished without the united effort of progressive people and an optimistic and vigilant philosophical perspective.

CHAPTER 2.

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY -- WHAT FOR?

FREDERICK S. ELLETT, JR.

"If philosophy is for anything -- if it is not a kind of mumbling in the dark, a form of busy work -- it must shed light upon the path."
John Dewey.

There is something particularly annoying about the question of whether doing educational philosophy serves any purpose or function. It would be different, of course, if people would with equal force raise the question about whether doing, say, educational psychology serves any purpose or function. (How I would like to see that question taken seriously!) The challenge to educational philosophy always seems biting; it always seems to be in order. One is almost forced to admit that there must be something to these challenges, for why on earth would people continue to make them?

It is comforting, perhaps, to realize that philosophers have always been regarded with suspicion. But this only pushes the question back another step. Perhaps there really is something to these challenges and suspicions. Philosophers of education might try to defend themselves by pointing out that they are changing and becoming better at their tasks than were their predecessors. After all, psychologists would have to use a similar defense in their behalf. Still, I suspect such a "defense" would not satisfy those who raise the challenge against educational philosophy. Those people think they see the difficulty in a different place -- in the nature of educational philosophy itself. Quite simply, they believe that educational philosophy is of no use in addressing the problems which face education. For example, they might hold that whether a solution to a problem exists or whether a policy is effective, so the argument goes, one questions whose nature is empirical not philosophical.

If I may be permitted to make an observation here, I would say that the problem should not be thought of as one in which philosophy is likely to

be scorned by psychology or the social sciences. I would say that the problem should be thought of as one in which the knowledge and the insights of the disciplines -- including philosophy and psychology -- are likely to be scorned by educational planners. I shall say no more about this.

A full refutation of the negative views about educational philosophy would take much more room than I have available to me in this short essay. But, perhaps, I can set out some of the directions that a full refutation might take. In doing these things, I shall also be answering the question about what the purpose of educational philosophy is.

There is an unexpected hitch as we set out to answer these questions. What is educational philosophy? It is a fact that philosophers have done different things and have conceived of their activities in different ways. How are we to identify what philosophy really is? Is there some characteristic activity which is common to these seemingly disparate activities? Is it possible to show that there is some family of characteristics -- to borrow a term from Wittgenstein -- which delimits the philosophical activities from others? It seems quite proper to regard both Plato and Dewey as philosophers, but Plato and Dewey seem to be in almost total disagreement about methods and conclusions.

Still, there does seem to be a strategy which might plausibly be said to be common to philosophical thought. One characteristic of the strategy can be seen in the following way. Philosophers are concerned not so much with determining what teaching English is, but especially with determining what teaching is in general; they are concerned not so much with determining what learning mathematics is, but especially with what learning is in general. Philosophers seem not to be interested in particular questions; rather, they are especially interested in general questions. As philosophers have a tendency to say, philosophy is interested in the nature or the essence of certain things. Here, one would do well to remember the way philosophers have set out determining the nature or the essence of knowledge.

It seems to me that such activities could also be described by saying that philosophers are interested in clarifying, explicating, criticizing, and -- where required -- logically reconstructing our concepts and our conceptual frameworks. When seen in this light, philosophy is best thought of not as a set of doctrines but as a <u>method</u>. Philosophy is a method for clarifying, explicating, and criticizing our concepts.

Is there a need for philosophy in education? Is there a need for an

educational philosopher to apply the method to the problems and issues in education? Well, I hope it won't seem dogmatic to say that there are some problems and issues in which concepts stand in need of clarification, explication, and logical reconstruction. That people do have different concepts of education is something worth showing. It would also be worthwhile to show that theoreticians hold different and often conflicting conceptions of what a human being is. As for philosophy's contribution to the solution of educational problems, perhaps one should remember that finding a solution depends on how the problem is conceived. It may be the case that our educational programs are ineffective (or trivial) because we conceive of human learning in an inappropriate way, as when we think of learning in a Skinnerian behavioristic way.

There is no need for me to give more examples which indicate that important concepts in educational practice stand in need of philosophical criticism. Members of the audience can bring to mind their own examples -- examples that may suggest problems which urgently require philosophical criticism. Insofar as philosophy can help educators clarify, explicate, and logically reconstruct those concepts of educational practice which are fundamentally important, then educational philosophy is worth doing and has a valuable contribution to make to the understanding and improvement of educational practice.

One might call this typical characteristic of the strategy of philosophical thought the analytical characteristic. Members of the audience should understand, however, that my use of the word "analytical" covers much more than those activities to which Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore applied the word. I am using the term to refer to a whole range of activities which includes clarification, explication, and logical reconstruction by means of determining the logical presuppositions, assumptions, and logical presumptions of a concept. It seems to me that this range of activities has as its purpose the shedding of light upon our path. Therefore, it seems correct to conclude that philosophy has as its purpose the shedding of light upon the path.

Philosophical thought, however, has another typical characteristic which is as important as its analytic aspect. Philosophers are concerned not so much with justifying a particular policy, but with finding the different ways in which policies can be justified. Philosophers are often interested in showing whether a given policy can be justified and in showing what kinds of policy can be justified. Here, one might say that philosophers are engaged in the search for good reasons upon which to base or to build policy. The philosopher may be anxious to point out that there are different kinds of reasons and that some have more weight than

others. For example, a philosopher is likely to point out how what counts as a good reason in empirical inquiry differs from what counts as a good reason in moral thinking. A philosopher might point out how these differ from what counts as a good reason in aesthetics (or even mathematics).

Is there a need for such activities in educational practice? Is there a need for an educational philosopher to search for possible justifications of actual and potential programs and policies? In response to such questions, I can only say that insofar as good reasons can be found in favor of certain programs and policies -- and one must include the reasons against implementation of certain programs -- then educators and the general public have an interest in coming to understand such reasons. In the end, our educational policies and programs should be based on the best reasons. Those policies which cannot meet the test of reason should be eliminated. Of course, much needs to be said about what counts as a good reason. Indeed, there is much to be learned about such things, but there is a substantial body of philosophical knowledge upon which we can build our justifications and criticisms. Thus, philosophical thought not only sheds light upon the path, but also determines which path is justifiable or which paths are justifiable. Not only does philosophical thought enable one to see things more clearly, it also enables one to find those paths which are worth taking.

It is important to note that philosophical thought, as it is thought of in general, is self-critical. For example, a philosopher can raise questions about the nature of justification itself. He can ask, "What about the kinds of argument which are sufficient or necessary to establish that a certain kind of justification has been established?" He can even subject his second-order arguments and conclusions to a further self-criticism. One might say that philosophy sheds light upon the path and that it can even shed light upon the shedding of light upon the path. Philosophy can shed its light on anything, though it can't shed its light on everything at once. If we want people to trust philosophy, then we would do well to bring them to understand this important feature.

Up to this point, I have been arguing for the position that educational philosophy has a valuable contribution to make to educational practice insofar as it helps us become clear about our problems and it helps us to find those paths which are worth taking. In other words, educational philosophy can contribute to the understanding and formulation of educational practice. At this point, one might expect that I would rest my case. After all, someone may say, "You have presented a quite plausible case for the relevance of philosophical thought."

But something is missing. Something has been left out. Although philosophy has something worth contributing to the understanding and the formulation of educational practice, I am not sure that such a contribution is philosophy's most important contribution to educational practice. I believe it is quite plausible to hold that philosophy's greatest contribution to educational practice would come about if the students were to encounter philosophy as <u>part</u> of the curriculum -- if the students were to come, at least in some ways, to think philosophically.

It has become fashionable in some places to say that students should become <u>moral</u> philosophers. Here, I am referring to Kohlberg and his followers. My point is the more general one: Students should become empirical philosophers, aesthetic philosophers, religious philosophers, and philosophers of logic, as well as moral philosophers. To be well educated, a person needs to know about the different forms of knowledge and about the different kinds of experience. He should develop his critical thinking capacities to a high level. I hope it is clear to all that a student should learn something about physical science, aesthetics and literature, and the social sciences. But a student should also view these areas from a philosophical perspective. I suggest to you that teaching students philosophy -- teaching them the philosophical method -- would contribute greatly to the development of the student's understanding of himself and his world and to the development of the student's reasoning powers. Such educational opportunities would enable the student to become clearer about himself and his world and to see things in a new way or in different ways. Such opportunities would help the student to try to find those paths which are most worthwhile. The outcome of such opportunities would be, then, that the student himself would be able to shed light upon the paths worth taking. In a truly democratic society, such outcomes would be highly worthwhile, both for society and for the individual.

Conclusion.

John Dewey is reported to have said that if philosophy is for anything, ... it must shed light upon the path.

I have tried to argue that those who claim that educational philosophy is of no use are wrong. In arguing that such a claim is unfounded, I have suggested that there are several ways in which educational philosophy can contribute to the improvement of educational practice. I have suggested,

therefore, that John Dewey's figurative statement about philosophy shedding light upon the path expresses a truth -- an important truth -- about the relevance of philosophy to educational practice.

One final comment. Our tasks as educational philosophers should include bringing people to understanding and appreciating the relevance of philosophy.

CHAPTER 3.

THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: A RECONSIDERATION.

WILLIAM F. O'NEILL.

Not all philosophers address themselves explicitly to education, therefore much philosophy of education is necessarily a matter of inference and extrapolation based upon relatively "pure" philosophy which makes very little explicit mention of teaching and learning.

What makes inferences from basic philosophical assumptions to specific educational practices possible in many instances is the fact that educational philosophy is implicit in most fully-developed philosophical systems. This relationship might be summarized as follows:

1. What is ultimately good is ultimately right and should therefore be done.

2. That which a society deems right (morally preferable), when viewed in terms of existing conditions, provides the basis for specific moral policies.

3. Specific moral policies, construed in the light of existing conditions, give rise to recommendations for particular moral practices as well as to recommendations for the sort of conditions (including social institutions such as schools) which are designed to preserve and promote such moral practices.

Phrased in somewhat different terms, then, philosophy, when interpreted in the light of existing social conditions, generates prescriptive rules which imply the necessity for certain social controls. Political philosophy is ultimately applied moral philosophy, an ideological rationale for using power to guarantee the establishment and survival of good (moral) behavior within society-at-large. In this sense "government" consists of that system of social controls which exists in order to guarantee the fullest realization of some overriding concept of the general good. Our schools, as merely one institution within government,

are both a product of society and its values and, at the same time, a determinant of society and its values. Like all social institutions, however, the school is basically an agency for social control which exists in order to modify personal behavior. It employs socially-sanctioned power in behalf of socially-sanctioned purposes. Put still differently, then, formal education is one of the conditions (institutions) necessary for effective political control. It acts to shape social behavior at the most basic level of all, by determining whether the next generation will possess the ability and inclination to behave in a manner consonant with dominant political (and therefore moral) purposes. The relationship between moral philosophy, political philosophy and educational philosophy might be outlined as follows:

The Relationship Between Social Ethics and Educational Philosophy.

Value-principles: What is ideal? (What is ultimately good?)

(are basic to)

Moral-principles: What does this imply for the behavior of man in society? (What is ultimately moral?)

(which are, in turn, basic to the establishment of)

Moral policies: What course of action does this system of moral principles imply when viewed in the light of existing conditions? (What is practical?)

(which are fundamental to)

Political policies: What social conditions -- what institutions and what relationship between institutions -- are necessary for such moral policies to be implemented and sustained? (How can morality be institutionalized as a continuing aspect of society-at-large?)

(which is basic to)

Educational policies: What sort of knowledge is necessary and how should such knowledge be imparted to others?

In a similar sense, the same descending level of abstraction can, as indicated earlier, be observed in the relationship between general philosophy and educational philosophy. This relationship might be outlined as follows:

The Relationship Between Philosophy and Philosophy of Education.

Ontology (What is ultimately knowable and how can we know it?)

(encompasses)

Axiology (What is ultimately good?)

(which is fundamental to)

Moral Theory (What is good interpersonal behavior?)

(which is implemented in)

Political Philosophy (What is good social organization?)

(which is partially expressed as)

Educational Philosophy (What knowledge is necessary and how should it be implemented?)

Particular philosophies or systems of philosophy may be either too general or too specific to provide a satisfactory basis for a truly effective philosophy of education.

There are two basic difficulties which can occur in the attempt to trace the educational implications associated with more basic philosophical points of view. One difficulty arises in those cases where there is a clear-cut political philosophy but where this political philosophy is not coherently related to any explicit set of underlying philosophical (and particularly ethical) precepts. In such a case, it is not difficult to draw reasonable inferences about the general sort of education needed on the basis of overall political requirements, but neither the political nor the related educational prescriptions are effectively grounded in any convincing philosophical rationale. In such cases, and while political philosophy is a <u>necessary</u> basis for educational theory, the political philosophy itself does not provide a <u>sufficient</u> foundation for establishing a really compelling set of educational principles.

The other fundamental difficulty arises in the opposite case, where there

is a convincing philosophical base, but where this highly abstract worldview is not sufficiently spelled out to encompass a full consideration of specifically political questions. In this instance, the problem arises primarily from the fact that the philosophy is too abstract, and therefore too vague, to be applied directly to the particular questions of education. In this case it is necessary to make preliminary inferences about the nature of the political philosophy which is implied by the overall philosophical point of view, and then to use the political inferences as a basis for even more extended speculations about schooling. Again, the difficulty is primarily one of ambiguity. Basic philosophical theory is necessary, but, without additional intermediate theory in the area of politics, it is scarcely sufficient for establishing an effective philosophy of education. The sort of inferences which are necessary in order to build a philosophy of education are simply too extended to be convincing.

There is no one-to-one relationship between general philosophy (that is, general "philosophical systems," such as realism or experimentalism) and specific educational practices. The same or similar ethical and social systems occasionally stem from significantly different philosophical first-principles. It is therefore in the realm of social ethics, and particularly in the area of political philosophy (which is the first step toward the formation of specific social action from the more abstract considerations of ethics) that fundamental differences in educational philosophies -- the so-called educational ideologies -- emerge.

The translation from social philosophy to educational philosophy, while predictable, is restricted almost entirely to the more generalized realm of educational policies and does not ordinarily extend to specific educational practices. Phrased somewhat differently, philosophical principles (even at the intermediate level of abstraction represented in social ethics) do carry over into more specific and issues-oriented educational policies, but there is a vast difference between educational policies which serve to channel broad categories of behavior across a wide range of the same and similar situations, and specific educational practices, which describe what is actually done in response to particular problems. It is, for example, virtually impossible to specify how a person will respond to such problems as class size or administrative style merely on the basis of his commitment to this or that set of overall educational policies (assuming, of course, that these sorts of things are not defined as "policy considerations" in the first place). Policies are simply neither that explicit nor that inclusive, and many other variables of an essentially non-philosophical nature also intervene to affect practical responses to specific school situations.

CHAPTER 4.

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: TOWARD AN INTEGRAL VIEW.

ALETA YOU MASTNY.

Educational philosophers, in their search for ultimate truth and reality, have oftentimes failed to recognize the inherent unity that exists among the various philosophical points of view.

The philosophy of Aurobindo Ghose has generally been described as ". . . Integral Non-Dualism or Integral Idealism. It attempts to integrate materialism and idealism, to synthesize science, metaphysics and religion and seeks to understand reality in its undivided entirety. . . ." (1)

In his philosophical schema, Aurobindo (2) postulates an educational theory which seeks to integrate the various aspects of man's nature. It is the contention of this writer that in order for educational philosophy to continue to exist as a viable discipline, it must take into account an integral approach in its study of the nature of man. Therefore, the purpose of this paper will be to discuss Aurobindo's integral educational theory in terms of his aim of education and the five pedagogical areas that he deals with: physical, vital, mental, psychic, and spiritual.

Aim of Education.

According to Aurobindo, "The first principle of true teaching is that nothing can be taught. The teacher is not an instructor or taskmaster; he is a helper and a guide. He does not actually train the pupil's mind, he only shows him how to perfect his instruments of knowledge and helps and encourages in the process." (3)

"The chief aim of education should be to help the growing soul to draw

out that in itself which is best and make it perfect for a noble use." (4)

It is Aurobindo's contention that every person possesses "something divine;" "a chance of perfection and strength in however small a sphere which God offers him to take or refuse." (5) The task of education is to help students discover, develop, and utilize all the powers that exist within.

In order for education to be complete, Aurobindo maintains that it must take into account the following aspects of man's nature.

Physical Education.

The obvious value of including physical education in the curriculum is not a new idea whether one happens to be educated in the southern part of India or in the United States. Aurobindo believes that the ultimate aim of physical education is the total perfection of the human body. (6) The education of the body would involve three principal areas: (a) control and discipline of functions, (b) total and harmonious development of all parts and functions of the body, and (c) correction of defects and deformities if any exist. (7)

"The basic programme will be to build a body, beautiful in form, harmonious in posture, supple and agile in its movements, powerful in its activities and resistant in its health and organic functions." (8)

Vital Education.

According to Aurobindo, another dimension of a person's nature is the vital being. This consists of energy, impulses, desires, passions; indeed, the entire spectrum of one's emotional state.

Two principal goals of vital education are: (a) development and utilization of sense organs, and (b) mastery over and transformation of character. Sensory development and character education are commonly found in many public school systems within the United States. What is especially noteworthy is that sensory education, at least in the

Aurobindian sense, is not confined to the development of five senses. Some ancient forms of mystic knowledge have declared that the number of senses that can be developed is not five but seven and, in certain cases, even twelve. (9)

One can not help but speculate that what is referred to as mystic knowledge may, in actuality, be the area of research known as parapsychology. (10)

In comparison, character education deals with self-analysis and learning by example. According to Aurobindo, the student should be taught to observe within himself all that he wishes to change. Through introspection, substitution, and guidance from the teacher, the student is encouraged to develop a strong will towards progress and perfection. What is necessary is for the existence of ". . . conditions in which the need for outer advice is minimum, and in which the work of change of the students' character is sought by example, presence, influence and inner work on the part of the teachers. The child is expected and allowed to think for himself and act according to what he thinks best; advice is given where needed but nothing is imposed." (11)

Mental Education.

In addition to physical and vital education, Aurobindo maintains that the human mind can be trained to perform "great feats of intellectual strength." (12) Emphasis is placed on the development of concentration, memory, reasoning, comprehension, judgment, imagination, expansion, and synthesis.

For example, in teaching students that there are many ways of reconciling ideas, the suggestion is made that "all contradictories can be transformed into complementaries through the discovery of a higher idea that will be able to harmonise them." (13) This suggestion is reminiscent of Hegel's approach in the formulation of a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The underlying assumption of this procedure is the belief that "every idea contains a little of the truth. But there is no idea which is in itself absolutely true." (14)

Finally, mental education should deal with the development of mental silence, or what Aurobindo refers to as silence from within. The value of inner silence can be found in the following passage:

"When one will have learnt to silence the mind at will and concentrate it in the receptive silence, then there will be no problem that one cannot solve, no mental difficulty to which a solution will not be found. Thought, while in agitation, becomes confused and impotent; in an attentive tranquillity, the light can manifest itself and open new horizons to man's capacity." (15)

The claim can be made that education, as we presently know it, deals with the physical, vital, and mental nature of the child. What, then, makes Aurobindo different from all the other educational philosophers? One can reply that it is his inclusion of and unique way of dealing with psychic and spiritual education.

Psychic Education.

In order to adequately discuss psychic education, a brief description of what is meant by psychic may be in order at this time. Psychic comes from the Greek word psychikos meaning of the soul. For Aurobindo, psychic being refers to the soul which exists in all persons. (16) In Aurobindo's words: "It is that which endures and is imperishable in us from birth to birth untouched by death, decay, or corruption, an indestructible Spark of the Divine." (17)

Aurobindo's psychic being may be compared to the inner guide, the daimon that Socrates spoke of, or the "still small voice" often referred to by mystics. Aldous Huxley, in an essay entitled "Education of an Amphibian," describes a concept of the "not-self" which may be similar to Aurobindo's interpretation of the psychic being.

". . . there is the not-self who inhabits the world from which we derive our insights and inspirations. This is the not-self who spoke to Socrates through his daimon, who dreamed the text of Kubla Khan, who dictated King Lear. . . and the Tibetan Book of the Dead, the not-self who is responsible in all of us for every enhancement of wisdom, every sudden accession of vital or intellectual powers." (18)

What is the goal of Aurobindo's psychic education? The goal of psychic education is to help the child become aware of the psychic "presence" that exists within. More specifically, in ". . . all exceptional beings it is always this consciousness that governs their life. . . . What the human mind does not know and cannot do, this consciousness knows and

does. It is like a light that shines at the centre of the being radiating through the thick coverings of the external consciousness." (19)

The assertion is made that children are often under the influence of their psychic being as demonstrated in their "spontaneous reactions and even in their words." Unfortunately, because parents and teachers are unable to understand the inner promptings of the child, they have a tendency to make children "as unconscious as possible" having them concentrate their attention upon "external things." (20)

What Aurobindo appears to be arguing for is the necessity to turn within and to bring forth all the latent powers that exist in an individual. The principle notion that all knowledge and wisdom lie within is an idea which seeks to realize itself in Aurobindo's paradigm for psychic education.

Spiritual Education.

Before discussing what is meant by spiritual education, a distinction might first be made between religiosity and spirituality.

Religion, as it is commonly practiced today, deals with "intellectual dogmas," ritual, and ceremony. According to Aurobindo, very often religion implies something "remote from earthly life" and "seems to condemn the pursuit of earthly aims as a trend opposed to the turn to a spiritual life. . . ." (21) Another problem with organized religion is its attempt to "universalise and impose" (22) itself upon the beliefs of other people.

Aurobindo argues that often the attempt to make children religious through the teachings of religious textbooks is a "delusion" because "the heart is not the mind and to instruct the mind does not necessarily improve the heart." (23) However, Aurobindo does state that it would be erroneous to conclude that religious teaching has no effect whatsoever. Aurobindo explains that religious teaching may implant "certain seeds of thought" and if these thoughts become habitual, they may influence one's conduct. What Aurobindo appears to be saying is that one should go beyond religion in the traditional sense of the word for ultimately "religion has to be lived, not learned as a creed." (24)

In contrast with religiosity, Aurobindo emphasizes that spirituality is not something over and above life, but is part and parcel of it. In Ideals and Progress Aurobindo states:

"Man also is God and it is through his developing manhood that he approaches the godhead; Life also is the Divine, its progressive expansion is the self-expression of the Brahman, and to deny Life is to diminish the Godhead within us." (25)

While psychic education seeks to assist an individual in realizing and utilizing all the powers that exist within, spiritual education aims at identifying one completely with the psychic being (soul). A spiritual person is one who not only realizes the indwelling God but consciously lives from this unity with the Divine. The Divine is within us, but hidden. It needs to be realized and expressed.

Not only will a complete transformation of man take place, but a gradual transformation of matter, i.e., the material world will take place as well.

"For the true solution of the problem of suffering. . . is a transformation. . . of matter. . . towards perfection, by the creation of a new species that will be in relation to man what man is in relation to the animal and that will manifest upon earth a new force, a new consciousness called supramental education." (26)

A spiritual or a "supramental" education will differ primarily from the other types of education in that the other forms will progress from "below upward through an ascending movement of the different parts of the being." Conversely, spiritual education will be directed "from above downward, its influence spreading from one state of being to another till the final state, the physical is reached." Furthermore, ". . . one can say that the supramental education will result not merely in a progressively developing formation of the human nature, an increasing growth of its latent faculties, but a transformation of the nature itself, a transformation of the being in its entirety, a new ascent of the species above and beyond man towards superman, leading in the end to the appearance of the divine race upon earth." (27)

One can catch a glimpse of what is meant by "divine" in the following passage:

". . . all the knowledge we have to acquire, all the power we have to obtain, all the love we have to become, all the perfection we have to

achieve, all the harmonious and progressive poise we must make manifest in light and joy, all the unknown and new splendours that are to be realised." (28)

The primary goal of spiritual education is to help all persons reach a state of unity with God or "divine supermanhood" according to their own individual natures. Spiritual education is not concerned with the after-life. Rather, it is an attempt made by Aurobindo to help man develop his spiritual nature and thus contribute to the transformation of the material world into a "divine heaven on earth."

Conclusion.

The need for an integral educational philosophy, as espoused by Aurobindo, is largely lacking in the public school system within the United States. There are several reasons for this.

In the area of psychic and spiritual development public education is clearly deficient. Perhaps the main difficulty is that within the minds of many people is the erroneous equation that is commonly made between spirituality and religiosity. As Aurobindo pointed out, there are distinct differences between the two modes of thought. These differences need to be expounded if psychic or spiritual education is to ever be taken seriously in the United States.

Also, the First Amendment in the United States Constitution represents, for many, the implication that concern for the psychic or spiritual nature of the child has no place in the public schools. The claim can be made that any emphasis placed on psychic or spiritual development is too "mystical" and controversial in nature and is, therefore, not within the domain of public education.

Finally, Aurobindo's education philosophy represents an integral part of the Sri Aurobindo Ashram and Auroville, (29) an experimental spiritual community currently under construction in Pondicherry, India. The idea of merging education with life is an aim that the ashram and Auroville are striving to realize. Aurobindo's spiritual community represents an ideal environment where his principles are put into practice. However, one might ask if these principles can be successfully realized in the United States where there is no overwhelming urge on the part of the population to achieve a spiritual transformation much less a "divine life

on earth?" Can the goals of a spiritually oriented philosophy be successfully adapted to a society whose goals are primarily utilitarian in nature?

These, then, are the problems and questions we need to address ourselves to if we are to open new vistas into the nature of man and his very purpose for existence. The task of educational philosophers is not an enviable one. Not only do we analyze, synthesize and question, but we must also be willing to investigate the various dimensions of man and help "point the way" to which education can best fulfill and develop those hitherto unexplored areas.

Documentations.

1. K. Damodaran, Indian Thought A Critical Survey (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967), p. 402.

2. Although Aurobindo is not as well known as some of his Indian contemporaries such as Tagore, Gandhi, or Radhakrishnan, Robert McDermott states that:

"More than any figure of modern India, Sri Aurobindo dramatically exemplifies the ideal blending of social-political activism and spiritual discipline. In addition to rivaling the aesthetic creativity of the poet Tagore, the social and moral achievement of Gandhi, and the philosophical accomplishment of Radhakrishnan, Sri Aurobindo stands out as the single most accomplished yogi of modern India."

The Essential Aurobindo, ed. Robert McDermott (New York: Schocken Books, 1973), p. 3.

3. Aurobindo Ghose, A System of National Education (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1948), p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 5.

5. Ibid.

6. Aurobindo Ghose and the Mother, On Physical Education (Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1967), p. 5.

27.

7. Kireet Joshi, "Research in Education at the Sri Aurobindo Ashram," International Centre of Education at the Sri Aurobindo Ashram (Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education, 1968), p. 84.

8. Pranab Kumar Bhattacharya, "The Role of Physical Education in the Sri Aurobindo Ashram," International Centre of Education at the Sri Aurobindo Ashram (Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education, 1968), pp. 174-175.

9. Ghose and the Mother, On Education (Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1966), p. 64.

10. For a general overview of current research in parapsychology, see J. B. Rhine, ed., Progress in Parapsychology (Durham, North Carolina: The Parapsychology Press, 1971). Some informative background information on the parapsychology movement is provided by John L. Randall, Parapsychology and The Nature of Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

11. Joshi, "Research in Education at the Sri Aurobindo Ashram," p. 83.

12. Ghose and the Mother, On Education, p. 11.

13. Ibid., p. 69.

14. Ibid., p. 90.

15. Ibid., p. 71.

16. Ghose, The Life Divine, Vol. I (Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1973), p. 227.

17. Ibid., p. 225.

18. Aldous Huxley, Tomorrow and Tomorrow and Tomorrow and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 10.

19. Ghose and the Mother, On Education, p. 72.

20. Ibid. See also Samuel H. Young, Psychic Children (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1977) for case histories of children exhibiting psychic abilities. Young suggests how parents and teachers might better cope with psychic ability in children.

28.

21. Ghose, The Human Cycle/The Ideal of Human Unity/War and Self-Determination (Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1971), p. 167.

22. Ibid., p. 249.

23. Ghose and the Mother, On Education, p. 16.

24. Ibid., p. 18.

25. Ghose, Ideals and Progress (Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1966), pp. 47-48.

26. Ghose and the Mother, On Education, p. 78.

27. Ibid., p. 79.

28. The Mother, "This is What We Mean By Divine," Collaboration, I, 3 (Spring, 1975), p. 8.

29. A resolution inviting support for Auroville was unanimously passed at the Fifteenth General Conference of UNESCO held in Paris during October and November of 1968. The Mother states:

"Auroville wants to be a universal town where men and women of all countries are able to live in peace and progressive harmony, above all creeds, all politics and all nationalities. The purpose of Auroville is to realise human unity."

Auroville -- The City The Earth Needs (Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo Society, 1973), p. 31. It may be noted that Auroville is striving to realize this unity in terms of diversity rather than uniformity.

CHAPTER 5.

THE LEARNING OF PHILOSOPHY BY CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND ADULTS: AN APPROACH TO THE COUNTERACTION OF APATHY TOWARD PHILOSOPHY.

JAMES JOHN JELINEK.

In his Dictionary of Philosophy A. R. Lacey (1:179), Professor of Philosophy, University of London, states, "An embarrassment for the professional philosopher is that he cannot produce any succinct, or even agreed (upon), definition of his profession." In these terms it is no small wonder that many lay and professional persons, including many students, teachers, administrators, board members, and legislators are apathetic about philosophy or profess disdain for philosophical discourse.

This apathy/disdain for philosophy is all the more incredible on the grounds that decisions of all individuals -- be they decisions of children, youth, or adults -- one way or another are inherent in ontology, epistemology, and/or axiology, the very substance of the philosophical enterprise.

Frank Barron (2:147) points out, "The word 'crisis' is Greek in origin, and in that language its primary meaning is 'decision.' In medical pathology, a crisis is that point in the course of a disease at which a decisive change occurs, leading either to recovery or to death. In general a crisis is a turning point, the end of one epoch and the beginning of another." A crisis in belief, then, is a point in the course of individual development at which the person must decide for himself whether the picture he has been given of the nature of the world, in part or in whole, is a true one. (3:1-13) It is the point at which one is called upon to think for himself about the important matters of ontology, epistemology, and axiology -- of such characteristics of the universe as ethics, space, time, causality, and freedom. It is the time of decision about the meaning of life, the existence of God, the elements of moral law, the place of man in nature, the freedom of the individual will, and all the other great problems with which philosophy deals. Whether or not we are philosophers, if we are human we must have a philosophy. Individuals demand that experience be accounted for; the need for things

to be intelligible is a basic human need. (4:17-24) "Thus we are all, willy-nilly, philosophers of a sort, in the sense that we tell ourselves one story or another about most of the enduring issues with which systematic philosophy deals, and without which we cannot face life with any sense that it has meaning and worth." (5:65-83)

It is thus not a question of philosophy or no philosophy. Each person does have a philosophy. Denial simply means one will not look at it. The question then becomes one of whether an individual will be content with a philosophy he just happens to have or whether he will identify it, study it, and try to improve it. (6:passim)

Because so many individuals consider philosophy to be a matter of complex and abstruse reasoning there is before us the question of when to begin this identification, study, and improvement of one's philosophy. The fact of the matter is that "crises in beliefs" do not and need not occur at any special age, and in fact do not and need not occur very conspicuously at all.

Any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child, youth, or adult at any stage of development. At each stage of development the child, youth, or the adult has characteristic ways of viewing the world and explaining it to himself. The task of teaching a subject to a person at any particular age is one of representing the structure of that subject in terms of the person's way of viewing things. As Jerome S. Bruner (8:33) points out, "The task can be thought of as one of translation."

What, then, is philosophy and how is it to be translated? Philosophers of old were so preoccupied with the puzzles of epistemology and the disputes between realist and idealist, between phenomenologist and absolutist, that even many present-day philosophers are at a loss to know what would be left to philosophy if there were removed both the metaphysical task of distinguishing between noumenal and phenomenal worlds and the epistemological task of telling how a separate subject can know an independent object. But would not the elimination of these traditional tasks make it possible for philosophy to devote itself to more fruitful and needed tasks? (9:passim)

Indeed it would and does. The new, changed conception of philosophy is that the central problems of philosophy, although not all problems of philosophy, turn around the analysis of critical discussion. "The peculiarity of philosophy as a form of critical discussion, states John Passmore (10:221), lies in its being a critical discussion of critical

discussion. As John Dewey (11:359) (12:passim), put it, philosophy is the habit of mind in the exercise of which one tends not to take for granted the conventional and customary, but always to see and analyse possible alternative solutions to problems. The peculiarities of philosophy apply not to one but rather any area of human affairs -- politics, economics, religion, sex, education, or whatever, including, of course, any academic area -- physical science, social science, humanities, and the like. There are certain recurrent ideas that appear in virtually all branches of knowledge. If in one subject one has learned them well and generally, then that achievement makes the task of learning them again in different form elsewhere much easier. This is heurism at work. That things are connected and not isolated, that things mean their consequences, that there is multiple determination of events in the physical and social world, that understanding basic hypotheses and principles makes a subject more comprehensible, are all examples of the heuristic approach. Philosophy can be presented effectively and excitingly, even in the early grades, in this heuristic manner.

As we have pointed out a "crisis in belief" is a point at which the person must decide for himself whether the picture he has been given of the nature of the world, in whole or in part, is a true one. It is the point at which one is called upon to think for himself about some important aspect of ontology, epistemology, and/or axiology. It is the point at which, wittingly or unwittingly, one enters the realm of philosophy. On the basis of this "crisis in belief" one approach in the philosophic enterprise would be, first, to identify the problem at hand, second, to identify the issue inherent in the problem, and third, to resolve the issue and solve the problem. (13:passim)

At the professional stage of development, presumably the highest stage of development, the following would be involved in this three-step philosophic approach:

The Formulation of Problems. A problem is a question that asks what relationship exists between two or more variables. In these terms the characteristics of a problem are as follows -- (a) It is a question, an interrogative sentence. (b) It asks what relationship exists between two or more variables: "Is A related to B?" "How are A and B related to C?" "Is A related to B under conditions C and D?" (c) It is stated in observable terms. (d) It is descriptive, not valuational. (e) It is stated in the present tense. (f) It is stated in the third person. (g) It is stated in the general sense, usually applying to more than one situation. Examples of problems are as follows -- (a) What are the effects of different types of incentives on individual behavior?

(b) What is the effect of learning-how-to-learn on learning in new situations? (c) What are the effects of parents' comments on children's personality development? (14:3-30)

The Formulation of Issues. An issue postulates alternative solutions to a problem. The characteristics of an issue are as follows -- (a) It is constructed in the form of a question. (b) It is valuational in nature, as expressed by way of the concept of "should," "ought," "must," and so on. (c) It identifies distinctive alternatives to the solution of a problem. (d) It is resolved by way of hypotheses/principles used in the acceptance, rejection, and/or modification of each of its alternatives. Examples of issues are as follows -- (a) With respect to purpose, content, method of instruction, and means of evaluation, should the curriculum of the schools be designed (i) to transmit the culture of the school community, and/or (ii) to change the culture of the school community? (b) Should the basis of educational authority in curriculum building be (i) divine will, (ii) eternal truth, (iii) science, and/or (iv) society -- government, society, culture? (15:22-23)

The Formulation of Hypotheses/Principles. An hypothesis/principle is a statement of the relationship between two or more variables. In effect it answers questions like the following -- (a) "Is A related to B?" (b) "How are A and B related to C?" (c) "Is A related to B under conditions C and D?" The characteristics of an hypothesis/principle are as follows -- (a) It is a declarative sentence. (b) It identifies an action and the consequence of that action. (c) It establishes a relationship of "If . . . (action) . . ., then . . . (consequence) . . . " (d) It is stated in behavioral terms. (e) It is descriptive, not valuational. (f) It is stated in the present tense. (g) It is stated in the third person. (h) It is stated in the general sense, usually applying to more than one situation. Examples of hypotheses/principles are as follows -- (a) If there is reconstructed practice in a mental function, then there is an effect on the future learning of that mental function. (b) If a group consists of upper-class, middle-class, and lower-class children, then the middle-class more often than the upper-class and lower-class children avoid finger painting. (16:35-39)

An Example of a Philosophical Analysis. The following is an abridged example of a philosophical analysis of a professional problem in the field of curriculum development as presented by a graduate student in a professional education program:

Joe Doe. (17:24-30)

33.

The Formulation and Resolution of an Issue in the Area of Patterns of Curriculum Development: A Philosophical Approach.

The Problem. The problem I formulated in the area of "Patterns of Curriculum Development" is, What is the effect of the organization of the content of instruction upon the learning of pupils in the public schools?

The Issue Inherent in the Problem. The issue I identified as being inherent in the problem is, Should public schools opt for (a) the subject curriculum, (b) the activity curriculum, and/or (c) the core curriculum?

Readings, Activities, and Observations Related to the Problem and the Issue. The following readings, activities, and observations were instrumental in my formulation of the problem and my identification and resolution of the issue:

1. Franklin Bobbitt, How to Make a Curriculum, Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1924, 843 pages.

2. William Heard Kilpatrick, Education and the Social Crisis, Liveright, New York, 1932, pages 580, 782, and 795.

3. Theodore Brameld, "Curriculum Designs for Schools of the People," Chapters 8 and 9, in Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of Education, The Dryden Press, New York, 1956.

4. To Sir, With Love, Television Movie, Columbia Broadcasting System, October 4, 1970.

5. Robert L. Brackenbury, "The Teaching of Values," an address presented to The John Dewey Society at Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, September 4, 1970.

. . .

The Resolution of the Issue. Although I know I will need to do much more thinking and studying about the issue in my professional work, if I were to attempt to resolve it at this time I would do it as follows:

I. The alternative of the subject curriculum pattern should be rejected on the basis of the following principles: (A) If the center of orientation is a refined system of the academic disciplines of the world of adults, then (a) the present experience of the learner is subordinated

to organized societal experience, (b) the characteristics of personality growth such as creativeness, cooperativeness, social sensitivity, tolerance, and the ability to think reflectively are not developed. (B) If subject matter is organized and classified with the aim of explanation, then (a) . . . , (b) . . . , (c) . . .

II. The alternative of the activity curriculum should be rejected on the basis of the following principles: (A) . . . , (B) . . . , (C) . . .

III. The alternative of the core curriculum should be modified on the basis of the following principles: (A) . . . , (B) . . . , (C) . . .

From this example it can be observed that the student studies the points of view of those individuals who believe in earnest each of the alternatives of the issue, each possible alternative solution to the problem, as well as any alternatives he formulates on his own. Also, the independent variables he states in his hypotheses/principles identify the actions inherent in the alternatives and the dependent variables identify his perceptions of the consequences of those actions.

From this example it can also be noted that the approach emphasizes the role of structure in learning philosophy and how structure is made central in teaching. As Jerome S. Bruner (18:11) (19:50-62) points out, such an approach is a "practical one. Students, perforce, have a limited exposure to the materials they are to learn. How can this exposure be made to count in their thinking for the rest of their lives? The dominant view among men who have been engaged in preparing and teaching new curricula is that the answer to this question lies in giving students an understanding of the fundamental structure of whatever subjects we choose to teach. This is a minimum requirement for using knowledge, for bringing it to bear on problems and events one encounters outside a classroom or in classrooms one enters later in one's education. The teaching and learning of structure, rather than simply the mastery of facts and techniques, is at the center of the classic problem of transfer."

The purpose of learning, over and beyond the immediate satisfaction it might give, is that it serves us in the future. Learning not only takes us somewhere, but it allows us later to go further more easily. (20:passim) There are two ways in which learning serves the future: First, there is the phenomenon of specific transfer of learning in which there is specific applicability to tasks that are highly similar to those we originally learned to perform. Second, there is the phenomenon of nonspecific transfer, the transfer of principles and attitudes, which consists of learning initially a general idea that can then be used as a basis for recognizing subsequent problems as special cases of the idea originally

mastered. This type of transfer is at the heart of the educational process -- the continual broadening and deepening of knowledge in terms of basic and general ideas.

Thus, when pupils learn the structure of philosophy at the very outset of their concrete-operations stage of development as well as subsequent stages of development, they view it as something that has wide and powerful applicability, rather than something that is abstruse, dull, and useless.

Because philosophy is conventionally taught in the upper levels of a college curriculum, no doubt some, perhaps many, individuals will object to this approach. Be that as it may, David Page (21:34-40), a most experienced teacher, has this to say: "In teaching from kindergarten to graduate school, I have been amazed at the intellectual similarity of human beings at all ages, although children are perhaps more spontaneous, creative, and energetic than adults. As far as I am concerned young children learn almost anything faster than adults do if it can be given to them in terms they understand. Giving material to them in terms they understand, interestingly enough, turns out to involve knowing the (subject) oneself, and the better one knows it, the better it can be taught. It is appropriate that we warn ourselves to be careful assigning an absolute level of difficulty to any particular topic. When I tell mathematicians that fourth-grade students can go a long way into 'set theory' a few of them reply: 'Of course.' Most of them are startled. The latter ones are completely wrong in assuming that set theory is intrinsically difficult. Of course it may be that nothing is intrinsically difficult. We just have to wait until the proper point of view and corresponding language for presenting it are revealed. Given particular subject matter or a particular concept, it is easy to ask trivial questions or to lead the child to ask trivial questions. It is also easy to ask impossibly difficult questions. The trick is to find medium questions that can be answered and that can take you somewhere. This is the big job of teachers and textbooks." One leads the child, then, by well-stated "medium questions" to move more rapidly through the stages of intellectual development -- to a deeper understanding of philosophical hypotheses/ principles.

If one respects the ways of thought of the growing child, if one translates material in terms of the child's perceptions of the world and in terms challenging enough to tempt him to advance, then it is possible to introduce him at an early age to the ideas and lifestyles that in the present and in later life make an educated, philosophical person -- one who does not take for granted the conventional and customary but

analyzes possible alternative solutions to problems that prevail in any area of human affairs.

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CHAPTER 6.

ONE RESPONSE TO CULTURAL PLURALISM (1).

ROBERT L. BRACKENBURY.

A word about the rationale for this paper. Dr. John Connely, President of FWPES, has challenged us to demonstrate the usefulness of educational philosophy. Despite the unscholarly nature of such a call (scholars analyze problems, not solve them), the message has its appeal and this paper is an attempt to shed "light upon the path."

Whether or not light is shed is open to argument, but there can be little doubt that the path is well traveled. "Cultural pluralism" is of increasing concern to educators. Books are written on the subject, complete issues of professional journals are being devoted to it, and textbooks in Philosophy of Education contain chapters about it. A good deal of attention was devoted to the subject at the last annual FWPES meeting and "Cultural Pluralism -- A World View" was the theme of the Western Region Comparative and International Education Conference held in San Diego only six weeks ago.

It would seem, however, that "cultural pluralism," like the weather, is a topic about which people do little but talk. There seems to be substantial agreement that the schools are no longer justified, if indeed they ever were, in imposing a WASP life-style on our multi-cultured society. But there seems to be little agreement on what the schools should be doing.

Consequently, it is hoped that this paper on "One Response to Cultural Pluralism" is both practical and timely.

Men have long recognized that good comes with the bad for "Every cloud has its silver lining" and "It's an ill wind that blows no good." Even man's ultimate immorality, war, brings its benefits. What is not so generally recognized is that the reverse is equally true. Yet every blessing has its curse -- or at least its price.

The Trap.

The invention of writing has long been hailed as an unmitigated boon to mankind since it enables man to transcend his immediate environment and speak to his fellowman across distance and time. Fairly recently, however, some of the more insightful students of language have pointed out that this invention also "freezes" thought, increasing the likelihood of distortion and misunderstanding. Likewise with learning, educators have long recognized that the young acquire the language and skills, the habits and beliefs of the group into which they are born as indeed they must if they are to survive as human beings. Scholars refer to the process by such names as acculturation and socialization. Once again, however, some of the more thoughtful students of language and learning point out that the process, necessary as it is, also encapsulates the young in a cultural cocoon which prevents them from perceiving the world save through their particular perspective.

While it is hardly flattering to man to compare his offspring to a (silk) worm, the analogy has its usefulness.

The Worm.

At a stage in their development, the larvae of silkworms spin their cocoons. They begin by first making an outer network known as the 'floss' and then winding the silk around their bodies. A single insect may produce from 2,000 to 3,000 feet of silk which completely encapsulates it. From fifteen to twenty days after the chrysalis has been formed, the insect emerges and lays its eggs. This emergence is necessary if the insect is to survive and propagate.

The Child.

In a like manner, human infants are born into a world of "buzzing, booming confusion," if William James' characterization is correct. To make any sense of such a world, the young must learn the speech and the

ways of the parents. Such development is quite natural and by the time the human infant reaches adulthood, his cultural cocoon not only has a 'floss' of beliefs to which his insights are fastened, but he may be almost as completely encapsulated as the silkworm. The use of labels such as 'middle class,' 'Mexican-American,' or 'Wasp' suggest the nature and extent of the encapsulation.

A silkworm must break out of its cocoon if it is to survive. A parallel need for de-encapsulation on the part of the human infant has not been so generally recognized. While it can hardly be maintained that de-encapsulation is necessary for the physical survival of man, it is the thesis of this paper that it is a great benefit to those individuals who undergo it and it is essential to the cultural progress of a social order.

The Sting.

Unfortunately, a great many human beings never really experience de-encapsulation and thus cannot know the benefits thereof. Those who do experience the phenomenon generally accomplish the feat much like the silkworm, without benefit of planning, and thus the entire matter is left to chance. Anyone who has suddenly found himself abroad in a culture about which he knows little and with which he is ill-prepared to cope is well acquainted with "cultural shock." But if the person remains in his new, strange culture long enough and if he is psychologically secure enough to be open to new ways of doing things, he may slowly come to understand and appreciate a different life-style. In time he begins to suspect the new culture is neither ridiculous nor absurd but simply different from the one he previously knew. When he reaches the point of realizing that the new culture truly makes sense -- i.e., that it provides patterns of language, values, dogmas, rituals, symbols, skills, folkways and mores which enable human beings to survive, multiply and enjoy life -- he may be said to be de-encapsulated. Whether he still prefers his old ways, becomes bi-cultural, or adopts his new life-style and becomes an ex-patriot is another matter. The point is, he has broken out of his old cultural cocoon and come to view the world through a fundamentally different perspective.

A less dramatic though equally valid example of de-encapsulation might be that of the preacher's son who goes off to college in the big city and discovers a world far apart from that which he left but one that intrigues and beguiles him. As he indulges himself in his newly discovered behavior

patterns he comes to realize that some people do not attend church twice on Sunday and that hymns are not the only songs to be sung. Whether he opts for the new way of life or whether, like the prodigal son, he returns to his father's life-style is again not the point of concern here. What is to be noted is that he has, for a period of time at least, come to the realization that there is more than one way to interact with the universe and this realization inevitably has its liberating impact.

The Problem.

The discerning reader has noted that the phenomenon of de-encapsulation (a) is accompanied by an emotional state that is disquieting or unpleasant, (b) is not one that parents or the public would likely embrace as an objective of education -- at least not upon their first exposure to it, and (c) occurs almost invariably without having been planned or sought.

Anyone who has experienced the anguish of culture shock well remembers its accompanying emotional state. Home-sickness and diarrhea, inability to communicate, housing and transportation problems, and a host of minor irritations soon has one longing to return to a land where the world makes sense. In the case of the adolescent who goes off to college, the emotional state accompanying the slower process may be only mildly discomforting as the elation of freedom and discovery is permeated with feelings of guilt. But even in college the experience can be quite traumatic if it leads one to break with his religious tradition and alienate his entire family. Such a person undergoes a threat to the core of his existence for the very fibers of his being seem to come unglued. It may well be that such an experience is what Aristotle had in mind when he declared that learning is painful. (2)

Most parents strive to provide their children the best and most wholesome environment they can and consequently, it is understandable that they seldom appreciate a college or university offering alternative life-styles to their offspring. In a similar way, the public at large regards the primary task of the school that of perpetuating the existing, dominant culture. After all, society establishes formal educational institutions for precisely this purpose. Thus, de-encapsulation is not an educational objective the value of which is readily recognized.

Moreover, when the phenomenon does occur, it occurs only by chance. No

one ever consciously sets out to experience culture shock and parents seldom, if ever, intentionally send their progeny off to college to acquire better values. Thus, it is understandable that since de-encapsulation is an unpleasant process to undergo and since it is not a consciously desired goal, most people are willing to leave it to chance. The only viable defense for change comes from those who have reflected upon the values inherent in the experience.

The Testimony.

Almost universally, those who have undergone the phenomenon are happy, in retrospect, to have experienced it. John Ciardi, the poetry editor of the Saturday Review, once reflected upon his own childhood as the son of Italian, immigrant peasants and concluded that

"I, for one, do not know how to live without more questions than I shall ever have answers for. And to the extent that I can believe my questions have encompassed the answers of those (in whose world I was reared) and gone beyond them to questions (they) have not come upon -- to that extent I am bound to believe I have outtraveled them, and that my life has been better experienced than theirs." (3)

So it is with others who have experienced de-encapsulation. The process may have been so painful that the person does not want to repeat it, but invariably after a period of time he feels his life has been better traveled than it otherwise would have been. He recognizes it as an essential stage through which he had to go in order to become fully aware of his egocentric predicament. For an encapsulated man may become intellectually aware that he is the center of the universe he knows and he may even recognize that what he knows is refracted by his own biases, but only the de-encapsulated person can experientially understand what it means to be encapsulated. A man must escape his cultural cocoon to fully understand its limiting and restricting impact.

Others have attested to the value of de-encapsulation though they have called it by different names. John Dewey once wrote, "It is the office of the school environment . . . . to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born." (4) In an interview reported in the Los Angeles Times a few years back, Carl Menninger was quoted as saying he always tried to achieve a "universality of perspectives." But perhaps the popular novelist, Kurt

Vonnegut, said it best when, in explaining his attempt to write a manual for small children called Welcome to Earth, he said

"One thing I would really like to tell (children) about is cultural relativity. I didn't learn until I was in college about all the other cultures, and I should have learned that in the first grade. A first grader should understand that his or her culture isn't a rational invention; that there are thousands of other cultures and they all work pretty well; that all cultures function on faith rather than truth; that there are lots of alternatives to our own society."

The Proposal.

Since those who experience de-encapsulation acknowledge, each in his own way, the value of the experience, it seems unconscionable that its attainment should be left to chance. Hence, the basic thesis of this paper is de-encapsulation should become an essential objective of all general and liberal education.

The Solution?

What our schools and colleges might do were they intentionally to promote de-encapsulation as an objective of education can only here be suggested. Perhaps it would be helpful to look first at some practices and procedures that are not uncommon in our schools. In the not too distant past nearly all schools, and even today a great many schools, have a textbook in social studies and history classes. Thus, the great majority of our students get exposure to an event like the War Between the States from only one perspective. The author of this paper has frequently taken informal polls in his graduate courses and asked, "How many have studied the Civil War from a textbook written by a Northerner and also from one written by a Southerner?" Only ten to twenty per cent generally indicate they have had such an experience and of these, many admit they have had the experience because they moved from one region to the other between the times they studied the event. What a sad commentary upon our pedagogical practices.

Whoever puts pen to paper writes of himself and we should teach the young

that however worthy objectivity is as a goal, its attainment is another matter. No textbook is unbiased even if it is a dull chronology, but we seldom teach this truth effectively. Even students in a graduate course in the History of Education are often unaware of this fact. Towards the close of a lesson on the Reformation the author once asked his students, "What are the religious biases of the authors of the textbook?" In a class of eleven, not one student was able to detect any bias. So the course outline was immediately amended and a new assignment made for the following week. Each student was told to read an account of the Reformation written by a Catholic scholar. The effect was electrifying for the following week students were saying such things as, "Why it didn't read like an account of the same period of time," "they didn't talk about the same things," and "maybe the authors of our textbook were not so objective as we thought." In brief, they began to suspect that what they thought was objectivity was little more than the fact that they and the authors of their textbook shared the same 'Wasp' encapsulation.

Implicit in these observations, of course, are suggestions for remedy. Socio-dramas, mock-assemblies, role-playing, projective techniques and a host of similar methodological approaches can be employed to involve the emotions along with the intellect in de-encapsulating experiences. Why should not the problems in the social sciences be consistently viewed from a multiplicity of perspectives? Whether it is a civil rights issue or one pertaining to this country's dependency upon OPEC nations for a large proportion of its oil, there is nothing unwise or unpatriotic about asking students to explore it from more than one point of view. And explore it in an empathetic way. Might it not make sense to assign each student a perspective quite different from his own and ask him, perhaps for an entire semester, to immerse himself in that point of view in order to learn to perceive the world in another light? Instead of asking a student to write an unbiased or objective analysis of some situation, why not ask him to write a paper on how Saudi, Arabia, Russia or Standard Oil might react to a President's speech pertaining to proposals for national self-sufficiency.

It is recognized, of course, that actually living in a different cultural setting is far superior to 'pretending' and a few schools have tried programs based upon this realization. (5) It is recognized, however, that such programs are difficult to arrange and that they are not without their dangers. The proposal advanced here is one that any school can adopt for it costs little more to buy six sets of five textbooks each than to buy thirty copies of one textbook. It will require effort to select textbooks and other resource material with genuinely divergent biases and to plan learning experiences that truly involve students in different frames of

reference or life styles, but the energy and ingenuity of teachers are most certainly up to the task once teachers are sold on the objective and given a facilitating climate within which to work.

The Benefits.

What benefits might result from the attainment of de-encapsulation? What advantage has a person who has achieved 'meta-encapsulation' over one who has simply enlarged upon his initial encapsulation? It seems reasonable to expect both personal and social gains.

The individual who has experienced the process of de-encapsulation should be able to recognize his own biases as well as those of others for what they are. Such a person would not necessarily refrain from making judgments -- for indeed life requires us to judge -- but he would first seek to understand. (6)

It has often been said that the liberally educated person can discuss his differences with others without getting mad. Surely it seems reasonable to expect such an achievement from one whose education has taught him that differences in perspective make difficult the task of agreement, even on what constitutes facts, and that differences in perspectives are generally arbitrary.

Consequently, de-encapsulation should help us overcome the tyranny of ideologies for there is usually one or more ideologies hidden within every cultural cocoon that encapsulates men and it is these ideologies that enable euphemisms to be employed. We welcome the news that 134 Vietnamese 'Reds' are casualties rather than deplore the news that 134 human beings are destroyed in a brutal fashion. 'De-foliation' is acceptable since we see it as removing the cover under which an enemy can hide rather than as rendering poisonous and useless fields essential to the livelihood of a people who never caused us problems or posed a threat to our way of life.

Thus, in addition to personal gains, there are social benefits that would accrue were de-encapsulation more frequently achieved. For in the world of tomorrow, it seems very likely that force and power will less frequently "solve" world problems. Rather, the realization may slowly come that lasting solutions will only be achieved when the legitimacy of various interests are recognized and taken into account. And varying interests are legitimate precisely because they emerge from cultural contexts whose

differences are arbitrary, not rational. Such a day of realization may not arrive tomorrow or even in our lifetime, but arrive it must or man must go.

Epilogue.

The author has taken over a dozen pages to state what the late Robert Hutchins once put into a single sentence -- namely, it is the task of the schools to make children as unlike their parents as possible. Hutchins said it better. The author's only excuse is that he attempted to explain why.

Documentations.

1. Some parts of this paper are similar to sections of an article recently submitted to the Journal of Phi Kappa Phi under the title of "Meta-Encapsulation As A Goal Of Liberal Education."

2. This Aristotelian insight long baffled the author since his experience led him to regard most learning as generally pleasant and he would even agree with George Leonard that learning out-of-school brings, at times, moments of ecstasy.

3. John Ciardi, "The Courage of His Confusions," The Saturday Review. June 2, 1962, p. 9.

4. Dewey, John, Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 24.

5. One school system in Southern California arranged exchanges which brought Mexican children to this country for a short period of time during which they lived in American homes and attended school. In a similar manner, American children went to Mexico and experienced Mexican home life and schooling. The Human Relations Council in another Southern California community arranged for exchanges of children from White families in its community and children of Black families in a nearby town during summer months.

6. Understanding does not replace judging, but the de-encapsulated man should more clearly realize what is involved in judging -- namely, that every judgment involves a self-judgment. A popular sports columnist, Jim Murray, once wrote that every woman was a dame to Leo Durocher, but to Walter Alston every woman was a lady. Clearly, Murray was intending to tell his readers more about Durocher and Alston than he was about the class of women with whom they associated.

CHAPTER 7.

MAURICE FRIEDMAN'S TOUCHSTONES AND EDUCATION.

DONALD S. SECKINGER.

Maurice Friedman stands his own ground as a freely choosing philosopher of dialogue who speaks to us for the most part indirectly, as interpreter of literature, philosophy, and religious experience. His beautiful and complex treatment of Buber's thought in Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, (1) marks him in Buber's own view as one of the few persons able, in some degree, to make some sense out of the rich and tangled growth of Buber's thought for English speaking readers.

Again, in his literary studies, the intensive Problematic Rebel: Melville, Dostoievsky, Kafka, Camus (2) and the very extensive To Deny Our Nothingness: Contemporary Images of Man (3) -- in both of these he exemplifies the dialogical approach of evoking through their own works and words the meanings authors disclose through lived experiences. He takes a stance, of course, an active stance in terms of the authors' carrying out intentions, and he does not hesitate to judge the success of their endeavors on their own terms. Yet he leaves the reader quite free to make his or her own interpretations, to disagree and contend seriously with himself as author in dialogue with each of us.

On these terms, it becomes extremely difficult to encounter and to tease out for education the prime meanings of his philosophy of dialogue. We know he stands in the tradition of Buber, Marcel, and to some extent the later Camus but, unlike his most influential mentor Buber, he has not as yet written directly on education. We do have his indirect commentaries, but these could mislead us if we fail to encounter him as a person on his unique life's way. Thus it becomes critically important to enter the life of Maurice Friedman in the most personal way open to us, by means of his intellectual autobiography and testament Touchstones of Reality. (4)

Why touchstones? Why not principles, guidelines, absolutes, metaphysical system building? Why not, indeed, in a life turned toward the comparative study of religious experience a psychological or theological treatise on

the psychic mechanisms or logical proofs of belief? All of these approaches or methods of inquiry and analysis Friedman rejects in favor of his touchstones:

"What modern man needs is not 'faith' in the traditional sense of that term but a life-stance -- a ground on which to stand and from which to go out to meet the ever changing realities and absurdities of a techtronic age. Touchstones of reality have to do above all with our life-stance -- with that personal and social ground that might enable us to withstand bureaucratization and surveillance -- the innumerable incursions of military, industrial, ecological, economic, and political forces into our personal lives." (5)

At the same time that he offers us a witness to his own personal journey along the way, Friedman does not presume to prescribe this as a model of wisdom for all persons. He is one person, present in and to the human problematic as it has compounded itself since his coming of age on the threshold of the Second World War. He has and continues to encounter his touchstones, decisive experiences of persons, events, philosophical studies, moral choices, as he lives his way through the shattering middle and later years of our century. In the same sense that his mentor Martin Buber lived seriously, faithfully, decisively through two World Wars, from intellectual leader in Germany to educational pioneer in Palestine and Israel to gadfly-scholar at the meeting ground of the traditional and the present moment -- so has Friedman been reared and made in the uniqueness of his responses to the inevitabilities of moral actions and their consequences.

In a previous essay, "Martin Buber and the One-Sided Dialogical Relation," as well as in my "The Buber-Rogers Dialogue: Theory Confirmed in Experience," I pointed out the risks and paradoxically the necessity to be present to one's personal encounters. (6) So with Friedman as with Buber and Rogers and any person confronted with choice, there has been anxiety and pain and a turning both more deeply inward and more sincerely outward in the interhuman. In Friedman's case, he was born into a comfortable Reform Jewish family in the American southwest in 1920, reared with both a secular and worldly public education that led on to a Harvard scholarship, and uprooted -- as have been so many of us -- from the traditions of his ancestors. No matter what the religion or ethnic group from which we may have come, some generations back, we can certainly identify with his version of the culturally displaced American:

"When I went to Reform Jewish Sunday School in Tulsa, I learned much Jewish history and legend and took to heart the predominantly moral

emphasis of Reform Judaism of the 1930s. But I learned almost nothing of traditional Rabbinic Judaism or of the mitzvot (commandments) and observances that made up the life of my Hasidic grandfather in Lithuania." (7)

It does not require much imagination to transpose this experience to American Protestants or Catholics or any ethnically identifiable subgroup in the "modernizing" environment that still engulfs us all in the present moment of cultural confusion unless, as is unlikely, some of us have made a choice to reaffirm our roots and our ground of being in a tradition.

For Maurice Friedman, his journey of the soul really began with the painful and decisive choice to become a Conscientious Objector as we made our way as a nation into the Second World War. He describes briefly what was to him a necessary turning in the face of his ideals of social justice and pacifism conflicting and assuming a new relation to one another through his personal choice:

"Finally, my alternatives seemed to boil down to the unhappy choice of doing nothing -- that is, spending (as it turned out) three and a half years in Civilian Public Service camps for conscientious objectors largely performing 'made work' . . . and doing what seemed harmful in itself and in its results -- taking part in a war that was likely to produce new conflicts and new wars. . . . I pictured myself at times as a man tied to a chair, to whom others said, 'We will untie you from the chair if you will agree to kill your fellow man. Otherwise you must remain tied to this chair.'" (8)

It was, in spite of Friedman's own denials, something more than "made work" -- even though there was much physical routine. One of the striking experiences he encountered was hospital duty, reminding us, in a sense, of Marcel's similar service in the First World War. Just as human suffering so deeply affected the French Catholic philosopher of dialogue, so it was said by Friedman of his "tour" as an orderly in a mental hospital:

". . . Whatever of depression and fear, filth and horror has remained in my memory from my time with the feeble-minded, I have taken with me from there something infinitely precious and ever present: these images of man that have been my daily companions in all the years since then." (9)

He was on his way, during his darkening journey through this nonmilitary wartime service, to discovering to himself a direction for his studies and reflections. He sought, for a time, to become what he would later call a real contradiction, a modern "saint" -- and he describes his youthful resolve:

". . . I cut myself off almost altogether from the regular life of my own unit. I would never play cards, dance, or even, if I could help it, converse with the other members. Instead, I tried to feel the presence of God at every moment by means of silence, inner concentration, and the constant repetition of phrases from Brother Lawrence or Hindu song-words (mantrams)." (10)

When the opportunity arose, late in the war, to join a newly formed "Retreat side-camp" of "C.P.S. men who wished to join together in the search for God," (11) Friedman eagerly volunteered. The Retreat experience was for him both tragically disillusioning and marked another decisive turning. He discovered that his own mysticism was merely another subjective system of thought, as he held it then, coming into painful conflict with other subjectivities. He felt reduced, in the eyes of many of his fellows, to an object in their own systems -- one to be accepted and (in Buber's sense) "confirmed" only on condition of his accepting Christ. In particular, Friedman describes "a high church Episcopalian" who

". . . had come to the Retreat with the express purpose of finding disciples to join him in a monastic life vow the following Easter. . . . He imposed upon the group a Christocentric and highly ritualistic Christianity in place of the silent meditation which we all had in mind. . . . He said it was only pride and self-will that kept me from believing, and I was too conflicted at that time to be altogether sure that he was wrong. He shouted at me, stamped his feet in rage, and tried to force upon me a 'holy obedience' to him to which I had never agreed." (12)

He experienced, in brief, what tragically so many Christians have gone through in authoritatively misguided religious "education" which is in fact psychic and theological miseducation. A more insulting and patronizing misdirection of spiritual energies can hardly be imagined.

In response to these experiences, Friedman wrote a letter to his fellows in which he laid the foundation for his "touchstone of touchstones," the giving way of subjective mysticism lived in cold cooperation with other would-be "saints" to a more humane decision for the interhuman:

". . . I came down to this Retreat to find the peace and free time in which to grow spiritually in fellowship with other seekers. I have found conflict rather than peace, conscious problems rather than higher mystical states. Yet I have grown through conflict and the confusion and pain which it caused . . ."

". . . I now know that I shall live a life of service in the world and shall have a family -- both central parts of the Hasidic tradition. However, the service I shall give will be what I call 'integral social action' -- remaining open to the will of God at each moment and sensitive to the needs of those around one . . ." (13)

He had returned to the tradition of his grandfather, having passed through student socialism, studies in modern psychologies, Hindu mantrams and meditations, and the effort consciously to construct a mysticism and a metaphysical cosmology which would intellectually reconcile the great religions of the world. He found, for himself at least, that in retreat from the world, in the attempt to reach God without reference to man in the serious, concrete presentness of everyday life, that he was unable to participate in the task of bringing his God forth.

And so was Maurice Friedman's life forever changed, and in a way that he would never forget. There would be other touchstones along the path he had chosen, graduate studies, travel, family life, teaching, the long and fruitful personal association with Martin Buber. But this, in his own words, was the decisive turning, that which gave meaning to the suffering that had gone before and would illuminate that which was yet to come:

". . . basic trust came to me not in spite of but because of the destruction of all that had so carefully been built up. It was a shattering experience to be forced to recognize that what I had taken to be the whole of reality was really a world-view in my mind -- shared with other people, to be sure, but lacking a real encounter with otherness. . . . basic trust has to do with the very meaning of touchstones. For touchstones of reality imply that we do not have to be 'hung up' on the either-or of objective, universal meaning or a meaning that is merely subjective and cultural. To say that we can have some contact with reality without having to make the claim that it is <u>the</u> reality, to say that we can have touchstones of reality and even share them -- that takes a certain trust along the way." (14)

With trust in existence, it is possible to go forth in helping and other interhuman relations, to be teacher or lover or friend. Lacking this trust, we lose our way in an object world of meaningless manipulations, a wasteland unredeemed and emptied of the possibilities of human encounter.

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CHAPTER 8.

LAYING TO REST OUR GHOSTS: JOHN DEWEY AS A "PROGRESSIVE EDUCATOR."

HUGH C. BLACK.

Like sepulchral ghosts certain myths, fantasia, or plain untruths rise to haunt us in educational philosophy. As with scholars in other fields such as religion, we must step into the future in full pursuit of knowledge, being ever alert to the so human legends of the past which divert us from gaining meanings, truth, and full understanding. Drawing on the experience of "The Ghost of King James" (1) which has so affected the pursuit of meanings in religion, I wish in this paper to do what I can to lay to rest one "ghost" which haunts our understanding in educational philosophy. That ghost is the myth, fantasia, or plain untruth that John Dewey was a "Progressive Educator."

This "walking" or "happening" of a ghost which distorts the light of knowledge on the path ahead is not unusual to the human experience -- as shown by the Edgar Goodspeed experience in religion. As long ago as 1924, this good Baptist and outstanding Biblical scholar at the University of Chicago (who much later retired to Bel Air and teaching at UCLA) reported the frustrating reality of his experience. This was the reception too many newspaper editors -- the rich and supposedly "well-educated" -- gave to Goodspeed's new American translation of the New Testament. Opposition was "hasty and conventional," Goodspeed reporting:

"'Theologians and laymen alike,' says one good brother, in a newspaper interview, of the present translator, 'will wait with awe for God to strike him dead for thus laying his calloused hands upon the sacred and inspired word of God.'" (2)

Behind such responses was the limited belief and perspective: the idea of the divine inspiration of the King James Version. And to the support of its perpetual monopoly were issued the claims "that it is richly freighted with religious associations, and that it is a noteworthy monument of sixteenth-and seventeenth-century English."

Remarkable of our human condition is the fact that others, including the poor and not-so-well educated, responded differently. They, claimed Goodspeed, "ventured to look King James squarely in the eye and even to ask him, '. . . why the sepulchre,/Wherein we saw thee quietly inurn'd,/ Hath op'd his ponderous and marble jaws,/To cast thee up again.'" (3) They saw the true nature of our conventional barrier to truth and meaning and appreciated the necessity for thought and New Testament scholarship to destroy that paradise long ago so well described as ". . . where ignorance is bliss,/'Tis folly to be wise." For example, a New Jersey man wrote Goodspeed: "Long have I wished and needed your kind of translation." "In comparison with the vast number of book-readers," said a businessman from Kansas City, "the Bible is the least read of all books, very largely because of its burdensome, involved language, making it impossible for thousands of people to make head or tail of it." Goodspeed was encouraged about the future because such as these could perceive the knowledge which scholarship disclosed to him. He saw that "no real King James . . . but in very truth a mere blanched and pallid ghost of him" was abroad and must be laid to rest permanently by modern discovery and sound learning. More people would have to understand that the current printings of the Authorized Version had been so tampered and tinkered with over the years since 1611 that "Few verses indeed of that great literary landmark remain as they were first printed." They would have to know that in fact about one tenth of the King James Bible -- the Apocrypha -- had been dropped from its contents. It contained errors such as "Let it be anathema maranatha" because its human authors, despite their reputed "inspiration," were never able to understand that "maranatha" was not a curse but a blessing. And the writers of the King James Authorized Version had themselves sought to "modernize" God's Word but committed such errors as to say "ghost" when the meaning was "spirit" and "candle" when the meaning was "lamps." In truth candles were unknown to the people of the New Testament, and its characters were dependent upon oil lamps for illumination!

Our future in educational philosophy -- the theme of this annual meeting -- requires sound scholarship from such men as was Edgar Goodspeed, who in the field of religious scholarship was

". . . sufficiently interested in the New Testament to want to know, not simply how it sounds, but what it means, and see neither beauty nor propriety in muffling it up in words that contradict its thought." (4)

He saw correctly that the chief interest and worth of the New Testament must always lie in its meaning, in its message for modern life as in its own time. "The King James Version," he stated clearly:

"belongs of right to literature and to liturgy; it is of little use for interpretation. Its stiffness and obscurity are quite alien to the Greek original, and its 7959 arbitrary paragraphs constitute 7959 obstacles to coherent understanding, which taken together are literally insurmountable." (5)

Goodspeed knew that the New Testament was written in the everyday language of the common people -- in that Greek language which can have meaning to us only by taking into account the archaeological and philological progress since 1611, especially the discoveries and studies since 1900 of Greek papyri written in the common Greek of its day which had caused the virtual rewriting of New Testament grammar and lexicography. That scholarship, Goodspeed knew, reveals the New Testament as "not a collection of disjointed texts, but a library of coherent and powerful books" possessing the ancient quality of "continuous readability." This knowledge, so many realize, ought to lay to rest "The Ghost of King James." Yet Goodspeed can instruct us still. For no one knew better than Edgar Goodspeed how attached human beings are to the "familiar forms of religious truth." He knew that when Jerome had produced the great Latin Vulgate, Jerome was bitterly criticized even by Augustine himself. He knew the fate that had been suffered by William Tyndale, who first translated the New Testament from Greek into English. Certainly he was acutely aware of the human attachment to the hasty, the conventional, and the familiar forms when his new American version of the New Testament came off the presses in the early 1920s. Goodspeed instructs us in 1977 when he shares with us his 1924 feeling that our attachment to the hasty and conventional "still operates and probably always will." (6)

My contention and thesis is that something similar operates in educational philosophy, that we continue to respond to our educational crises too often from the limited perspective of the hasty and conventional "opinion" rather than from the fuller perspective of "knowledge" -- and understanding and wisdom which our scholarship should disclose, and that our perspective on John Dewey is a case in point. Specifically, I maintain, those who now, as in the past, continue to label John Dewey's educational philosophy as "Progressive Education" call up a ghost which is in very truth a mere blanched and pallid ghost of Dewey and which must be laid to rest once again now and as often in the future as it continues to arise.

If any of you in my audience wish to serve well your students and our communities as we anticipate the future of educational philosophy, I can think of no better way than to guide some of your interested students in

term projects enhancing their knowledge of the Dewey alternative by researching the question of whether he was a "Progressive Educator." The rest of my paper is intended as a guide.

Is the matter of Dewey being a "Progressive Educator" timely and "relevant"? Yes, I believe it is. For in the people's continuing arguments over Traditional vs. Progressive Education, they do so in terms of "Back to the 3 R's" (1957) or "Return to the Basics" (1976), or "Why Johnny Can't Read" or "Why Johnny Can't Write" or Alternative Schools of either the fundamental or the "open" type. People have differing convictions about the specific issues in such arguments -- issues which identify the contestants as "Progressives" or "Traditionalists" in newspaper accounts and in the professional literature. People continue to do what John Brubacher noted in 1959: "making Dewey and 'progressive education' synonymous terms." (7) Let's look rather fully at one such instance.

Wayne Jennings and Joe Nathan, director and program coordinator of the St. Paul, Minnesota, Open School, maintain in their article in the March 1977 issue of Phi Delta Kappan (8) that "For more than 50 years now, studies have been documenting the effectiveness of nontraditional school programs in the United States. This research should cause us to question 95% of current educational practice." (9) Moreover, they tell us that "Reformers pushing for change in public schools have had remarkably little help from professors of education," (10) and that ". . . educators are not serious students of learning and may be unable to recognize when or how it occurs." (11) They cite again the Eight-Year Study published in 1942 as "one of the most significant and exciting studies in the history of American education" and mark up its results as all favorable to the effectiveness of "Progressive Education." "Subsequent studies of a similar type have yielded essentially the same result," they maintain. And then under the heading of "Today's Alternative Schools," they assert:

"Since 1970 a number of schools have been established which make use of curriculum and organization ideas developed either by the experimental schools in the thirties or even earlier by John Dewey and other progressive educators." (12)

Take note of the phrase: "John Dewey and other progressive educators." Today, as too often in the past, people make this erroneous identification -- usually to serve their own political purposes.

Harry S. Broudy, a scholarly student and critic of John Dewey, is one professor of education who is a serious student of learning. Jennings and

Nathan could learn much themselves from Broudy's sound knowledge that Dewey is not a "Progressive Educator" and that "progressivism in education was as much a political doctrine as an educational one." These Phi Delta Kappans of the University of Minnesota chapter could profit from the instruction in Broudy's Phi Delta Kappa Fastback #37 of 1974 [since they show ignorance of the University of Minnesota's Robert Holmes Beck's 1941 doctoral thesis at Yale]. For Broudy states clearly:

"The permissiveness, randomness, improvisatory nature of some of the schools using the title had little to do with the task-oriented, problem-solving process urged by Dewey. After all, Dewey was not Rousseau. Growth for him was not a self-directing process or an undirected process; learning by doing was not learning by agitating only the lower end of the spinal cord and the large muscles. He defined growth as making action more intelligent, more controlled by ideas. The kind of doing that Dewey regarded as educative was a doing that verified or falsified an hypothesis or a proposal; it was a doing by thinking." (13)

To any California audience such as this I need merely recall (without scholarly documentation) another example in those amazing misinterpretations of Dewey's educational philosophy made by Max Rafferty to serve his own political ends. And many of you are of sufficient age to remember the "Back to the 3 R's" controversies in the late 1950s in which Dewey's "Progressive Education" was the target. None of us should forget that the March 15, 1957, issue of U. S. News & World Report put it like this:

"'Progressive education,' founded on the teachings of a noted Columbia University philosopher, the late John Dewey, attacked rigid standards of learning and discipline that had governed America's schools for about 300 years. Thousands of teachers and theorists, fanning out from Columbia's Teachers College, eagerly spread a new doctrine: "Classrooms should emphasize 'interesting experiences,' related to a child's daily life, rather than memory drills and learning by rote.

"Teachers should develop the 'whole child' -- his sociability and character as well as his intellect.

"Children should be graded according to their own capacities, not by rigid over-all standards.

"Teacher and pupils should work together in 'democratic' classrooms.

"This philosophy of education discouraged scolding or spanking. Some

interpreted it to mean that punishment should be discarded altogether. Periodic tests and report cards lost favor.

"Algebra and other 'difficult' subjects no longer were required for all students. Courses such as 'democratic citizenship' placed much emphasis on a child's 'personality development.'

"Along with these changes, parents and teachers alike began to see the public school as a 'community center,' taking over from home and church more of the responsibility for molding a child's character. That viewpoint is summed up by an educational theorist at San Jose, Calif., State College:

"It's just as fundamental to keep a child out of jail as it is to teach him spelling or arithmetic or reading." (14)

Such are the basic educational issues and doctrines over which we debate, whether in the late 1950s or in 1977. Today, as then, we respond in hasty and conventional ways, clinging fiercely to the so familiar forms of controversy. In 1977 Jennings and Nathan cloud our wisdom about essential matters. They open the sepulchre to a pallid and frail ghost of John Dewey when they identify him as a Progressive and rehash the oft-repeated "Progressive" evidence for their opinion.

Even those we would expect to be more scholarly make the same error. And that, too, is reason enough to say it is timely and relevant to lay to rest the "Ghost of John Dewey as 'Progressive Educator.'" My example is this statement by the educational historian Clarence J. Karier in his, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring's Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century of 1973:

"It is significant that the political progressives reshaped political organizations so as to disenfranchise the masses to as large an extent as possible and to heighten the political influence of the better classes. Similarly, the educational progressives moved to take politics out of the school (nonpartisan school board), and progressive education theorists, like Dewey, used the term democracy to mean little more than participatory democracy, without facing the political power issue. 'Rule by the people' gave way to rule by the 'scientific expert.' See Elinor Mondale Gersman, 'Progressive Reform of the St. Louis School Board, 1897,' History of Education Quarterly 10 (Spring 1970): 3-21." (15)

Again, take note of the John Dewey "ghost" in the phrase: "and progressive education theorists, like Dewey." I suggest that we again have

a misleading contemporary practice. I wonder if our revisionist educational historians do not misinterpret Dewey and flaunt us with the ghost of Dewey as a "Progressive Educator" and thus enhance their own careers and reputations. Are they not saying something like this: "Look at these startling results of my scholarship: John Dewey was a Progressivist and a 'liberal' who simply did not go far enough to become the kind of 'radical' our romantic and compassionate critics of today say we need and they profess to be? Actually, I contend, anyone who truly read or reads John Dewey's writings should already know -- without the help of such revisionists -- that Dewey had a more moderate and more tenable educational philosophy than that of the 'Progressivists.' Dewey never was so radical as the 'Progressivists,' he did not espouse a revolutionary doctrine, and the only antidote for this and the other misunderstandings of Dewey is, as John Brubacher stated so clearly in the centennial year of Dewey's birth (1959):

"a close reading and study of what Dewey has actually said. This I fear many critics have failed to do. . . . it behooves his protagonists as well as his antagonists to go and read carefully. If they would claim to cast out educational devils in Dewey's name, let them first be sure they are not taking his name in vain." (16)

"John Dewey," wisely pointed out University of Chicago Chancellor Lawrence A. Kimpton in 1959, "was one of the most significant philosophers of our time, and the serious misunderstanding of him -- unlike most philosophical misunderstandings -- has affected millions of lives." (17) Neither in 1977 nor in the future can we afford to do what George B. Leonard, Jr. reported our doing in 1958:

"According to the critics [of American education], the educationists, following the theories of philosopher John Dewey, created progressive education, then seduced the public into accepting it. Now they are riding high, say the critics, while blocking the tough academic schools the public <u>really</u> wants. All the nation has to do is repudiate the theories of John Dewey, knock the educationists off their thrones and -- presto! -- Johnny will read, spell, know calculus and build nonfizzle missiles. . . . the critics have selected the wrong target for their major attacks. If the schools are to upgrade their intellectual content . . . , no superficial revamping of theory and method will do. Mainly what is needed is for parents and other voters to take a new look at their own attitudes toward intellectual and cultural activity. . . . They must value and reward scholarship. They must insist on winning academic programs as well as winning athletic teams. The schools are, and always will be, exactly what the people make them." (18)

I believe that since the people debate educational issues in terms of "Progressive Education" and "Traditional Education," we need definitions of those terms which are grounded in the reality of people and their controversies. Then we need to be guided to a direct reading of Dewey to determine what he said and see the falsehood of identifying him as a "Progressive Educator." Finally, we need the help of our most scholarly interpreters of Dewey as a check to our own reading of Dewey's tortuous prose.

You know how much I favor its more widespread use, but I still suggest Black, Seckinger, and Lottich's THE GREAT EDUCATORS: Readings for Leaders in Education for the best and most enjoyable entree to this task of educational philosophy. My "A Four-Fold Classification of Educational Theories" in Chapter 54 affords a contextual guide for the direct reading of the essential John Dewey in Chapter 52. My "Overview" to Part 5: "Precursors of the Contemporary in Educational Theory," including Charles W. Eliot's introduction to the 1911 edition of Spencer's work on pp. 407-408, affords a perspective allowing one to appreciate the scholarship of those Dewey interpreters most helpful in doing what I maintain must be done: lay to rest "The Ghost of John Dewey as a 'Progressive Educator.'"

Of these, Harry S. Broudy's General Education: The Search for a Rationale, the 1974 Phi Delta Kappa Fastback #37 already mentioned, does, on pp. 24-25, an outstanding job of summarizing the Dewey alternative to the Progressivist's strategy of "sneaking in the academic subject matters while the pupil's interest is riveted to something else." Broudy's is a master educational philosopher's summary of Dewey's view of education which points out both its strength and its weakness.

Another excellent guide is I. L. Kandel's "A Controversy Ended" in Educational Forum, 22 (January 1958): 175-81, which points to appropriate direct statements by Dewey in Experience and Education and also provides a useful historical context. (19) Dewey's Experience and Education is the book about which the late George Barton, Jr. wrote in 1959 regarding why "so many supposedly educated persons consistently misunderstand Dewey:"

"Such a book [the cure for misinterpretations] has already been written by Dewey himself. It is called Experience and Education. It has only one hundred sixteen short pages. . . . [since 1938], it has been available to anyone who can read." (20)

One additional guide is Lawrence A. Kimpton's article "Dewey and Progressive Education" in the Dewey Centennial Issue of The School Review for summer 1959 previously cited.

Perhaps these guides suffice to give any interested student in educational philosophy of the future the necessary background knowledge to lay to rest the ghost of Dewey and "Progressive Education." I know at least such an informed person should be critical and able in the face of encounters with, for example, such statements as these in Lawrence A. Cremin's The Transformation of the School, said by some to be the definitive work on "Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957:"

"Dewey set out in the volume [Democracy and Education, "hailed in some quarters as the most notable contribution to pedagogy since Rousseau's Emile"] to explore the educational meanings of democracy, science, evolution, and industrialism. He ended by writing the clearest, most comprehensive statement of the progressive education movement." (21)

Our enlightened educational philosopher should be equipped to know that this tie of Dewey to "the progressive education movement" can have meaning only in the sense of Cremin's own special definition of "progressive" as "the educational phase of American Progressivism ['a vast humanitarian effort to apply the promise of American life -- the ideal of government by, of, and for the people -- to the puzzling new urban-industrial civilization that came into being during the latter half of the nineteenth century'] writ large." (22)

Hopefully, our enlightened educational philosopher of tomorrow will catch the contradiction between Cremin's definition on p. viii of his Preface and this statement on p. x:

"The reader will search these pages in vain for any capsule definition of progressive education. None exists, and none ever will; for throughout its history progressive education meant different things to different people, and these differences were only compounded by the remarkable diversity of American education."

He will have read sufficiently in Dewey's own Experience and Education to see that Dewey meant something specific when he wrote of "Progressive Education" and "Traditional Education" -- specifics very similar to those of his opponent I. L. Kandel in Conflicting Theories of Education, like Dewey's book published by Macmillan in 1938. He will have read enough from the media to know their grounding in the realities of our educational controversies. He will have read enough of Dewey's Democracy and Education to know that the laissez-faire education of the "Progressive Educator" is a far cry from Dewey's 1916 declaration on p. 27 of Democracy and Education:

"As a society becomes more complex. . . , it is found necessary to provide

a special social environment which shall especially look after nurturing the capacities of the immature. Three of the more important functions of this special environment are: simplifying and ordering the factors of the disposition it is wished to develop; purifying and idealizing the existing social customs; creating a wider and better balanced environment than that by which the young would be likely, if left to themselves, to be influenced."

He will know from the same source, p. 10, that Dewey pursued a moderate, balanced educational ideal:

"Hence one of the weightiest problems with which the philosophy of education has to cope is the method of keeping a proper balance between the informal and the formal, the incidental and the intentional modes of education."

And, hopefully, the ghost of John Dewey as "Progressive Educator" will be laid to rest by educational philosophers who know and pursue Dewey's ringing declaration on p. 116 as he ended Experience and Education:

"What we want and need is education pure and simple, and we shall make surer and faster progress when we devote ourselves to finding out just what education is and what conditions have to be satisfied in order that education may be a reality and not a name or a slogan. It is for this reason alone that I have emphasized the need for a sound philosophy of experience."

Documentations.

1. Goodspeed, Edgar Johnson, "The Ghost of King James," Atlantic, 133: 71-76; 1924.

2. Ibid., p. 75.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 74.

5. Ibid., p. 75.

6. Ibid.

64.

7. Brubacher, John S., "Ten Misunderstandings of Dewey's Educational Philosophy," in John Dewey in Perspective: Bulletin of the School of Education, Indiana University, A. Stafford Clayton (ed.), Volume 36, Number 1, January 1960, 27-42, p. 41. Also to be consulted for Brubacher's interpretation that Dewey is NOT guilty of a "soft-pedagogy," of being excessively permissive, of weakening discipline, of being anti-intellectual in his educational influence, of stressing vocational education unduly, of exaggerating the uniqueness of his "activity program," of giving an aimless education, of giving "growth" as a meaningless and confusing aim of education, of being irreligious, and of being a social radical. The Broudy and Rugg articles are also recommended as guides to understanding Dewey.

8. Jennings, Wayne and Nathan, Joe, "Startling/Disturbing Research on School Program Effectiveness," Phi Delta Kappan, 58: 568-572, No. 7, March 1977.

9. Ibid., p. 568.

10. Ibid., p. 571.

11. Ibid., p. 572.

12. Ibid., p. 568.

13. Broudy, Harry S., General Education: The Search for a Rationale, Bloomington, Indiana: The Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, Fastback 37, 1974, pp. 24-25.

14. "Changes in the Schools -- Back to the 3 R's?" U. S. News & World Report, March 15, 1957, p. 39.

15. Karier, Clarence, "Liberal Idealogy and the Quest for Orderly Change," Chapter 5 in Karier, Clarence, Violas, Paul, and Spring, Joel, Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century, Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1973, p. 99, footnote 36.

16. Brubacher, op. cit., p. 42.

17. Kimpton, Lawrence A., "Dewey and Progressive Education," The School Review, 67 (No. 2, Dewey Centennial Issue, Summer 1959): 125-127, p. 127.

18. Leonard, Jr., George A., "Who Runs Our Schools?" Look, June 10, 1958, pp. 79, 86, 88.

19. For example, Kandel quotes on p. 176 of his article from Dewey's Experience and Education, pp. 17-18 and pp. 6-7, and on p. 177 of his article from Dewey's pp. 7-8 and p. 87.

20. Barton, Jr., George, "John Dewey: Too Soon A Period Piece?" The School Review, 67 (No. 2, Dewey Centennial Issue, Summer 1959): 128-138, p. 130.

21. Cremin, Lawrence A., The Transformation of the School -- Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957, New York, A Caravelle Edition, Vintage Books, Random House, 1964, p. 120.

22. Ibid., Preface, p. viii.

CHAPTER 9.

AN AMERICAN ARISTOTLE: LESTER FRANK WARD'S VIEWS ON EUGENICS AND RACIAL STRUGGLE.

STEPHEN M. YULISH.

Lester Frank Ward is known as the father of American sociology. His works were so extensive and complex that he is often referred to as the "American Aristotle." Edward A. Ross wrote of his friend and mentor that:

"When one considers the vast range of Ward's intellectual interests, the number and variety of his original contributions to science, and his great power of generalization, one feels that if Aristotle had by chance been born in Illinois about the middle of the nineteenth century, his career would have resembled that of Lester Frank Ward more than that of any other American of our time. Had I had the privilege of intimate association with Aristotle, he would not have made upon me a greater impression of vast knowledge and intellectual force than did Lester Frank Ward. If I should meet socially with Aristotle, the 'Master of them that know,' I doubt if I would find him a bigger man than Lester Frank Ward." (1)

Ward's progressive, egalitarian, environmental views in the midst of an era of Social Darwinism, racism, and eugenics, are lauded as a great achievement. Unfortunately, these conceptions of him have prevented a critical historical analysis of his entire spectrum of thought. The purpose of this paper is to show how Ward's belief in Lamarckian environmentalism, coupled with his belief in progress and the perfectability of man, was not inconsistent with his stance on eugenics nor with his concept of racial struggle. This is a crucial point since these concepts have often been associated exclusively with the conservative hereditarian wing of American sociology rather than with the environmental, egalitarian views of Ward's progressive wing.

Ward, like Herbert Spencer, was a product of many of the major themes of Enlightenment thought. They both believed in progress, perfectability of man and the importance of rational knowledge and science. They both

believed that social phenomena, like physical phenomena, were uniform and were governed by law. For Spencer, society was seen as a biological organism which, if let to develop on its own, would perfect itself. On the other hand, Ward believed that man through the evolutionary process had gained the ability to use his mind to further the march of progress. Thus man now possessed the ability to use his intellectual faculties to enhance his progress by a telic or purposeful action.

"Every step that man has taken in advance, every invention he has made, all art, all applied science, all achievement, all material civilization, has been the result of his persistent refusal to let things alone . . ." (2)

For this reason Ward attacked the laissez-faire attitude of Herbert Spencer. It was not enough to leave society alone; man should take the initiative and forward the evolution of the race. Ward also disliked the laissez-faire individualists whom he saw as backing large business interests at the expense of the common man. It was of the utmost importance to Ward that man learn to understand the laws of social phenomena so he could generate a society which would most enhance the progress and future of mankind.

Hofstadter characterized this precisely when he wrote:

"In time, Ward was eminently successful in impressing his criticisms upon American sociologists. In his sphere he served a function similar to that of instrumentalists in philosophy: he replaced an older passive determinism with a positive body of social theory adaptable to the uses of reform." (3)

Ward felt that while the environment transformed the animal, man transforms the environment, and thus he opposed any ideas of a conservative deterministic nature. Instead, he proposed a purposeful improvement of society by what he termed "cold calculation." He wished to remove all the artificial inequalities of caste, class, privilege, status, and sex from the masses and let the natural inequalities be the sole determinant of one's place in the society. Thus Ward's sociocracy (now termed by some meritocracy) would enable all persons to realize their own potential and have equal access to the educational system. By spreading knowledge to the masses, Ward believed that man's progress and future perfectability would be enhanced.

Basic to Ward's views was a belief in the Lamarckian concepts of inheritance of acquired characteristics, use and disuse, and strengthening

of faculties by exercise. Ward felt that by educating the masses he was furthering the progress of mankind because, although the knowledge itself might not be passed on, the capacity to learn would be. The belief that education could change the germ plasm through the Lamarckian concept of use-inheritance was vital to Ward.

Since Ward's ideas were developed before the culture concept of Boas et al., he explained the differences in the evolution of races and the mental evolution of mankind in terms which included biological transmission, but he freed them from the conservative deterministic implications. The notions of progress and perfectability of man were clearly evident by his belief that the purposeful spread of knowledge throughout the race would genetically be transmitted to future generations in terms of an increased capacity to learn.

Ward on Eugenics.

Mark Haller, in his book, Eugenics (4) and Richard Hofstadter, in Social Darwinism in American Thought (5) both quote Ward's statement at an American Sociological Society meeting in 1906 during a discussion of "Social Darwinism" when he stated that:

"So far as the native capacity, the potential quality, the 'promise and potency' of a higher life are concerned, those swarming, spawning millions, the bottom layer of society, the proletariat, the working classes, the hewers of wood and drawers of water, nay even denizens of the slums, that all these are by nature the peers of the boasted aristocracy of brains that now dominates society and looks down upon them, are the equals in all but privilege of the most enlightened teachers of eugenics." (6)

While this statement has often been cited as evidence of Ward's disdain for eugenics, a closer look at his writings reveals an interesting statement that he made in 1891. Ward had written:

"But the great debate on heredity seems destined to secure still other and more far-reaching advantages. Not only has it assured us that we may hand our good works down to posterity through the law of the transmissibility of acquired qualities, but it may and should teach us that the all-powerful law of selection is also an instrument in the hands of intelligence for the working out of human destiny. It is the right and the duty of an

energetic and virile race of men to seize upon every great principle that can be made subservient to its true advancement, and undeterred by any false ideas of its sanctity or inviolability, fearlessly to apply it. Natural selection is the chief agent in the transformation of species and the evolution of life. Artificial selection has given to man the most that he possesses of value in the organic products of the earth. May not men and women be selected as well as sheep and horses? . . . From all this, why may we not learn to select on some broad and comprehensive plan with a view to a general building up and rounding out of the race of human beings? At least we should, by a rigid selection, stamp out of the future all the unworthy elements. Public sentiment should be created in this direction and when the day comes that society shall be as profoundly shocked at the crime of perpetuating the least taint of hereditary disease, insanity and other serious defects as it now is at the comparatively harmless crime of incest, the way to practical and successful stirpiculture will have already been found." (7)

It is clear from this statement made in 1891 that Ward initially backed the two forms of stirpiculture (eugenics) which he later formally classified in 1913. Not only was he advocating negative eugenics which provided for the removal of all unworthy elements from society and the prevention of their perpetuation, but he also advocated positive eugenics whereby men would use their intelligence and purposeful will to breed human beings like animals in order to further the progress of the race.

It is also quite apparent that by the time of the American Sociological Society Meeting in 1906, Ward was backing away from his stand on positive eugenics. Once again, in apparent contradiction to his 1891 statement, he wrote in 1909 that:

"They (eugenists) demand that the mind of man shall be improved by some process which we may call artificial in exactly the sense that the various breeds of animals and various plants have been improved by human artificial methods . . . I will only say that I do not belong to that school." (8)

By this time Ward's ideas on what he called intellectual egalitarianism were being developed. Ward believed that the human brain was adequate to perform any duties it was called on to perform. He then went on to define intelligence as the capacity for knowledge together with the knowledge added to it. Instead of wasting time trying to increase the human intellect, man should spend more time in the dissemination of knowledge. Ward continued:

"If I am right in that then the great problem is to equalize intelligence; or to simplify it still further, to put all knowledge in the possession of every human being. I call it the equalizing of intelligence because I maintain that the native capacity of mankind is equal in all classes of society . . . I call this intellectual egalitarianism, the principle that -- no matter what class of society you may select from -- taking a corresponding number from each -- the individuals from all classes of society will be equal in their native capacity for knowledge; that those from any one class will be equal in their capacity for knowledge to an equal number from any other class of society." (9)

Ward also backed away from positive eugenics for another reason. In the development of his thought Ward had come to realize that there was a biological imperative at work in nature which was constructive, and creative. He called this universal principle synergy. (10) Nature was seen as ever becoming, striving in a "universal nisus" (11) constantly pushing higher and higher structures into existence. This thought was apparent in his Applied Sociology (1906).

"The forces of nature are, as it were, chained. The channels of energy are everywhere choked. The new gospel, therefore, to which I found myself committed was a gospel of liberation . . . the environment . . . is plastic. It can be indefinitely modified or completely transformed." (12)

Ward felt that nature was ever striving for perfection and rather than try to change it one should set it free from the shackles of the environment. Ward is often characterized as saying that nature was inefficient, uneconomic and wasteful, but the reason that nature exhibited such properties was due to its constant battle with the hostile environment. According to Ward, nature, the biological urge towards perfection, needed no interference.

In 1913, shortly before his death, Ward summarized his views on eugenics as well as those on nature in a very revealing article entitled, "Eugenics, Euthenics, and Eudemics." (13) At this late date in his life, Ward reiterated his sincere belief in negative eugenics. All the discussion against eugenics throughout the years between 1891 and 1913 was concerning positive eugenics. Ward felt that all classes of society were equal in their capacity for knowledge and all that blocked equality were artificial differences and the environment. The belief that the "defective" should be eliminated was always a part of Ward's thought. In 1913 he wrote:

"As the defectives are the wards of society, society has somewhat the same control over them as intelligent men have over the vegetable and animal

kingdoms, and there is no good reason why it should not act in the same way with regard to them and eliminate as completely and as rapidly as possible the worthless elements in the population. Nothing but an inexcusable indifference, due to the general ignorance and the half-unconscious state of society prevents this being done." (14)

Ward went on in this article to explain that while he once thought that positive eugenics was a fine thing (he referred to his 1891 article), he now felt that its practical application created unresolvable problems. He believed that while society is master of its defectives, normal people should be their own masters. Also he felt that it would be a great infringement upon liberty if society were to control the choice of partners in marriage.

Crucial to his rejection of positive eugenics was Ward's view of nature. As stated previously, Ward was developing a view of nature that opposed positive eugenic manipulation. In this 1913 article he reiterates his earlier remarks:

"There are many ways in which nature strives to maintain a perfect race and even to improve it . . . Man assumes to know better than nature how to guide the forces of heredity . . . At bottom it is the universal energy at work in all nature. We have only to recognize that this universal energy is constructive and creative as I have so fully shown . . . Evolution is a series and it is also an ascending series." (15)

Ward attacked the eugenists whom he feared would select only for intellectual qualities and the resultant enlarged human head would eventually lead to a prevention of the possibility of birth through the birth canal. He felt that not only what was needed was more knowledge instead of more brains, but breeding for intellect only would leave the emotional and affective qualities deficient.

"But Nature is far wiser and seeks to develop all the faculties and to prevent all extremes. The normal becomes the ideal. A perfect race is one that is developed in all its qualities; physical, moral, and intellectual. It is this that the biological imperative aims at, and if not interfered with by the doctrinaires of heredity, this will be the result." (16)

He continued to attack the eugenists (positive) for their lack of faith in nature:

"The present eugenic movement is one of distrust of nature, of lack of

faith in great principles, of feverish haste to improve the world, of egotism in the assumption of a wisdom superior to that of nature." (17)

Ward felt that the end and aim of the eugenists couldn't be reproached since the race was far from perfect. He questioned their method rather than their principle. Once again Ward spoke of the tendency in nature for the avenues of progress to become choked or blocked. He stated that "every plant and every animal possesses potential qualities far higher than its environment will allow it to manifest." (18) Ward attacked the eugenists again for their belief that they were changing the nature of man. All that they were doing, said Ward, was setting free certain potential agencies by their method of selection.

"But all this is nurture, pure and simple. Nature is unchanged. The hereditary tendencies remain the same. These are beyond the reach of human art. It is the environment that holds the hereditary impulse down. Man has no power over heredity. The only thing he can affect is the environment. It is true that man can utilize the laws of heredity. But the utilization of any law of nature consists simply in so adjusting the environment that the law shall operate in his interest. It is merely directing the forces of nature into channels of human advantage. But these channels belong to the environment." (19)

One can see how Ward's belief in purposeful action using telic faculties would manifest itself in environmental reform. Ward wanted to free nature from the bonds of environment. The life force of nature as well as the mind or psychic force of man were perceived to be held down by "environmental debris." To release them from their bonds would enable spontaneous lifting to higher planes. Ward summarized his thought in the following manner:

"The environment lies across the path of both and obstructs their rise. The problem everywhere is how to unlock these prison doors and set free the innate forces of nature." (20)

From this discussion of eugenics, certain points are readily clear. First of all, Ward, contrary to popular belief, was always a firm believer in negative eugenics for "defective" persons. He also exhibited initial interest in positive eugenics but broke from this tradition as he developed his concepts of intellectual egalitarianism and the positive universal ascension towards perfection inherent in nature. It also appears that his evolving conceptions of human nature and society precluded any acceptance of man's eugenic control over other "normal" persons.

Ward on Racism.

As was pointed out earlier, there was a tendency of Lamarckian environmentalists such as Ward to confuse social and physical heredity and to assume the physical inheritance of complex cultural characteristics. Thus while Ward could emphasize the continuing efficacy of the social environment, he still spoke of racial characteristics and instincts. Before the concept of "culture" had been developed by Boas and others, Ward was content to explain transmission of culture by the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

While Ward believed that the lower classes of society contained as much potentiality of intellect as the highest classes, he didn't carry this belief over to his discussion of different races. Intellectual egalitarianism existed within each race but not necessarily between them. In his unpublished manuscript, "Education" (1871-1873), he wrote:

"The Chinese may be less brilliant but he may be more precise and persevering. The African is probably less energetic and less intellectual, but he may prove more artistic and more imaginative. Beneath the tawny exterior of the Malaysian or the American who shall say what germs of genius a few centuries of civilization and education may reveal?"

When Humboldts and Goethes spring from the barbarian hordes of Attila, Alaric, and Hendric, we need not be surprised at any transformation which culture shall work out in raw humanity." (21)

Later in 1906 in his book Applied Sociology, Ward reiterated his belief in racial differences when he approvingly quoted a statement by Auguste Comte:

"The black races are as much superior to whites in feeling or sentiment as they are below them in intelligence and the yellow races are superior to both the whites and blacks in activity, though they are inferior in intelligence and feeling." (22)

Ward believed that sociology, as distinguished from anthropology, should deal only with the historic or "favored" races, (23) since these alone had built up civilization. It was his belief that one could trace human development back to barbarians and even to savages, but these groups no longer contributed to the main existing line of development and thus had

only historic significance. Ward also believed that as races and nations became overgrown and over-specialized, they fell easy prey to more vigorous surrounding ones. As a country began to colonize, it often gave off its most vitalized elements, leaving the parent country to decline or to be swallowed up. Thus he wrote:

"Race and national degeneration or decadence means nothing more than thus pushing out of the vigorous branches or sympodes at the expense of the parent trunks." (24)

Ward was greatly influenced by the racial struggle theory of Gumplowicz (25) and Ratzenhofer, and thus he believed that primitive races looked upon each other as utterly different and there existed between them "the most profound mutual contempt." (26) When these races were brought into contact, it usually meant war. It was Ward's belief that while there were still certain races at that time that had remained outside of cultural contact with others and continued their "simple half-animal existence unchanged by contact with other races," (27) most had been conquered and assimilated by others in the process of the genesis of society through the struggle of the races. According to this racial struggle theory, the origin of organized society was attributed to the conquest of one race by another. Ward saw this constant struggle as painful yet fruitful.

"Races, states, peoples, nations are always forming, always aggressing, always clashing and clinching, and struggling for the mastery, and the long, painful, wasteful, but always fruitful gestation must be renewed and repeated again and again." (28)

Ward described racial struggle in the context of "social chemistry." He believed that the appropriation of women of a subjugated race by men of the conquering race entailed, "Aside from purposes of lust . . . a certain intuitive sense that the mixture of blood conduces to race vigor." (29) Another instinct tending in the same direction was the "charm of sexual novelty," which, while leading to immediate race miscegenation, did not cease after the subjugation was completed.

"All attempts to keep the superior race pure fail utterly and by the time the state has been established, the majority of the inhabitants have in their veins the blood of both races. The formation of a people, therefore, is not only a political, civil and social process, but it is also largely a physiological process." (30)

Ward later crystallized this view of subjugation and struggle of the races. Men of the so-called low races were perceived to have very little social

efficiency. Since social efficiency was seen as a result of achievement, and achievement was only possible through human institutions, and the highest institutions resulted from social assimilation, one can see how the most efficient races were those that had been directly in the track of civilization -- those races which have never had their connection with the past cut off or interrupted. Ward's belief in the concepts of progress and perfectability of man were manifested in his line of growth of man from animal, to barbarian, to half-civilized man, to civilized man, to enlightened man. (31)

Racial struggle, according to Ward, was a necessary condition for progress to take place. Since progress ceased when races stopped struggling, the condition of peace meant social stagnation for primitive undeveloped races. It was in this context that Ward advocated an active program of both racial struggle and assimilation when he wrote:

"Races that have lived wholly off this line of historic development, that have been long undisturbed and never subjugated, have only slightly felt the power of social synergy, and have been left far behind in the race. It is not so much their mental inferiority, though the mind obeys the Lamarckian law of exercise, and is strengthened by every fresh effort put forth. But these races possess all the elements of development and have only lacked the opportunity which comes through the struggle of races and repeated social assimilations." (32)

In the historical milieu of the rising white civilization dominating the colored peoples of the earth, Lamarckian environmentalists, along with Social Darwinists and hereditarians, exhibited racist thinking. Both often believed that the European or Aryan race was superior to that of other races. Ward stated this succinctly when he wrote:

"The inhabitants of southern, central and western Europe call them Aryan, Indo-Germanic, or anything you please, and irrespective of the question whether their history can be traced back and their origin discovered or not, have led the civilization of the world ever since there were any records. They are and have been throughout all this time, the repository of the highest culture, they have the largest amount of social efficiency, they have achieved the most, and they represent the longest, uninterrupted inheritance and transmission of human achievement." (33)

It is evident from the preceding discussions that Ward believed in a definite hierarchy of races. He felt that the enlightened Aryan race was the most advanced and had spread itself over the entire world, and thus has become the "dominant race of the globe." Some people find it difficult

to reconcile Ward's environmental Lamarckian conceptions with his racist thought. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that if the capacity to learn is passed on, then those in the mainstream of civilization will continue to improve, while those divorced from it will remain stagnant and their minds will not improve through the Lamarckian laws of use-inheritance, exercise, and inheritance of acquired characteristics. William Gossett, in his book, Race: The History of An Idea in America, presented this point concisely:

"Further, Lamarckianism could easily be adapted to race theories. One can easily visualize an imperialist agreeing with Ward that primitive peoples might at some future time develop a civilization as high as that of the white races, but that it would take hundreds, if not thousands, of years for the germ plasm of the inferior races to improve to this extent." (34)

Ward continued to sink himself further and further into the racist thought prevalent in his day. He stated that the overrunning of North America by the Europeans was a necessity of the "master race of the planet" in extending its dominion over inferior races. This cosmic principle, according to Ward, reduced all overtures of peace, humanity and justice to a waste of breath. These moral forces, however, were seen to be gaining strength and were slowly mitigating the severity of the law of nature. Then in a statement echoing the call for an uber-mensch or superman, Ward stated:

"But mitigation is all that can be hoped for. The movement must go on, and there seems no place for it to stop until, just as man has gained dominion over the animal world, so the higher type of man shall gain dominion over all the lower types of man." (35)

This line of thought brought up by Ward demonstrates a certain tendency of his Progressive purposeful action-oriented philosophy. First of all, he acknowledged a definite hierarchy of races but he did not leave it at that. He stated that race struggle was a necessity. There was no immediate prospect of peace. Inevitably the primitive races of the world must be conquered by civilized races. Thus Ward had not only racist but also imperialist tendencies. His racist philosophy was not manifested in laissez-faire ideas but in notions of conquest, subjugation and assimilation.

Lester Frank Ward proceeded in his book, entitled Pure Sociology, to argue against slavery in the present, but maintained that it was useful in the past. He reached the conclusion of usefulness by applying his Lamarckian views to the social system.

77.

According to Ward:

"Nothing can come into being that is not demanded by the conditions existing at the time. Nothing that is really useless can by any possibility be developed. A fortiori, it is a contradiction of terms to speak of the natural genesis of anything injurious or wholly bad. And all this is as true of social as of organic structures. According to Lamarckian principle, it is function that creates structure . . . There never was a human institution that was not called forth in response to a social demand which from the scientific standpoint, means a social necessity." (36)

While Ward thus justified the innovation of slavery in the development of mankind, he felt that this approval was not to hold indefinitely. It was his opinion that it had outlived its usefulness and persisted merely as an impediment to the life and health of society.

Ward went on to describe the beneficial attributes of slavery. He noted that the primitive races (whether black or red) had no capacity to do anything that could be called work. According to him, prior to the period of social integration, the savages and primitive peoples involved were "utterly incapable of sustained labor, and had no conception of it." (37) Thus, since the productive power of such people in the modern industrial world of today would be nil, it was of the utmost necessity to teach them to work.

"It is safe to say that if left wholly to these influences man would have never learned labor. It required some other influence far more imperative and coercive. In a word, nothing short of slavery would ever accomplish this. This was the social mission of human slavery -- to convert mere activity into true labor. The aim of the conquering race was to gain the maximum advantage from the conquest." (38)

This talk of the social mission of slavery once again exhibits the action oriented imperialistic racism of Ward. One could easily see the political and social overtones of such thought in things like "Manifest Destiny" and "White Man's Burden." This particular manifestation of racist thought also had definite Lamarckian attributes. Ward felt that the "capacity to labor" (39) was a typical "acquired character" that has been transmitted slowly through generations of slaves until at last great numbers of their ancestors were born with the power to apply themselves to laborious tasks "naturally" throughout their lives. Ward actually believed that slavery was not only of immense economic importance, but it enabled the primitive races to acquire and transmit through generations the "capacity to labor."

In characterizing the female form in various races, Ward, quoting Darwin, states that in the "undeveloped state of male tastes, the qualities preferred are apt to be mere monstrosities," (40) as in the case of steatophygy in Hottentot women. Not surprisingly for him, Ward believed that the women of Oriental-Semitic and Aryan peoples were and always had been stirpicultural nurseries of female beauty. Ward once again failed to appreciate the importance of cultural differences. Since Ward believed that he was at the zenith of civilization, it was his belief that he could best choose the ideal female form. All considerations of individual preference were forgotten in the midst of an elitist racist ideal.

He continued this type of thought when he remarked that "romantic love" was a product of only advanced races, namely the Aryans. For Ward there was no sign of it among savages. He quoted Joachim John Monteiro's "Angola and the River Congo" (1875) to substantiate his beliefs:

"The negro knows not love, affection, or jealousy . . . In all the long years I have been in Africa, I have never seen a negro manifest the least tenderness for or to a negress . . . I have never seen a negro put his arm around a woman's waist, or give or receive any caress whatever that would indicate the slightest loving regard or affection on either side. They have no words or expressions in their language indicative of affection or love." (41)

It is obvious what problems arose as a result of Ward's lack of an adequate concept of culture. Different races and groups were almost universally compared to the dominant culture. Those attributes of the dominant group that were not found manifested in the exact manner in the other groups were said to justify and substantiate the lower rankings of the less dominant groups. Ward even went so far as to state that as a factor in human achievement, the super-preservative social force, "the love of money," (42) has had no rival and still remained the mainspring of economic and industrial activity. For the sociologist, Ward said, the love of money is the root of all good in material civilization. Since the primitive had no such "love," he was thus backward, unambitious and lazy.

Lester Frank Ward presented his racial bias very evidently in his discussion of the philosophy of rape as an ethnological phenomenon. He described four universal and fundamental principles of ethnology which all resulted from the more general principle of race improvement.

"1. The women of any race will freely accept the men of a race which they regard as higher than their own."

"2. The women of any race will vehemently reject the men of a race which they regard as lower than their own."

"3. The men of any race will greatly prefer the women of a race which they regard as higher than their own."

"4. The men of any race in default of women of a higher race, will be content with women of a lower race." (43)

Ward explained his first principle by stating that the inferior woman yields to the man of the superior race, due to a subconscious motive probably more powerful than physical passion itself -- the command of nature to elevate her race. Likewise, when the woman of a superior race rejects the man of an inferior race, it is from a "profound though unreasoned feeling" that to accept him would do something more than to disgrace her, that it would to that extent lower the race to which she belongs. But Ward also believed that:

"when the man of an inferior race strives to perpetuate his existence through a woman of a superior race, it is something more than mere 'bestial lust' that drives him to such a dangerous act. It is the same unheard but imperious voice of nature commanding him at risk of lynch law to raise his race to a little higher level." (44)

Ward had thus reduced social phenomena to biological urges and instincts. His environmental Lamarckian philosophy manifested itself in racial overtones. He went on to say that since the man of an inferior race sought subconsciously to raise his race when he raped a woman of a higher race, it should to that extent be excused as merely a biological imperative and those who pursued and lynched the offender did not realize that they were also driven by an urge of race preservation which ultimately led them to create a crime "more savage than the poor wretch had committed."

Fortunately, Ward's theory did not necessitate a constant cycle of rape (as he did for racial struggle). Since there was a terrible penalty involved, men of an inferior race, according to Principle 4, were often content with women of a lower race. For Ward, male members of an inferior race only settled for women of their own race as second choices to the women of a higher race.

The racial overtones of Ward's four principles are obvious. He had initially created the dichotomy of superior and inferior races, and from there set up a whole array of biological imperatives working instinctively

within the individual involved, towards either race preservation for the superior, or race elevation for the inferior. Ward concluded by stating that a corollary to these laws would be that in racial mixture the father should belong to the superior race and the mother to the inferior race, so that in the process, the children produced would create a leveling up of the inferior race, rather than a leveling down of the superior race.

Conclusion.

The purpose of this paper has been to show that Lester Frank Ward's concepts of man and society included a belief in negative eugenics and racial hierarchy. His notions of progress, perfectability of man, intelligent expertise and purposeful action led not only to a belief in intellectual egalitarianism within races (not between) and environmental reform, but also to "removal of worthless elements" from society and to the necessity of racial struggle.

Ward believed that defectives were the wards of society and thus society had control over them. It should therefore eliminate them as completely and rapidly as possible. For a time, Ward also backed positive eugenics but it later became unreconcilable with his views on the wisdom of Nature and the infringement on liberty it would entail. The eugenists' goal of race perfection was never questioned by Ward -- it was only their method that he disdained.

On the question of race, it is important to realize that Ward was writing before an adequate concept of culture was developed by Boas and others. As was discussed earlier, during this period, Lamarckian environmental ideas could lead to racism just as readily as hereditarian ones. The notions of inheritance of acquired characteristics, the effects of use and disuse on mental faculties, as well as the other Lamarckian law of exercise, all could serve to create a hierarchy of races from enlightened Aryan man to black or brown savage. In fact, Ward's notion of purposeful action, coupled with his approval of racial struggle and his Lamarckian outlook, led to imperialist-like statements of "social mission," "master race," and "subjugation of all inferior races."

Ward's racism seemed to be differentiated from most of the hereditarian racist thought of the time in that he believed that the inferior races possessed the potential to rise, and would do so if subjugated to racial conflict and assimilation. This struggle would instill in them the

valuable knowledge and skills which would not only exercise their minds but would be passed on to their future generations. Eventually over time the inferior race would be totally assimilated and equal in intellect to its conquering race.

Lester Frank Ward, the "American Aristotle," pioneered the concepts of intellectual egalitarianism (between classes) and environmental reform. His Lamarckian environmentalism, however, may have furthered the imperialist, ethnocentric racist doctrine of the time. Progressive American sociological thought, as expressed by its founder, not only spoke of a transformation of the environment and the possibility of a better society in the future, but it also advocated removal of defective stock and constant racial struggle in the present. Ward has left a mixed legacy which to this day has continued to haunt progressive sociological reform.

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CHAPTER 10.

THE TESTING, RECORDING, INTERPRETATION, AND PROCESS -- THE BOTTOM LINE OF EDUCATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY.

COLLEEN S. DECKER.

Testing as a "Subject Matter Area" for Students.

Educators, parents, students, legislators, fiscal officers, and most people interested in education place great importance upon the quality of the educational programs available. Yet, just when is an education of "good quality" when it comes right down to it? The rules, unfortunately, for identifying a "quality" education are vague if not totally obscure.

We all want the best education possible for our children. When we ask how a student is doing in school the answer is usually given in terms of test scores, local and national norms, classroom participation, and citizenship grades. A better question might be, "How is that student doing in learning to take tests? Can he transfer the test taking skills to all subject matter areas?"

The testing, recording, interpretation process becomes, for all practical purposes, the "bottom line" of educational accountability. The "scores" are placed on record and are used to "pass" or "fail" a student. The record is kept. This record then becomes the only retrievable evidence of how much the student has learned over the years in school. The importance of a good academic record is self-evident in college admissions, post-school employment, and even to a student's self-concept.

Recorded scores and the subsequent interpretations of these scores become the "tail that wags the dog" of instructional programs. The interpretations given to these scores literally determine the range of successes which can be predicted for the students tested. As the emphasis on accountability increases in public education, what once was the result of an educational program becomes the goal of educational programs. Something important to education in the bigger sense of the word is bound to be lost in this reversal of emphasis.

What may be more relevant is that something important is not gained in this change in emphasis. When something is seen as crucial to us in education we institute special programs and allocate fiscal resources which are placed at our immediate disposal. Sputnik, Adaptive Education programs, national attention to "Why Johnny Can't Read," each sponsored special funds and extensive professional recruitment.

How is it then that when educational accountability looms on the horizon there are no special funds designated for teaching students how tests are designed, normed, administered, recorded, interpreted, and retrieved? Where are the special programs which could equalize test taking skills rather than merely assuring equal opportunities to learn a subject matter? In all likelihood, public familiarity with testing as a topic is limited to each person having taken a test at one time or another. We all have worried, anguished, and struggled to do well on the various tests given to us to determine our abilities, competence, and even on occasion, to measure our worth as human beings. What is especially strange is that those being tested for whatever purposes usually adopt the results of the tests. They assume their place on the norms of human abilities as a self-fulfilling prophecy. We become our test scores. We aim at only those goals prescribed for us by the range of scores we have achieved on tests we have taken.

If passing a test at a high level of performance is to carry such far-reaching implications, why have there been no major efforts to teach everyone to take tests? Is the neglect of teaching test-taking the result of a pervasive and unsupported belief that knowing how to take tests is "inborn?" Is this neglect of test-taking training due to some feeling that to teach testing skills is to "cheat" on knowing the information for which the tests were designed?

This "cheating" concept illustrates a confusion between

·teaching from the content of the materials to be used on the actual test, and

·teaching test-taking skills in the most generic sense of the word.

The first type of test teaching is used primarily to

·help students score better in the actual test situation

·on the material

used in training.

Many students, of all attainment levels, seem to have become relatively test-wise in the normal course of growing up. Other students somehow remain unaware of even the most rudimentary test taking skills. These students, as well as the test-wise students, can gain new heights in knowing when generic test taking skills are taught to them.

It is time for test-taking to be considered a subject matter in itself. We teach English and logic, philosophy and art as isolated subject matter areas. These disciplines are most meaningful when placed in the total context of the human enterprise. Test taking skills could, in a parallel fashion, provide a much-needed background for students whose lives will be dramatically influenced by how well they do on tests in school and in the human enterprise in general.

Two illustrations of the meaning of tests can demonstrate the "power" of testing:

I.Q. scores are both the boon and the bane of all students. When was there a program in school designed to teach intelligence as a skill, much less a course in school designed to help students take an I.Q. test? (1)

Again, when a test is given to a student for whom the test content, structure, as well as the values assumed by the test, are wholly inappropriate, can the test be said to mean anything at all?

What are the steps taken that end up with a score on a student's record? The sequence of steps goes from

"available subject matter data" to "the record maintained," with several steps in between.

The steps in the test-to-record sequence can be shown to be of two different types, types not easily combined into an effective measure of information taught nor of student learning.

II.

The Open Market Place of Accountability.

There is the assumption in most educational circles that whenever something

Figure I

Steps in the Testing Process: Information and Procedures

Process Step	Subject Matter Information	Testing Procedures
1.	Overall data available from ·Profession, ·Teacher, and ·Text materials	
		Students are not given test taking training or an insight into test designs
2.	Material is presented to students based on ·Educational goals, ·Program objectives, and ·Instructional materials	
3.	Data is selected for inclusion on tests which are representative of the material presented	
4.		Test designs reviewed
5.		Test pattern selected and representational data framed within test forms
6.	Specialists in testing establish and publish test batteries	Instructions for taking test given to students
7.		Test given and data collected
8.		Scores interpreted and evaluation and recommendations made
9.		Feedback to teachers and student (on data not on test skills)
10.		Student record maintained (coded scores)

is learned that that which is learned can be measured. (2) Even a brief look at the issue should dissuade all but the most tenacious from direct dependence upon the "learn it -- test it" syndrome.

How many kinds of tests would be necessary to measure the most significant "learnings" of a program?

1. Learning of basic skills?
2. Learning of concepts?
3. Learning of a comprehensive subject matter?

What about those "learnings" which we all deem crucial to a person in a democracy?

1. Learning to know oneself?
2. Learning to love learning?
3. Learning to be a citizen?

What of those learnings which traditionally have been taken for granted?

1. Learning to take tests?
2. Learning to do abstract thinking?
3. Learning to make value judgments?

Cultural histories which are different from those used as the basis for instructional materials establish diverse learning needs for many children, e.g.,

1. Learning to maintain pride in one's own family patterns?
2. Learning to function effectively in different cultural systems?
3. Learning to gain strength from shared differences?

Assumptions which must be used to justify testing compound the problem. We, in this country, have always believed in "a day's pay for a day's work." (An educational translation would be the "cash value" of an idea.) This maxim becomes a "good grade, a promotion, and academic success for doing well on the achievement tests of various kinds."

What Are Some of the Major Concerns With Regard to Testing for Learning?

·Do the testing instructions confuse the test content?

·Are the test items correctly formulated? (Such that they make sense and are not ambiguous?)

·Do the items "add up" to a cumulative score and not to a conglomeration?

·Is the material taught in the classroom directly or only indirectly evident on the test? (Are the parallels easy to identify?)

·Is the information presented in such a way as to require abstraction skills in addition to knowing the information? (Are questions framed in analogical terms?)

·Are the statistical procedures appropriate for the group and the size of the test population?

The student's score on a measure may be largely a function of his ability to understand unusual and difficult syntax and to follow complex directions rather than indicate his ability to answer the questions themselves.

"Several well-known reading tests for early primary pupils have two columns of items on each page with eight or more items per column and four choices per item, plus the item stem or stimulus (e.g., a picture). Sometimes this complexity is further compounded by: small print, poor and ambiguous drawings and by how the student has to mark his choice." (3)

What do Test Scores Mean?

On what criterion group are the norms calculated? Is the score a score for test taking skills or can the score be directly traced to the information gained or not gained? Does the testing process get in the way of retrieving test result information?

An overwhelming matter usually left to later generations concerns the use of tests in the classroom at one time in a student's education which play a role in forming the student's life expectations and self-image for years to come. Strangely enough, were we to test ten years later for those very skills which were learned by these students, the results would be shocking. How many of you, for instance, can still compute a square root? Identify iambic pentameter? Explain why Washington crossed the Delaware? The knowledge attrition is extensive.

A major concern rests on the educational fallout from retroactively applied testing criteria.

1. Readiness Measures	2. Classroom Skills	3. Grade Level Skills	4. Graduation Skills	Lapse of Time and Usage	"Educational" Doppler effect*-- attrition of knowledge i.e., Loss evident but not real in that the measuring stick falls into disuse in direct relationship to the time and distance from school work

*Doppler effect--the apparent change in the frequency of a wave, as a light wave or sound wave, resulting from a change in the distance between the source of the wave and the receiver. Named after C. J. Doppler (1803-53), Austrian physicist.

This situation has led to the practice of holding students responsible (accountable) only for those goal areas which are amenable to measurement with existing standardized instruments, while omitting from tests any specifications for performance on goals that are difficult to assess, but which nevertheless constitute a sense of personal worth as a human in the society.

III.

Conclusion: The Reassessment of Assessments.

Every American school system has as its educational mission the preparation of citizens for full participation in our Democracy. The goals of the schools set the framework in which specific program objectives can be planned and put into operation. A student's progress can be measured only in terms of some level of expectancy for the student on the program objectives being used for that student's program.

The level of expectancy for each student should be determined in ways that will assure each student the best educational opportunities and to assure the schools that the objectives of the school programs are appropriate and effective. Some form of comprehensive, cumulative, and continuous evaluation of the educational progress of students should be in use for each school. Yet each evaluation should include additional measures of progress for those students for whom standard assessments are inappropriate. Each evaluation must include a weighted score for each student's test-taking skills in addition to the weighted score for the various norms on which an individual performance score is to be plotted.

Recommendations.

Educators should:

·develop test instructions, formats, and designs that coincide with the test-taking skills of the person taking the test

·reassess administrative procedures when test scores are being used for long range accountability purposes.

"...the need to parallel equal opportunities with equal assessment, i.e., where an evaluation of grade level competency is made, the evaluative measures must reflect a consideration for the patterns of learning which characterize the norming population to which the student is being compared." (4)

Some guidelines for the establishment of grade level competencies should address the following basic issues: (5)

1. "What is the pervasive purpose of education in a democracy in terms of preparing students to participate effectively in American society?"

2. "Is there a clear relationship between what is narrowly measured as success in basic skills at any given grade level and the student's success in society as a worker or a citizen?"

3. "Assuming a need for school systems to measure student success in quantitative ways, are the tests used (based on the norms developed) appropriate to all students evaluated by those measures?"

4. "Are there criteria used by professionals in the assessment of student competence which go beyond measures taken from standard test patterns...?"

Some Further Considerations and Suggestions.

Is this position a "cop out?" No, not a cop out but a concern for "survival cost accounting" in education. We must not hold students accountable for skills which they never were taught. No, not a cop out at all, not even a "soft headed" approach to educational measurement. Rather -- a question. Several questions.

Should students be prepared for

·citizenship in our democracy and for the love of learning?

·information and skills that are needed to live a productive personal life?

·information and skills presented with the best professional strategies?

Should teachers

·measure for information and skills?

·measure for learning without considering the testing process as a subject matter in itself?

·teach all the information and skills necessary for students to take information tests?

Should administrators

·collect the scores on the students' attainments on tests of information and on basic skills?

·collect the students' attainments on the tests which measure test understanding and test-taking skills?

·establish norms for test-taking patterns as well as for content information and basic skills?

Should educators

·develop detailed and well-packaged instructional materials from which students can learn about test purposes, test procedures, and about the long-range implications of test results?

·provide a professional review on the precise relationships between

-teaching and professional evaluation of "teaching effectiveness?"

-teaching students learning and assessments of student success at both the material learned and the measures used?

-norms of the various types collated and the possible meaning of a student's educational and test profile on the norms used?

·introduce a series of community educational programs designed to broaden the perspectives of parents on educational goals and on professional training and dedication?

The "bottom line" of educational programs can be formalized in

·the satisfaction of completing classes, programs, and degrees

·the transferable learning habits accumulated during the hours, months, and years of educational preparation

·the specific knowledge which is retained and retrievable for continuing success during the years which follow school attendance.

The meaning of the "bottom line" undergoes a dramatic change

from the time of classroom attendance where tests are specific and scores are normed and graded, to

·post-school years where the criteria of success are rather general and where the "facts" of school days are lost and rarely called into use without reference resources, and finally to

·ongoing adult life experiences wherein the "educational fallout" has all but disappeared and the educational residue has been subsumed or lost in the matrix of learning to solve daily problems.

Life is a series of tests -- knowledge is important (at least that which is not lost in time/usage attrition).

The problem-solving skill, the double-think sequence, remains as a deliberate style for facing the unknown. This, then, is the most promising bottom line of educational accountability.

Documentations.

1. For examples of I.Q. training, see: Bilingualism, Bilingual Education, and Biculturalism: Three Issues in Search of Meaning, by Maria L. Urquides, 1976. Creative Analysis, by Albert Upton and Richard W. Samson (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1963). Doublethink, by T. Frank Saunders and Colleen S. Decker (Tucson, Arizona: Farmington Press, 1973). Unbiased Assessment, by T. F. Saunders, Roy Blake, and Colleen Decker (produced for the Southwest Regional Resource Center in conjunction with the Regional Task Force on Nondiscriminatory Appraisal and Programming, 1976).

2. The converse assumption is held by T. F. Saunders in that, "That which can be measured can be taught." This reference is primarily to intelligence, but can be seen to apply equally well to the testing syndrome, e.g., testing for testing training as a subject matter skill itself.

3. "The Uses and Limitations of Standardized Tests in Meeting the Demands for Accountability" by Stephen P. Klein, University of California, Los Angeles. Based on an address to the AASA National Academy for School Executives, Dallas, Texas, October 6, 1976.

4. "Rationale and Position Paper for the Assessment and Certification of Grade Level Competency: An Instructional Packet," (Tucson Unified School District; Dr. Wilbur Lewis, Superintendent and Dr. Florence Reynolds, Deputy Superintendent, 1977).

5. Ibid.

CHAPTER 11.

GERMAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS: PERSPECTIVES AND QUESTIONS FOR AMERICANS.

WILLIAM B. LEE AND WAYNE DUMAS.

The subject of this paper is secondary schools in the Federal Republic of Germany but let us be clear about the real target -- American schools and American education. We have long felt that the most compelling reason, the ultimate justification for the study of education in other countries is not to learn about their schools, but for the new knowledge and the fresh insights we receive about ourselves.

We create a new frame of reference from which we can observe and interpret American education, a perspective that usually provokes questions which never would have been articulated or perhaps not even thought of without the comparative framework. At least this was our experience during our recently completed study of German schools. (1)

It was also our experience that during the initial phase of trying to understand German education, one had to be constantly on guard against interpreting them in an American rather than a German context. At times it was difficult to keep an open mind and to withhold judgment because of our own American conceptions, often unarticulated, and firm convictions of what education ought to be. Still to view German schools as if they were American can be disastrous, leading to considerable confusion and numerous errors of interpretation.

In this paper we will first briefly inform or remind the reader of two aspects of German education which especially must be viewed in a German and not an American context. Then, we will describe the German system of secondary education and finally will conclude with perspectives and questions which we think will be of particular interest to American educators.

German Educational Context.

Within the German educational context we became increasingly aware of two crucial areas which are especially necessary to consider from a uniquely German point of view. (a) State control and national unifying tendencies and (b) politics and education.

Like the United States, Germany has a state rather than a national system of education. This means that each of the eleven states has the ultimate authority for the educational system within its borders. Throughout German history this has always been technically true and this traditional arrangement was re-affirmed in 1949 with the founding of the Federal Republic. The new constitution set forth only a few educational principles applicable to the nation as a whole and gave the Federal government no power at all in the field of education. A strong reiteration of state sovereignty seemed to be the best way to correct the abuse and deterioration of the schools during the Hitler era and to prevent their reoccurance in the future.

However, there are two important differences between the state control of education in the two countries. In Germany, education is highly centralized with the state government not sharing its decision-making authority with local units. It is almost as if Germany were made up of eleven school districts -- one for each state -- instead of the more than 17,000 in the United States. In addition, there are a number of national agencies and commissions formed by the state and federal governments whose specific purpose is to further narrow the range of educational differences that do exist among the eleven states. Having governmental sanction and working within the governmental structures these organizations have considerable impact. Thus, despite the state system of education the structure tends to be highly uniform throughout the country.

In both the United States and Germany education is political in the sense that the ultimate authority for education belongs to elected representatives who are directly or indirectly responsible to the electorate. There are, however, two crucial distinctions. The first is that educational politics in the United States is typically non-partisan, not usually related to Republicans and Democrats, whereas in Germany it is distinctly partisan. The two national political parties espouse comprehensive educational programs reflecting their own political philosophies and which predictably are in basic conflict with each other.

The second distinction is related to the first. In the United States educational politics tend to have a local-state focus. There is considerable educational politicking at the local level and state-wide controversies have direct and immediate local significance but usually little impact on the national scene. (The current furor over busing may cause us to qualify this generalization in the future.) In Germany, educational politics have a state-national focus, by passing the local level.

In the absence of local political activity, any issue, however trivial, automatically must be resolved at the state level, and implications are usually nationwide. Politicians are sensitive to voter moods and analyze the results of state elections in an attempt to determine trends applicable to other states or to the nation as a whole. Election strategies and political platforms are modified accordingly.

German Secondary Schools.

Let us now examine the German system of secondary education (Figure 1).

You will note that primary school lasts only four years and secondary schooling begins at age 11 in grade 5. An even more fundamental difference is the vertical structure of secondary education. It reminds us of the situation of an American housewife in a German meat market attempting to buy her favorite piece of meat, a T-bone steak. Her frustration is understandable when she discovers that it does not exist -- not because German cattle are different than American, but the beef is cut differently. German schools, too, are cut differently. They are not divided horizontally by the age of the student, junior high 12-14 and senior high 15-18. They are separated vertically, three parallel school structures. This is the German tripartite system, famous -- or infamous -- depending on your politics or your nationality.

This vertical cleavage is indigenous and as natural for Germans as the horizontal one is for Americans. The present Hauptschule (main school) has its historical roots in the village elementary school Volkschule which once provided education for the children of farmers and unskilled workers. The forerunners of the Realschule, Secondary Modern school or the Middle School, was located in the towns. It attracted the children of the middle class, skilled workers, lower civil servants and small businessmen who could afford the modest fees. The third school, the

Figure 1

STRUCTURE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2)



Gymnasium or the classical grammar school, was also found in towns and was more expensive than the middle school. It was the most prestigious and reserved for upper class children whose fathers were rich landowners or professional men.

This compartmentalization has persisted and even today reflects these three discrete segments (see again, Figure 1). Hauptschule graduates are eligible after 10 years of schooling for vocational schools which train them for skilled and semi-skilled blue collar jobs. Students successful in the Realschule also graduate after a 10th year to pursue additional technical training but for white collar or middle management positions. As for the Gymnasium students, they are even today the elite. Those who complete this rigorous academic program and pass the difficult "Abitur" examination after their 13th year almost always attend the university, the successful completion of which accords considerable prestige and social status.

A clear hierarchy of Gymnasium, Realschule and Hauptschule is open and deliberate. If one is seeking an analogy in the United States the recommendations of the California Coordinating Council on High Education perhaps come close. The top 12% of a high school graduating class are eligible for the University of California, the next 33 1/3% for a California State College (now University) and the remainder would be eligible to attend the two year community colleges. Coupled with this hierarchy is the social class bias of the three German schools. For example, the Gymnasium not only prepares students for high administrative positions and the professions but also recruits students from the same milieu. The school then has become a vital instrument in maintaining clearly delineated social class divisions. It is almost as if there is a tri-level conveyor belt which procures the raw materials from different layers, processes it and then deposits the finished product at a corresponding level.

There is some evidence that more students from the lower social classes are now attending the Gymnasium. However, such liberal enrollment does not assure success, as only about 60% of those entering actually graduate. While this does represent a marked increase over previous figures, there are fears and some indications that the lower social classes will be overrepresented in the remaining 40%.

Both political parties would like to reform the traditional tripartite system. Both adhere to the principle of equality of opportunity (Chance Gelegenheit) and agree that early selection at the age of eleven violates this principle. They also criticize the lack of flexibility

which make the critical choice definitive and upward transfer almost impossible. However, the solutions offered by the two political parties differ dramatically. (3) The SPD (Socialists) view the Orientation Stage (Figure 1), as the first step toward elimination of the tripartite system and the gradual adoption of a comprehensive School (Gesamtschule). These schools would resemble somewhat the American comprehensive high school but in fact have been more inspired by Swedish and British models. The CDU (Conservatives) endorse the Orientation Stage but consider it operating within the three different schools, rather than a single one. They would hope to change the tripartite system to make transfer easier from one school to another. For them this is the end rather than the beginning of reform for they regard the comprehensive school with considerable skepticism.

The extent to which political parties determine educational systems within a state can be seen by the distribution of comprehensive schools. There are 114 in the SPD state of Hesse as compared to three in the bordering state of Rheinland - Pfalz which is controlled by the CDU.

At the present time it does appear as if the conservative position is prevailing. The comprehensive school has been unpopular with the general public and the Socialists believe that their advocacy of it has been at least partially responsible for recent setbacks in elections at the state level. The Socialists are presently in power but are beseiged by other urgent social and political problems and are in no position to press for further reforms. Indeed the movement toward the comprehensive school appears to have lost momentum and may even be losing ground.

Perspectives and Questions.

Americans do tend to be very critical of German secondary schools. One of the authors, in escorting nearly 200 American graduate students and teachers through German schools, was struck by the regularity with which they were seen as being elitest and undemocratic. As we generally shared this opinion we did not immediately grasp the significance of the fact that most certainly a clear majority, of Germans, did not agree. What emerged were two distinctly different national viewpoints; the Americans almost unanimously disapproving while most of the Germans approved.

We could, of course, have ignored the bifurcation of opinion, deciding that it was beyond the scope of our study, but quite frankly we were intrigued

by the situation and wished to explain it, at least to our own satisfaction. We easily understood why Americans would condemn a system of secondary education which is hierarchal, has clear social class bias, and which assigns students to a secondary school at the age of eleven and then makes it virtually impossible to transfer to a higher one. What puzzled us was how the Germans, how anyone, could defend such an arrangement? Or to draw the question out in the open, what are the redeeming features, if any, of the German tripartite system.

Eventually we found that we could not comprehend the German viewpoint, nor explain these national differences of opinion without dealing with the question of educational goals and their priorities. What are the most fundamental functions of German and American secondary schools?

After considerable sorting out of fundamental functions from secondary goals and objectives, we concluded that a system must give priority to (a) the development and self-realization of each individual, or (b) the preparation of individuals for a social and economic niche. Both the United States and Germany accept both of these obligations for their respective schools, but it has become increasingly clear to us that our priorities are reversed. Americans place at the peak of their priorities such ideas as individual freedom, individual initiative, rights of individuals to be different and to act differently within reasonable limits. We, of course, would also desperately hope that our school graduates will find a satisfying place in the national life after school, but for Americans schools to prepare people for their "place" or "to fit in" raise spectres of manipulation and subordination of individuality. We are generally a little frightened of the implications of a school system which begins by looking at the characteristics and needs of the national social, political, and economic system. Germans, on the other hand, seem to us to place much the higher priority on the second function, the preparation of individuals for a social and economic niche. They, like Americans, also accept the development and realization of each individual as a legitimate function of the school, but for Germans it is a secondary function, partly following from the first.

With the German priorities in mind let us take another look at their secondary schools. If judged by the criterion of selecting and sorting for future production roles in society they do very well indeed. Up until the present oil-induced recession there was no unemployment in Germany for any age group as compared to the United States 6-10 per cent adult unemployment and three times that for teenagers. Today teenage unemployment is over 5 per cent and both political parties agree that a crisis exists. The school with its opening toward society has generally

succeeded in preparing everyone for a place in it.

The schools also function internally according to that principle. There may be drop-downs, but no drop-outs. One might even say that while any given institution is cruel or harsh, the system itself is kindly. There are a sufficient number of realistic options so that in both the school and society there is a niche for everyone. A case can be made that this system is much more attuned than to the most basic of human needs. A sense of belonging, according to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, is a fundamental need superseded only by physical and biological needs. In Germany, everyone does belong and has a place in an identifiable socio-economic arrangement. Esteem and self-esteem are higher needs to be developed after the more basic ones have been fulfilled.

This explanation of the divergence of American and German viewpoints toward German secondary schools should not be uncritically accepted, even, or perhaps especially, with the underlying assumption that one can determine educational goals and their priorities. Can this really be done? If so, is it accurate to assert that Americans and Germans do reverse the priorities of the educational goals of personal development and a productive place in society? To us it did seem that Americans were condemning German schools for not concentrating on American priorities but there may be a clearer, simpler, and more persuasive explanation. Indeed how does one explain these distinctly different national viewpoints?

However, let us now, as was our original intention, return to American education. As we emphasized in the introduction, information about school systems in other countries can provoke questions about American education which had been previously ignored and issues which had been vague and nebulous are often brought into much sharper focus.

Let us begin with questions about American goals and their priorities (assuming, of course, that our interpretation is accurate or at least plausible). Are we not overly concerned, even obsessed, with creating pleasant learning environments where children may develop according to their own inclinations? May this not be self-defeating in the long run? How can one concentrate on personal development in the <u>present</u> without consideration of their long range consequences? Stated another way, is not planning for the child's future economic and social niche during his formative years an effective way to achieve the more individual goals? After all can we not achieve self-realization through productive work?

Let us continue with additional questions about American schools. How can a secondary school system claim to be humane and caring when 15-50

per cent of its graduates (depending on ethnic origin and residence) predictably will not find employment? Are self-realization and personal development even possible without having job skills or the possibility of employment? Should present self-choice be limited in order to assure a future productive role in society? If so, by whom?

And what about the school's relationship with the American society. Can the school even consider vocational functions without a full employment society? Can a school be called humane and still ignore the overwhelming social problems engulfing so many of the youngsters? Does the school belong in the "change the society" business? Can (should) the school remain neutral and ignore the problems of the larger society?

Posing these questions in no way implies that we have answers to them, let alone the right answer. For us they are significant and provocative questions about American education which we now view differently and more urgently as a result of our study of German schools. They are examples of how, when studying education in other countries, one is led, sometimes even compelled, to confront related issues about our own schools.

We could conclude this paper by reiterating the introductory themes of stressing the need to interpret German schools within a German context and by insisting that if Americans judge German schools it should not be according to a romanticized notion of what American schools should be doing. We could also point out that the study of other school systems is rewarding because one is often forced to consider neglected areas of American education. We could also plead with those wishing to reform German schools to concentrate their efforts on the imperfections of American education which they can influence and leave the flaws in German education to their own reformers.

However, we would like to conclude with another thought which transcends both American and German education and is concerned with the general issue of educational goals and their priorities. We do not believe that in any country with democratic aspirations, such as the United States and Western Germany, that there need be a single, immutable and inflexible right order for educational goals. Should not each free society have the right to determine its own educational priorities? These may vary from country to country with each one deciding for itself according to its own historical development and corresponding to the needs of its citizens. Similarly, within any given country, goal priorities may shift as economic, political and social conditions change; the priorities of today and yesterday need not be those of tomorrow. Nor do these shifting priorities reflect a type of moral relativism where one school system and one set of priorities is

as good as another. There is a criterion which supercedes education goals and by which they may be judged -- the creation of a democratic society. We would agree with John Dewey who stated simply and eloquently:

"It is not my purpose here to go in detail into the reason. But I would ask a single question: Can we find any reason that does not ultimately come down to the belief that democratic social arrangements promote a better quality of human experience, one which is more widely accessible and enjoyed, than do non-democratic and anti-democratic forms of social life?" (4)

Documentations.

1. Wayne Dumas and William Lee, Social Studies in American Schools First Hand Perspectives for Educators. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, to be published, April 1978. Portions of this paper are from chapters two and three and are included with the permission of the publisher.

2. This diagram is adapted from one provided in Brigitte Mohr, "The School Education System in the Federal Republic of Germany," Bilding und Wissenshaft (No. 17), 1975, p. 256.

3. The Socialist party (SPD) is the more liberal party in the predominantly two party system. The Christian Democrats (CDU) is the more conservative party.

4. John Dewey, Experience and Education. New York: Collier Books, 1938-1963, p. 34.

CHAPTER 12.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: WHY DON'T STUDENTS LEARN MORE? SOME IMPROVEMENTS THE SCHOOLS CAN MAKE.

JOHN B. CONNELY.

Let us start with the observation that learning is a widespread natural phenomena in all known human cultures. Whatever language we speak, we have learned. Whatever skills we possess, we have learned. Whatever knowledge we profess, we have learned. If learning is as normal to human beings as it seems to be, two questions should puzzle us as we view schooling problems.

1. Why do many students seem to learn so little of what we expect them to?

2. Is there some meta-subject or skill, such as Latin was once thought to be, which could give unity and purpose to the educational endeavor?

I intend in this paper to discuss five themes which I believe give some insight on these two questions.

Theme I.

Adequate learning of even moderately demanding skills or knowledge structures takes time. Just think in terms of learning to play the piano or becoming a good football player.

Many of our schools are plagued with a continuing transiency problem. Some children may attend up to six or more different schools in a school year. It is not unusual for a public school to have in excess of one-third turnover of students in a given year. It is fairly common for a high school graduating class to contain less than 10 per cent of those who started at the local elementary school.

Although this degree of movement does not mean that all children who move suffer educationally, for many children there is certainly a loss of school time and curricular continuity.

Theme II.

Transiency, however, is only one part of a larger question -- that of time actually spent in learning in a classroom.

Let's look at contact time in several ways. The average school district in California is required to be open for a minimum of 179 days a year. That works out to approximately 49% of the year. Students are in school slightly less than half the year.

That is a rather misleading figure. One somewhat more realistic in its implications can be found by computing the approximate number of hours a student is supposedly attending class. Assuming that an average secondary student is in class for six 50-minute periods a day, five days a week, then he is before his teachers 25 hours a week or 895 hours a year or, figuring a 40-hour work week -- a little over 22 weeks a year. That works out to about 42% of the year.

Since there are roughly 8,760 hours in a year, then our student is in a formal learning environment approximately 10% of his time. And, if we want to compute what per cent of his time he has spent in class by the time he has graduated from high school it comes to about 6.8% -- remembering that he will only go to school for 12 of his 18 years.

Now lest this seem gloomy enough, the figure really is seriously misleading in its simplicity. For, if taken at face value, it obscures the question of how the allotted time is utilized.

A significant portion of the allotted time is used for non-instructional purposes. How significant is difficult to say, since it will vary from student to student, grade level to grade level, teacher to teacher, school to school and year to year. A list of such non-instructional activities would be long, but such a list would typically include assemblies, fire drills, pep rallies, extra practices for sports and band and glee club, rehearsals for Christmas, Easter and graduation activities, the reading of the bulletin, the taking of the roll, the handing out and collection of class materials, the filling out of book cards, federal impact cards and

attendance cards, etc., etc. I am sure each of you could add an example from personal experience.

Another problem is that the time is scattered among, if not exactly a myriad of subjects, then a great many. Again, this will vary in many ways, but a secondary student would, at minimum, have six subjects a year vying for his class time. This would work out to approximately 149 hours per subject, before subtracting non-instructional activities. However, the typical student has more than six subjects in a given year. He may have six the first semester and 3 or 4 different courses the second. Thus, while 2 or 3 of his courses would continue to run for a total of 149 hours, the others would run for half that or approximately 74 hours before assemblies, etc., are subtracted.

An elementary student's course time would be much more difficult to compute because of the different structure of the teaching assignment. One would assume, however, from the large number of goals an elementary teacher is supposed to achieve, that few subjects would receive more time than a single subject taken for a year in a secondary school.

Another consideration is that it is confusing to think in terms of a subject as a coherent unity. This "subject" that, at most, is going to take up 149 hours a year, may involve innumerable different elements. An English class may encompass lessons in grammar, composition, spelling, oral reading, reading dramatic presentations, giving speeches, and in the history of the English language.

A social studies class may involve vocabulary lists, maps, readings, current events, a plethora of different historical episodes or epochs, time lines and dates and concepts drawn from sociology, archaeology, economics, political science, philosophy, psychology, the physical sciences and history.

So instead of speaking of a "subject" we should really speak of. perhaps, topics. Now these topics all take up some portion of the total time allotted to the class. They may, hopefully, relate to the larger purpose of the course, for instance as spelling may relate to composition. They may, however, have only the most tenuous relationship, as for instance current event reports on freeway accidents or divorces of Hollywood celebrities to social studies.

A further problem is that a great deal can occur in class which attenuates the amount of learning taking place. Think back on your "golden rule days." How much time was spent looking out the window, daydreaming,

passing notes, patiently waiting for the class to end? How many teachers lost time by poor organization? How many teachers accomplished little because of communication, pacing or overlap problems?

Thus when one tries to ascertain how much time really was involved on studying to learn a specific skill or concept, the resultant learning or lack of it may be explained to a significant extent by the simple variable of the amount of time profitably spent.

Theme III.

Learning is developmental and sequential in nature. Whatever skills and knowledge structures are learned, they have been developed. A student must grope and puzzle, try and try and try again. He must come to know the parts which constitute the whole and the whole by which the parts have acquired meaning. Complex learning cannot be done all at once, but consists of many intermediate steps out of which a gestalt can emerge.

This not only takes time, it takes long, arduous, concentrated, sequenced effort. This is true whether we are learning to do cabinet work or seeking to understand the French Revolution.

The analysis of contact time brings into question whether enough time is allowed for complex learnings to occur at all. It may further be observed that a developmental line may be only haphazardly followed, if at all, by a given teacher, as the class wanders from one task to another. Later, as a student moves from one teacher to another, any particular developmental line may be given a different priority or completely ignored. Most of us have had experiences where one teacher emphasized one aspect of a curriculum and the next one, a different aspect. It must then be asked whether whatever time is available is being fruitfully utilized to achieve the desired overall, long-term goals (assuming there are such) of the educational system.

Theme IV

J. Z. Young, a British surgeon, wrote a book a number of years ago entitled Doubt and Certainty in Science. In it he discusses the

development of visual perception in the case of patients who have been blind from birth and whose sight has been gained as an adult through surgery. What is of particular interest is that for the first time adults capable of speech could describe the experience of learning to see.

Dr. Young, discussing a series of interviews with such a patient, wrote that at first:

"He reports only a spinning mass of lights and colours. He proves to be quite unable to pick out objects by sight, to recognize what they are, or to name them. He has no conception of a space with objects in it, although he knows all about objects and their names by touch."

"For many weeks and months after beginning to see, the person can only with great difficulty distinguish between the simplest shapes, such as a triangle and a square. If you ask him how he does it, he may say, 'Of course if I look carefully I see that there are three sharp turns at the edge of the one patch of light, and four on the other.'"

"Gradually the patient leaves out the laborious counting of the corners and comes to identify things ... . So it is not that all along the eyes or brain were incapable of acting normally. What these people lack is the store of rules in the brain, rules usually learnt by the long years of exploration with the eyes during childhood. They have no [mental] models with which to compare input, ..."

"No models to help ... [them] abstract, to select significant features ... [which otherwise do] not seem to mean anything."

J. Z. Young then adds that "... we have to learn to see the world as we do."

Here we have excellent data from which to develop a paradigm of learning.

1. The person must be capable of learning a particular skill or knowledge structure.

2. Feedback must be received for several reasons. The learner must be able to determine whether he is making a correct response. He must have a sense of progress or completion which will encourage a continuing effort. Dr. Young reports that for some of the patients the experience of learning to interpret their visual impressions was so frustrating that they ceased to make the effort necessary to learn to see and consequently <u>did not learn</u>.

In an even more profound sense, however, feedback is crucial to the learning process. Without it as a touchstone there is no way to determine which aspects of experience are not meaningless, because initially all aspects apparently are.

3. Learning and developing a mental map by which visual interpretation was possible depended on the existence of an external standard. The learner had to be able to form judgments as to whether his responses were correct or not. Without the external structure initially it is hard to imagine how the patients could have formed their models of that external structure.

4. Seeing, as we understand it, seems to rest on perceptual skills which have been practiced sufficiently to bring about extensive overlearning. Adequate learning in this case demands repetition until a whole range of skills are performed automatically and perhaps unconsciously.

5. Learning to see is a process that verifies our earlier contention that learning is developmental and sequential in nature. Complex learning cannot be done all at once, but consists of many intermediate steps out of which a gestalt should emerge. This not only takes time, it takes long, arduous, concentrated, sequenced effort.

To the extent these statements are valid, they can be used to evaluate various school situations. To what extent does schooling incorporate those factors which are involved in learning to see?

1. Is care taken to place the learner in a situation congenial to his ability level?

2. Is feedback provided of the right kind, at the right time and in the right amounts?

3. Is there a clear external standard by which the learner may judge his progress and success?

4. Are skills and knowledge structures learned adequately enough so that they can be utilized for whatever purpose they were learned?

5. Finally, is the schooling environment structured so as to enable and encourage the sequential development of complex learnings to occur?

Theme V.

The path to learning seems made exceedingly devious for even the most stout of heart because of the labyrinthine nature of language. We are truly entrapped in a semantic maze which is so ubiquitous that many are not in control of language but are rather in many ways controlled by it and often oblivious to their prison and imprisonment.

Comprehension of language is not just a problem vis-a-vis our understanding of what others write and say. It is, in a more subtle way, a problem vis-a-vis our understanding of our own experiences. We encode our impression of our experiences in language, in fact part of our memory of our past is the memory of the encoding. Thus our language skills in many ways become significantly a measure of our ability to understand not only others, but ourselves, too.

An omnipresent human potential is that we will become so beguiled with the linguistic world we create that we may come to prefer it to the perhaps harsher less understandable or comfortable aspects of the real world we live in. We all seem to seek some degree of closure, of being able to believe that we know why and how the world and its denizens behave as they do. Thus we may find great psychological satisfaction in explanations that don't really explain anything at all. The extent to which we can join with others who find the same explanations satisfying is, of course, not necessarily evidence of the truth of our individual mental maps, but provides us a great deal of comfort and, if properly harnessed, may become an exceedingly powerful political force.

It has often been said that nothing is so powerful as an idea whose time has come. This may be so, but it does not insure that the idea is true in any logical or scientific sense. Hitler and his minions moved the world with many ideas which most of us consider largely invalid if not completely fallacious.

The nature of our language (and perhaps human nature) is such that we readily confuse fact, inference and value judgment. We confuse the intensional world of words with the extensional world of things. We see in a situation not what is there, but what we thought to find or hoped to find, or needed to find or we avoid the actual situation entirely and believe what we were told about it. We often cannot perceive the individual except through categorical lenses. What in reality are

inferences, may become, to us, dogmatic facts with which we flail at any who dare to disagree. Our value judgments become as real and palpable as the colors and shapes which we find in our perceptions. We forget, if we ever knew, that in many fields -- such as history -- the bulk of our knowledge consists of inferences which represent the perceptions, backgrounds and value judgments of the writer.

Words are magic. We are able to believe what we say. And having heard ourselves say it, it often becomes a certainty, if not at first, then on subsequent retellings. And thus a thrice-told tale becomes the past upon which we rely to help us confront the present and fend off the future.

This is the human heritage: An epistemological urge to truth -- for even the most in error assert their error in the name of truth -- and an enormous capacity for error. Other species can lie -- they can play dead to try to escape an enemy. Only human beings, as far as I know, can lie to themselves. Who, then, becomes the enemy?

Conclusion.

We are now better able to consider the two questions that were asked at the beginning.

1. Why do many students seem to learn so little of what we expect them to?

The problem of transiency and the lack of enough time being spent in a focused manner are an important consideration. Enough time, well spent, is certainly a sine qua non of adequate learning. Many children may not attain various educational goals because adequate time is not available, and what time is available may be poorly utilized in a fragmented fashion.

What time is available, moreover, is often not used to teach in a developmental, sequential manner. For a variety of reasons the individual teacher may view time as blocks to be filled in with a variety of non-related tasks which have little or no cumulative impact.

Not only should clear, developmental lines form the backbone of classroom instruction, but the learning environment ought to be structured so as to maximize the natural learning potential of the students. Any situation where the students' learning levels, adequate feedback and repetition,

and clear goals and subgoals, are not adequately considered and utilized is a situation where poor learning is likely to result. Thus, although students may learn poorly for a number of other reasons, they almost certainly will not be able to adequately utilize their normal ability to learn if the learning environment is not organized in such a way as to encourage such behavior.

2. Is there some meta-subject or skill, such as Latin was once thought to be, which could give unity and purpose to the educational endeavor?

That a meta-subject does exist is at least a defensible proposition. The ability to use language clearly, to describe adequately, to differentiate factual statements from inferences and value judgments, to develop a reasonably skeptical attitude toward what one hears and reads and tells oneself -- such language skills could not only provide a central, coherent developmental theme for which the vast majority of school subjects could form various alternative aspects, but they are necessarily a part of any improvement in the human condition. Their usefulness extends far beyond any immediate, local need.

The ability to talk sense is not just another skill among many. It is the paramount skill. The skill that interpenetrates all others and upon which all others are based. Probably no greater gift could be extended than that a person could learn to talk accurately to himself and others -- to talk in such a way that what one says "fits" the discoverable aspects of life and nature.

I conclude, therefore, that we need not despair of the possibility of improvement, though we may lack the means. Better learning is possible and a unifying theme may be available. Our job is to resolutely work for tomorrow while having to live today.

CHAPTER 13.

APPRECIATION: ANOTHER LOOK.

NICHOLAS APPLETON.

The concept of appreciation has been pervasive and persistent in the curricula of our schools as an appropriate objective. The concept has nudged its way, under the aegis of a variety of meanings, into a wide range of courses offered at every level of schooling. Many schools offer courses called "Appreciation of Art" or "Appreciation of Music" and many more incorporate the concept of appreciation into syllabi and course descriptions. For example, appreciation of the real number system, the political climate leading into World War II, or the socialization patterns of a primitive tribe are all common usages that imply that there is something of importance being imparted.

But, although the concept of appreciation is popular, its popularity is not attended by equal clarity and precision enabling theorists to describe and account for students' experience of appreciation or for teachers' ability to design logically sequenced instructional steps for attainment of the desired goal by their pupils. Indeed, concepts like appreciation have been criticized as being unworthy educational objectives because of their ambiguity and lack of measurability. Ambiguity in the concept results from several interrelated factors. One factor is that appreciation is most often associated with complex and sophisticated theories of aesthetics. Although aesthetic theories have been advanced from classical times to the present and constitute a substantial body of literature, they continue to generate discussion and controversy. A second factor is that the concept is ordinarily associated with the affective domain, which, because of its private nature, is difficult to measure and verify. We cannot be certain about the existence of an affective state or its quality. A third factor is that "appreciation" has not one but several usages in ordinary language and the different usages are compounded by the fact that they are interrelated and are seldom distinguished from one another.

However, as an educational objective, appreciation need not remain forever

imprecise, for at least the third factor lends itself to clarification through conceptual analysis. The required analysis of "appreciation" calls for making distinctions among the different usages of the concept and their educational implications. Through this analytic process both clarity and measurability may be enhanced. Of course, analysis will not completely unravel the mystery of the "appreciative response," particularly in the often opaque realm of aesthetics. But our purpose here is quite modest. If the analysis does no more than point to ways of increasing facility and accuracy of communication as we work with the concept, we shall be successful.

Levels of Appreciation. (1)

A useful point of departure might be found in the observation that appreciation is generally considered to be an affective response. This is evident in the close family relationship between appreciating and prizing, valuing, and holding in esteem -- all generally considered part of the affective domain. But, as Philip Phenix indicates, the affect does not name a simple quality, but is itself a complex concept embracing a range of interdependent meanings. (2) Phenix, in his analysis, goes on to establish developmental levels of the affect, each entailing a greater degree of sophistication. It would seem reasonable that to the extent that appreciation is an affective response we might well expect a similar structure. Indeed, one of Phenix's levels (his second) suggests a distinctive use of "appreciation" with which we might begin.

Appreciation as Pleasure. Phenix characterizes one level of affect by a "hedonic ethic" where one's feelings are generally associated with organic satisfaction and pleasure is taken as a measure of the good. Consider the relationship of this level to the statement: "I really appreciate a glass of cold water on a hot day." The defining feature of appreciation in this sense is the quality of simple enjoyment or pleasure. It is basically a hedonistic response where one does not need to analyze the meaning of his feelings or the values involved nor demand justification for them. They simply present themselves as experienced consummations. In this sense, one might be willing to say that a dog appreciates his bone.

Even though this sense of appreciation remains beyond the level of assessment and evaluation, this is not to say that it has no part in education. One important role suggested by Phenix is that in order to nurture certain modes of behavior necessary for a humane life, learning

situations must be provided in which the value of the experience in itself is acknowledged, instead of being regarded as preparation for something else. Thus:

"...it is important that the young learn to accept and enjoy their own feelings and to trust the messages they convey. To do so is the only basis for fostering a life with direct and unquestioned satisfactions. One need not elaborate on the predominance of ugliness and pain in the world to understand how much in need it is of persons who can appreciate and promote simple love and joy in things perceived." (3)

Support for the intrinsic enjoyment of pleasure has also come from Christopher Jenks. Jenks, arguing that in many respects schools make little difference in the eventual outcome of one's life, suggests that resources should be expended in such a way as to make life in the schools as humane and enjoyable as possible. (4) This argument is fundamentally an ethical one and is based on the fact that, since children spend a considerable amount of their lives in public schools, time ought to be as pleasurable (or painless) as possible.

We may also support the argument that school ought to be enjoyable on instrumental grounds. To the extent that people tend to engage in activities they enjoy, the enjoyment of a course can be justified as an instructional objective if the participation in that subject is deemed worthwhile. Thus, if the subject is seen as being important by teachers, it would seem appropriate for teachers to consider ways to cause their students to enjoy the subject. This position is similar to another argument presented by Phenix, namely that young people of the "now" generation increasingly recognize and reject the "receding horizon" view of life and learning, according to which consummations are postponed until some future date. In a rapidly shifting and essentially unpredictable existence, Phenix argues, the young rightly demand a type of learning experience in which affective fulfillments are immediately practiced and achieved and not merely anticipated in the future. (5)

We might also note that even while enjoyment for the sake of enjoyment tends to violate our Protestant ethic, teachers typically hold enjoyment as a goal for their courses. Most literature teachers, I think, want their students to enjoy literature as well as know the content. In the same manner I'm reasonably sure history teachers want their students to enjoy history and science teachers want their students to enjoy science.

Appreciation as Gratitude. Appreciation, as characterized above, proceeds from a simple sensation of pleasure. It entails no evaluation or judgments.

But contrast this view with the type of appreciation implied in the statement: "He appreciates all the things that have been done for him." To appreciate in this sense is to be grateful. Thus we speak of a person appreciating what someone else has done for that person. In contrast to the use above, the gratitude need not include a sense of enjoyment or pleasure. One might be grateful for a friend being in attendance at a funeral for a close relative but not enjoy the occasion or, in the present context of the funeral, the friend's company. We might also note that, unlike enjoyment in the first case, gratitude entails more than a simple sensation. One must also be able to relate certain relevant variables cognitively in a causal manner. Thus, for one to be grateful for a gift one must see the relationship between gift giving and friendship, or the usefulness of the gift to some desired outcome, or some other set of interrelated variables issuing from that for which one is grateful. In this sense the dog would be incapable of being grateful for the bone inasmuch as he could not comprehend the act which caused him to receive it nor estimate the nourishment he derived from eating it. We might also note that while the perception of the interrelationship is necessary, it is not sufficient. There is one further requirement, that of the perceived desirability of that which is appreciated. One cannot be grateful for something that is not perceived as having value.

On the surface the development of gratitude seems to play a relatively minor role in one's education. Often the focus is on the development and display of good manners as in, "Show some appreciation for what I've done for you." This emphasis on appreciation might be seen as a social lubricant, but there are hints of egoism and dominance as well. The individual who is concerned that others "appreciate all that I've done for you" may be concerned with ego strength or recognizing or reinforcing the importance of one's position as perceived by others. That teachers occasionally lapse into such behavior is not in need of verification. One must, however, question its instrumentality.

Appreciation as gratitude does have a more significant contribution to education. We may desire that students be grateful for a piece of knowledge or skill because of its perceived value or desirability. In this sense, one may come to appreciate a subject by recognizing its usefulness or application. As enjoyment, this sense of appreciation may have instrumental value as an educational objective. In recognizing the value of a subject students might be motivated both to engage in it and to apply it. In reference to application, if one is to appreciate something for what it can do, and its application is desirable, then it would seem reasonable for teachers to expend some effort to instruct students in the application. We must remember that students cannot apply nor appreciate that for which they do not "see" the application.

Application, of course, entails more than merely recognizing the usefulness of something. One must possess the necessary knowledge and skills as well. It is here that we can recognize further distinctive usages of "appreciation."

Intellectual Appreciation. In our first two considerations of appreciation the focus was primarily on the affect. There is a general area of appreciation, however, which accents cognitive functions and where the affect, if present at all, is a by-product. We shall consider three levels of appreciation within this category.

A. Consider the statement: "He has gained an appreciation for the hazards of reckless driving." Appreciation in this sense implies a level of understanding acquired through experience, either real or vicarious. For example, a student may attain such an appreciation by being directly involved in an accident caused by reckless driving or, quite possibly as a classroom experience, by watching films of some accidents where reckless driving was the cause. Regardless of the precipitating feature, the distinctive aspect of this use is the knowledge claim being asserted. The student who observes or is involved in an accident may know that (a) a speeding car can go out of control, (b) the impact of a car with another object while going at a certain speed can do some certain amount of damage, and (c) this automobile damage, combined with body momentum, can cause bodily injury or death. Between these knowings and the appreciation of hazards, however, is a leap of connection and conviction, that there is a cause and effect relationship between reckless driving and threat to life and limb, and that this connection is stronger for reckless driving than for safe driving.

B. Similar to this usage, but distinct enough to warrant notice, is the appreciation exemplified in the statement, "He gained an appreciation for the factors leading up to the Civil War," In this sentence, as in A, we see an ordering of several aspects: the knowledge of events and their assemblage to create a thesis of causality. I think, however, there are some pedagogical if not logical differences between the two. In the case of appreciating the hazards of reckless driving, the interest is in convincing a person psychologically of something which is empirically verifiable -- a consciousness-raising of sorts. The second case seems more theoretical, a matter of selecting events which had an historical connection to the war and constructing an argument on those events. This does not seem to be a case of simple convincing but the development of a psychologically adequate explanation. (6)

C. Consider a third level of intellectual appreciation as exemplified in

the statement, "He can appreciate the differences in their opinions." In this sentence what seems to be implied is a gauging or perception of differences. After learning the opinions, then, this person was able (a) to see the differences, and (b) to have some recognition of the position of each and the reasons for these positions. To appreciate the variance in style between painters might be seen in the same manner. Just like opinion, style is the product of individual thinking, and appreciation of the variance is a comparing activity. As in A and B, a claim to knowledge is an important feature of the usage. To appreciate differences of opinion it can be seen that (a) the opinions must be known, and (b) the grounds for these opinions must be known in either an empirical or psychological sense. But to appreciate differences, the appreciator must further "see the point" in their differences, identifying that there is some logical process that makes each a matter of connection and conviction. In like manner, the individual who appreciates variance in style of painters (a) knows something about painting techniques and representations (perspective, tone, use of space, etc.) and (b) knows something about how each style uses these techniques to achieve a visual and psychological effect. Appreciating, at this point, is again "seeing" how each achieves a different product, both presumably with force and effect.

There is a difference worth noting between the essence of appreciation discussed in A and B and that in C. In A and B we see a singular connective of evidence to conclusion -- reckless driving is hazardous. With regard to opinions and styles, however, there seems to be a more complicated network of connectives -- grounds for opinion and techniques of a product on one hand, and the legitimacy of each opinion and each product on the other. The first is of the convincing type, the second of a more psychological nature, suggesting perception of multiplicity in the interpretations of a situation or a subject.

The educational point to be made for all three types of intellectual appreciation is that students don't just come to appreciate but must learn to appreciate. Furthermore, it seems apparent that facts in themselves are not sufficient for appreciation to take place. Students must be able to order the facts in such a way that they come to "see the point." In the example of the hazards of reckless driving the pedagogical significance lay in a type of consciousness-raising. The facts were there and recognizable but needed to be psychologically connected. In gaining an appreciation for the factors leading up to the Civil War we see the need for the student to grasp a more complex theoretical position. In this case the interrelatedness of the facts is not as straightforward as in reckless driving. Rather, if a student is to come to appreciate, the facts must be

presented in such a way that an interrelationship is cultivated in the student's mind.

To appreciate differences as in C, seems to entail a still more sophisticated cognitive function. Here facts must be known and appreciated in the sense just discussed for each position to be compared. Moreover, one must be able to compare and assess these positions in terms of their relationship to one another. Thus, instead of merely "seeing the point" of a particular position, one must simultaneously entertain a multiplicity of positions in relation to one another. In the simpler sense one might simply study the Impressionist school with an aim for "appreciation." In the more complex sense (and I suspect that this is the dominant tendency) one might seek in addition to "appreciate" the variances in the styles of several schools or several painters in a single school. The teacher choosing this objective has a more difficult task than in other cases for now a more sophisticated network of interrelationships must be cultivated.

Aesthetic Appreciation. There is perhaps one final level of appreciation, that of aesthetic appreciation. To explore the nature of an aesthetic response is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a few brief points may be helpful. For example, let us look at the kind of appreciation as exemplified in the statement, "He can appreciate a good sculpture." First we recognize that aesthetic appreciation carries us back into the affective domain. While at the intellectual level one may or may not have "felt good" about what one perceived, to appreciate a piece of art, or, for that matter, a well constructed argument in an aesthetic sense is to find it pleasing. For the purpose of education it may be useful to consider the quality or value of the aesthetic experience on a continuum based on the impetus of the pleasure derived. For example, it would be useful to distinguish an aesthetic experience which was based primarily on sensory phenomena, as in the first level discussed, (e.g., "I just like it.") from pleasure derived from a more sophisticated level of understanding. The higher end of the continuum would entail a knowledge requirement as developed in intellectual appreciation. For example, when we talk about a sculpture being good, the implication is one of knowing what components make up a good product as opposed to a poor one. Elements of style, detail, imagination, etc., go into the production of a good sculpture, and their appreciation consists in recognizing these as valuable. One might note that aesthetic appreciating differs from that of appreciating variance in style in as much as the latter refers to technical considerations of works most likely already judged as "good." Nevertheless, it seems likely that the conditions of appreciation as developed in this area are necessary components for full aesthetic appreciation.

Conclusion.

It has been suggested that "appreciation" as an education objective has a variety of possible meanings. Questions to which curriculum planners might address themselves include: to what extent should students enjoy the subject matter (e.g., poetry?); what subject matter knowledge is desirable for students to acquire?; and what comparative analytic skills do we wish students to develop? It would seem desirable, however, for educators to consider not only which of these states of appreciation on which to focus, but how to incorporate each into the educational structure of their classrooms. Regardless of our objectives, it will only be through a clear conceptual view of what we are about and the logical and psychological steps leading to it that the richness of the concept will be utilized. It is hoped this brief analysis will contribute to the task.

Documentations.

1. In this section I am indebted to Mr. John Jensen who provided many of the examples.

2. Philip H. Phenix, "Perceptions of an Ethicist About the Affective," in Feeling, Valuing and the Art of Growing: Insights Into the Affective, L. Berman and J. Roderick, editors, Washington, D.C.: ASCD, 1977, p. 60.

3. Ibid., pp. 63-64.

4. Christopher Jenks, Inequality, New York: Basic Books, 1972.

5. Phenix, op. cit., p. 64.

6. For an interesting analysis of the necessary conditions of a psychologically adequate explanation see, Jonas Soltis, "The Subjective Dimension of Explanation," The Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1965.

CHAPTER 14.

THE DEVELOPMENT ETHIC: EXPERIENCES OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP.

CHARLES W. MERRIFIELD.

Introduction.

The address at 1818 H Street, N. W. Washington D. C. is one of the most famous locations in the world. It is the central headquarters of the World Bank Group, a cluster of global financial institutions specializing in something called "development" -- with special reference to the poorer countries of the world. As an exercise in applied ethics, it stands among its related institutions of the UN Development System as a primus inter pares in pioneering the functional (problem-solving) approach to a peaceful world society. Its learnings, disillusionments and its undoubted achievements merit a closer attention by all philosophers of the social process.

The sources of the BANK's (1) reputation and respect among bankers and investors in the private (profit) sector, as well as finance ministers and treasury officials of the several nation-states in the public (non-profit) sector of the world politico-economy, provides us with a clue to its corporate ethics. Basically the strength of the BANK and its sister-agencies the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association appears to derive from the fact that all three are voluntary agencies. That is to say, none of them have any power to compel their memberships. They have no armies, no police forces, no courts, no jails. Although member-nations can be expelled under the most serious conditions, even this (constitutional) right has never been exercised. What then might be the fundamental source of the World Bank Group's unique "determinant influence" in the global society?

The answer to this apparently simple query leads the inquirer on an extended journey into the basic assumptions and the value-posture of the Western Civilization, complete with its western optimism, belief in human dignity and its abiding faith in "progress" -- a body of beliefs and often

inarticulate hypotheses not always shared by other non-western cultures. The BANK and its affiliates have just begun to be aware of some of the very real problems involved in deliberate culture-diffusion on the western model. Fortunately, because they are voluntary agencies, the Bank Group members (like all functional entities) have not been permitted to relapse into the far easier role of policeman-enforcer. The Group has had to make its own ways on the much more difficult paths of obtaining understanding, will and consent.

It is in this search for non-power solutions to the problems of "development" that the major outline of an emerging development ethic is to be discerned. The effort to articulate a non-power ethic is not complete; it has just begun. But even the beginnings forecast possibilities for the future -- the subject of this brief essay.

The Voluntary Principle.

John Dewey's son-in-law, Eduard Lindeman once defined the voluntary principle as the essence of the democratic type of society. "The health of a democratic society," he said, "can be measured in terms of the quality of services rendered by citizens who act 'in obedience to the unenforceable.'" (2) If Lindeman is correct, the motives of free men to undertake voluntary enterprises cannot be compelled. True voluntary enterprises appear to transcend the petty struggles for physical power -- the squabbles of princes and power-politicians, dictators and demagogues for prestige and differential advantages. The loyalties of free men derive from will (voluntas) and consent freely given to concepts and ideas which are correct because they currently have the ability to withstand all efforts to prove them false. Such ideas reach out and appeal to voluntary will and consent because their self-correcting qualities enlarge human responsibilities. There is no magic in such ideas; they are open, candid and evidentially demonstrable for all to see (even the Missouri Farmer whose nature of proof is "show me"). (3)

When the world's financial leaders from 44 nations were called into session at Bretton Woods by President Roosevelt in 1944, there appeared to be an unusual -- if not unprecedented -- opportunity to mobilize the world's economic potential for postwar finarcial and monetary reconstruction and development. Parts of the world were in economic shambles: Europe, the Pacific Islands, Japan, China, South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa. The war had turned to the military advantage

of the Allies (the United Nations) and the chance to set new ground rules to smooth the transition from war to peace seemed propitious. But everything depended upon what was needed and how it was to be done.

After much discussion, debate and argument the Bretton Woods Conference agreed to set up a World Bank and an International Monetary Fund. In the case of each organization, it was agreed that two voluntary gifts of capital funds would be pledged by the member-nations signing the respective Articles of Agreement. These were to be capital funds without strings. The BANK and the FUND were not required to pay any interest; there were no collateral requirements; there were to be no dividends. None of the usual restrictions required for financial "permission to proceed" were exacted.

In retrospect, the agreement at Bretton Woods was a voluntary act of unprecedented (and sometimes unappreciated) significance in economic history. These capital funds are, of course, still in existence and have been multiplied several times over.

As a result of this original act of foresight and generosity, there has now been put into place in the United Nations System a financial and technical facility that has become the centerpiece for development efforts of the world society. What was created was a conduit for the responsible sharing of the world's wealth and know-how. The effort of the BANK and its affiliates has been devoted to using their capital funds to reduce absolute poverty, enlarge the flows of international trade, promote foreign investment to help needy nations build their infra-structure. So far, the Bank Group has survived three decades with a record of financial integrity that is quietly eloquent. Its institutional modesty and low-profile has earned it the solid -- if sometimes grudging -- respect and approbation of its States-Members. It has never had an uncollectible loan.

The BANK and Its Basic Assumptions.

In searching out the reasons for the ethical posture of an institution, it is sometimes useful to examine some of its basic assumptions. In the World Bank Group's case, among the most instructive of these are three:

1. Its theory of progress;
2. Its theory of human nature and motivation;
3. Its theory of social value.

The original BANK was founded primarily by the victors of World War II. They were completing a successful defense of the western capitalist civilization, with the assistance of the USSR (but the latter did not sign the Articles of Agreement created at Bretton Woods). It is therefore understandable if the BANK and the FUND and later the IFC and IDA reflected the traditional assumptions of western European cultures and their overseas extensions.

A. The theory of progress. Of all the basic assumptions of western civilization, the theory of "progress" is perhaps most visible. Distilled from the classical Greek heresy that was successfully defended at Marathon and Salamis, the modern concept of progress postulates that not only is earthly life worth living, but improving. "Things can be made better than they are by human effort." Mankind is an imaginative tool-using and culture-building animal species. As such, he can alter his environment, bend nature to his will and purpose, add the amenities of life to the basic security base, and begin to release human energies and talents for the plowing of new furrows and the discoveries of new worlds. This is the basic, almost paralyzingly optimistic, western commonsense.

It is not strange, then, that the World Bank Group, given the opportunity for a new beginning, should perceive its postwar tasks as redirecting the new world-society-to-be on the roads to rational re-development -- a process which had been temporarily interrupted by the Axis challenge. All of the 44 nations which signed the original Bretton Woods agreements shared this consensus in one way or another. Indeed, the degree of unanimity seems effectively to have over-shadowed the disagreements on how it was to be accomplished.

B. The theory of human nature and progress. A second basic assumption at Bretton Woods -- and an essential component of the theory of progress -- was the operational premise concerning human nature and its motivations. The doctrine that provides the model is that of "inherent traits," with which all humans are presumably endowed by "nature." In the economic realm, for example, it is simply assumed that men are born naturally acquisitive, selfish, aggressive and capable in varying degrees of pursuing their own pecuniary and material advantage. What was perceived as needed by the Bretton Woods delegates was to restore the opportunities for human beings to follow their inherent drives. The motivation for progress (both of states and individuals) was presumed to exist as part of the biological inheritance.

Like the theory of progress, the doctrine of inherited behavior traits was not at issue. It was simply assumed as obviously unquestionable. Nature

could be assisted by making available those "financial permissions" to wartorn nations and developing territories in the form of loans and credits for capital improvements (the basic infrastructure) needed for economic growth and development. Capital funds were to be the dynamic for re-starting the great wheel of progress.

C. The theory of social value. A third basic assumption that the founders of the World Bank Group employed was the utility theory of social value. The proposition rests upon the two previous assumptions. It is presumed that the pathway to progress by pecuniarily-motivated individuals lies in an efficient mini-max of human effort; "minimizing" inputs which "maximize" the outputs that have utility (use) value in daily life. By using the maximization principle as a guide to social effort, it is presumably possible to escape the worst effects of nature's pervasive "scarcity," while rewarding the enterprising individual with the comforts and amenities afforded by the current level of technology and know-how. The principle also purports to explain how economic justice is combined with progress (every man gets what he is worth), through the impersonal price system through which everyone calculates what is utilitous to him. Thus, production of goods and services is guided by the rise and fall of prices, directing a society's productive effort in those directions most likely to satisfy human wants, desires, needs and/or fancies.

The unquestioned acceptance of the utility theory of value and the price system for allocating scarce goods amongst mankind's infinite wants provided the Bretton Woods founders with an apparently unassailable ethical position. They were simply to help administer a "natural system of economic justice" whose mechanism was the "unseen hand" (of God) working according to impersonal "natural laws." The proposition that is thus implied -- that price measures value was not to be seriously challenged.

With these three basic assumptions of the western commonsense in hand, the BANK could confidently proceed with its mission. Progress, growth and development were synonomous terms. They designated the path to relief from war-devastation, and from want, dawn-to-dusk toil, general misery and a short life-span of illness, illiteracy and human degradation. The road ahead was clear -- to help nations in ways that were both practical and humanitarian to help themselves along the road to progress that had served western, industrialized, nations in their great escape from poverty.

The Road to a Global Development Ethic (some half-mile stones).

The social ethic of Practical Idealism is an attractive ideology. But in the three decades of the World Bank Group's existence, it has proven to involve some rather serious difficulties. Now, as the Second United Nations Development Decade is drawing to its close, the BANK and its two affiliates appear to be groping toward some important modifications which merit the social philosopher's attention.

As described above, the World Bank Group understandably adopted the basic assumptions of the rich, advanced, industrialized nations. These implied a generous, outgoing, if somewhat patronizing, attitude toward the poor, less developed nations -- many of whom had come only belatedly to national independence as the great colonial empires dissolved after World War II. As perceived through western lenses, the escape from poverty that had accompanied the western industrial revolutions was primarily a matter of will and skill combined. To share these things two requisites appeared necessary: 1) the will and motivation to progress, and 2) the transfer of technologies of all sorts from the West to emergent cultures.

But, as the first decades of the UN Development System began to unfold, it became increasingly clear that the same formula which had served the advanced nations was not necessarily that which can be exported intact to other non-white, non-capitalist, non-Christian, non-industrialized cultures. In fact, it was somewhat disillusioning to find that, in some cases, the efforts of the developed world were neither understood nor appreciated -- even viewed sometimes by developing cultures as culturally destructive.

A. Science and technology as articles of faith? The rise of modern science, with its myriad applications to the production of the means of life and experiences, has tended to become a basic tenet of western thought and attitude. The impacts of new ways -- of innovation and novelty -- on western cultures have proven generally capable of absorption and integration without undue dislocation, probably because for the most part they have been spaced over time and do not require a sudden wrenching of old habits and attitudes and values.

The same is not automatically true for many of the world's less developed cultures. The introduction of "inappropriate" technology may have serious disturbing effects on some cultures for which the germ theory of disease,

computers, contraception, high-yield seeds, Rochdale-type cooperatives -- even a money exchange system -- can severely weaken the traditional social bonds.

The BANK, as an apostle of modern science and technology, and to maintain its financial integrity in the world money markets, adopted a methodology called the Project Cycle. What was required were procedures that would insure a loan's repayment on schedule, complete a development project and make a profit for the lender. The steps of the Project Cycle are:

1. Identification: preliminary identification of high priority projects suitable to both the BANK and the borrower;

2. Preparation: entry of a project into the "pipeline," outlining in advance all the technical, economic and financial feasibilities and potential problems;

3. Appraisal: BANK appraisal of the full package: the economic, technical, managerial and institutional requirements for success;

4. Negotiation: discussion and negotiation between the BANK and the borrowing country on agreed measures for project success;

5. Supervision: field supervision of the project during construction in initial and subsequent stages, including necessary adjustments and changes as required. (4)

These are rigorous requirements based on western management experience. During the project cycle the BANK (or IDA) is present at all stages. It holds the funds. It may insist on all measures for viability of the loan. It disburses the funds only upon evidence of actual accomplishment. In its supervision duties, the BANK oversees the procurement of goods and services on the agreed guidelines, including competitive bidding by qualified contractors and manufacturers.

The Project cycle disciplines understandably tend to inject the BANK into the internal affairs of client nations. Such things as the government's borrowing policies, its tax and fiscal system, allocations of revenues received and even the interest rates to be charged by the utility services developed. It is not surprising that on occasion the BANK has been accused of "neo-colonialism," "capitalist arrogance" and "interventionism." The imposition of strict lending criteria, such as prevailing interest rates (on average about 8 1/4 per cent), or a short grace period (7 to 10 years at most), and a relatively short maturity term (not more than

20 years), may well appear to developing nations as restrictive and high-handed -- a vestige of attitudes of western superiority.

With the incumbency of George Woods, the BANK's third President, the development policies began to change in some important ways. Not the least of these was the discovery that the "demographic transition" as experienced in western nations was going to be long-delayed in many nations of the world -- particularly those which, because of the rapid importation of death-control technologies, were now suffering an avalanche of population-rate increase. Could it be possible that (with all the good will in the world) the BANK's efforts based on the "trickle-down" theory of prosperity were proving counter-productive? Was the realistic course, then, to contemplate TRIAGE?

B. Triage -- to choose or not to choose? As Parson Malthus had predicted in 1798 (first Essay on Population) the infinite hopes for human happiness were inevitably doomed, for population growth always exceeds the growth of production of the means of life and experience. Now in the 20th century we seemed to be witnessing the full meanings of this dire prediction: famine, pestilence, illiteracy, natural disaster, along with the misery, degradation and desperation of, perhaps, forty per cent of the world's population. The ethical-moral dilemma of international organizations like the BANK, the IFC and the IDA -- the financial heart of the UN Development System -- could prove crucial in the further evolution of planetary civilization.

The case for Triage, of course, is the Aristotelian-Malthusian proposition that, since population always outruns production, there are times when it is best to let nature take its course to "...prune the luxuriant growth of the human race." (5) South Asia, for example, can be perceived as beyond rescue or repair. Simply soothing the western conscience by donating food aid -- thus creating a permanent welfare system -- might well prove counter-productive by insuring the existence and further reproduction of even more welfare generations. If South Asia were to be cut adrift -- thereby selecting who should die by doing nothing -- only nature and the South Asians could be blamed.

The World Bank Group has, on the other hand, taken a most vigorous stand against Triage. Beginning with the 1960's, both the BANK and IDA developed a modified set of lending criteria that would single out development projects which would directly assist the poorest of the poor. These new style projects and programs went far beyond simply loans for basic utility infrastructure. The purpose now was to help the poorest sectors of client states to improve their productivity and their incomes, thereby seeking

"growth with equity." New style loans began to be made for such things as new job creation, labor-intensive intermediate (more appropriate) technologies, rural credit unions, improved food production methods, improved water supplies, farm-to-market roads, technical education facilities, health facilities and family planning programs. The overall objective was to invest in "human capital," recognizing that without benefits to the lowest-income strata -- the meaning of "development" would be relatively hollow. Any development which left the 40% of the poorest untouched would be an indirect choice for Triage -- and would render even the rich vulnerable to revolution.

The BANK's current President (now beginning his third term), Robert McNamara, put the World Bank Group's position in this fashion:

"...no amount of outside assistance can substitute for the developing member government's resolve to take on the task. It will call for immense courage, for political risk is involved. ...But if the governments of the developing world -- who must measure the risks of reform against the risks of revolution -- are prepared to exercise the requisite political will to assault the problem of poverty in the countryside, then the governments of the wealthy nations must display equal courage...by removing discriminatory trade barriers and by substantially expanding Official Development Assistance." (6)

The rather blunt statement of the dilemma: "reform or revolution" posed the more serious underlying question: given access by desperate groups to mass destruction weaponry and atomic blackmail -- then what becomes of the stable and orderly process of development for rich and poor alike? Opting, as it has, for a global social ethic which links traditional "security" with development helps place the World Bank Group in a virtually unassailable moral position. As McNamara put it to the Board of Governors in Manila recently:

"Surely we cannot contemplate the stark realities of absolute poverty in our poorest member countries, and then turn our backs on the 750 million human beings there who are trapped in it. ...By any objective standard, absolute poverty is an anachronistic tragedy in our century. A tragedy because it is a condition of life beneath the level of human decency; and anachronistic because there are now at hand the economic and technological means to end it." (7)

C. Sharing development potential: can it be done? Sharing the "economic and technological means" to end absolute poverty is no facile exercise as the World Bank Group has discovered. The simple "transfer of technology"

from advanced to developing cultures involves enormously profound understandings of 1) the ways cultures are built, 2) the value-structures and assumptions that lie behind social institutions, and 3) the ways institutions are modified and adjusted as new know-how comes into technical feasibility.

The BANK and its affiliates are currently struggling to probe these dimensions of "development." The simplistic version of duplicating the western escape from poverty by substituting labor-saving machinery for hand production has obviously made little headway under the burdens of the population avalanches. Moreover, the suspicion and distrust that accompany western technologies (even, or especially, on the model of western management disciplines) have forced the BANK to realize that what is technically possible is not always politically possible.

What is now required is a much more sophisticated posture that recognizes the enormous importance of "culture conservation;" of the great habitudes (mental, manual and moral) that control, perhaps, more than 90% of human behavior and conduct. These "cakes of custom" tend to freeze the conduct of successive generations into fixed channels of repetitive (usually unquestioned and unquestionable) behaviors. They can be changed only with the greatest difficulties, even with the utmost patience and understanding. To try to change them "from outside," from external cultural sources, may only tend to fix the foundations deeper in cement.

The BANK, along with other "development" agencies has been pushed, in other words, back to the fundamentals of social change. It is the hardest problem of all: how to help people, with their consent and understanding, develop the will to modify their actual behaviors in order to choose more intelligently from among a newer and broader range of real choices. The problem is complicated by the fact that traditional forms of coercion -- military, economic, financial -- are irrelevant to the problem-situation. Only the "power of ideas" that are capable of evidential demonstration -- and can be made ceremonially legitimate with the prevailing cultural traditions -- can serve as appropriate development tools.

Dimly recognizing the problem-situation, the BANK has turned to something it calls "institution-building." (8) It is described as "...a process of change intended to strengthen local capabilities for achieving the goals of a developing society...a dynamic process, a largely indigenous process responsive to changing internal needs and based on internally shaped solutions to which outside contributions may be adapted." (9) Without some such methodology, the BANK is beginning to realize, "development" is at best a happenstance. In fact, without adequate institutions to guide and

direct behaviors (without inhibitions of shame, guilt, fear, ostracism or punishment), sustainable social change is virtually impossible. But the puzzle still remains: how can it be initiated? How can it be made to come about while still protecting the dignities, pride and self-motivations essential to its long-term viability?

The implications of this new posture is an interesting lesson in western humility. The (understandable) pride in western achievements has been brought up short in its efforts to transfer them cross-culturally. In the process, some very important lessons have been learned, at least are being learned:

1. Development and its effects are not peculiar to new "emerging" nations; advanced nations too are affected by changes in technologies, demands for wider sharing of equities and amenities, environmental and resource limitations, changing demographic patterns. All nations develop all the time, rich and poor alike.

2. Thus, it is unnecessarily pretentious to hold out any of the industrialized models of development (western or socialist) as the best or only preferred models -- especially for the absolute poor who live at the margins of all societies.

3. Therefore, indigenous institutions that serve particular development needs in particular cultures must be allowed to emerge out of their own settings, suited to their own psychological, religious, technological, economic and resource assets and liabilities.

4. The key to institution-building lies deep within the cultural attitudes and existing value-systems of any culture, which may be quite different from the western "impersonal and professional" bias of the industrial models of development.

5. The challenge is "...to diagnose problems properly and to adapt knowledge and advice into politically and culturally feasible solutions." (10)

In taking this position the BANK appears to be adopting a more universal stance of appreciating the wide range of ethical aspirations that formally motivate the many differing cultures it is seeking to assist.

Summary: The World Bank Group and a Universal Development Ethic?

The World Bank Group purports to be a global, functional, change-agent. In the three decades of its existence, it has, indeed, learned a great deal, and its own ethical positions appear to have been changed by the experiences. A brief review of some of its achievements is relevant here.

In the first place the BANK and its affiliates have performed a feat that is unique in economic history. That is, they have provided a means by which the voluntary principle (obedience to the unenforceable) can work through transnational organizations, to share access to economic growth between advanced and developing nations. Though still in its infancy, this global enterprise is unique because it unites the interests of the free-market economies of the western tradition with the emergent (often planned) economies of the developing world on terms helpful to both.

A second achievement of the World Bank Group has been its flexibility in adapting itself to changing economic and political conditions. The strict Project Cycle disciplines and the original hard terms of lending have now been supplemented by the "soft" or concessional lending terms of the IDA and adapted to the needs of poorer countries -- but without surrendering financial integrity in the private money-markets where the BANK's own bond issues must be sold. In fact, out of its "profits" the BANK has been able to assist in creation of two new affiliates, the IFC and the IDA. In this instance, it has come to behave more like a Cooperative Credit Union than simply a "bank."

Thirdly, the World Bank Group has discovered the demographic transition, and especially some of the factors which tend to delay, lengthen and amplify it in the developing countries. In this connection it has taken an unabashed moral stand against Triage, and has sought to modify its lending practices to insure that the absolute poor will share in the development process. By thus stressing the global interdependence of both rich and poor (among as well as within) modern nations, it has assumed a dimension of leadership in the UN Development System that appears to be as unapproachable as it is unassailable. Its current President has put it very directly in these terms:

"The fundamental case for development is the moral one. The whole of human history has recognized the principle -- at least in the abstract -- that the rich and powerful have a moral obligation to assist the poor and

the weak. That is what the sense of community is all about." (11)

It is, perhaps, not too much to expect that as the century closes the main outlines of a truly global ethic will come more sharply into view. Some half-milestones have already been reached. The pragmatic gropings of the past thirty years have provided a further verification of the functional hypothesis that the soundest base for peaceful and mutually rewarding social life is the commonalties -- the things men share -- rather than their cultural differences. The adventures of the World Bank Group would tend to confirm this is technically possible, if it can be culturally cushioned and made minimally dislocational.

Documentations.

1. The BANK's official name is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, established at the Bretton Wood's Monetary and Financial Conference in 1944, as World War II was coming to a close. The International Monetary Fund (FUND) was created by the same conference.

2. Lindeman, Eduard C., The Democratic Man, edited by Robert Gessner with a foreword by Max Otto, Beacon Press, Boston, 1956, p. 217.

3. Cf. Merrifield, C. W., Leadership in Voluntary Enterprise, Oceana, New York, 1961, preface, p. 1.

4. Baum, Warren C., The Project Cycle, Reprint from Finance and Development, June 1970, pp. 3-13.

5. Peterson, Howard B., Triage, Logan, Utah, 1976, p. 1, 53rd Faculty Honor Lecture. Utah State University, Logan, Utah.

6. McNamara, Robert, Address to the Board of Governors, World Bank, Washington, 1973. Nairobi, Kenya, 24 September 1973, p. 28.

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8. Roumani, Jacques, "Institution-Building: A Position Paper and Work Program." Unpublished MS. The World Bank, 4 March 1977, Summary, p. iii.

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11. Maddux, John L., "Some Implications of the Development Philosophy of Robert McNamara." Unpublished MS. The World Bank, 1 January 1976, p. 3.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

OFFICERS.

President. Dr. John B. Connely, California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo, California 93401.

Vice President. Dr. Donald S. Seckinger, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming 82071.

Secretary-Treasurer. Dr. Nicholas Appleton, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85281.

Editor. Dr. James John Jelinek, Emeritus Professor, College of Education, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85281.

Representative. Dr. Francis T. Villemain, San Jose State University, San Jose, California 95192.

Representative. Dr. Michael Praetorius, Whittier College, Whittier, California 90608.

APPENDIX B.

HISTORY.

The Far Western Philosophy of Education Society was founded December 29, 1952. It has held annual meetings in December as follows:

1952. Stanford University.
1953. University of Southern California.
1954. Stanford University.
1955. Loyola University of Los Angeles.
1956. Fresno State College.
1957. Mt. San Antonio College.
1958. Sacramento State College.
1959. University of California at Los Angeles.
1960. San Francisco State College.
1961. Los Angeles State College.
1962. Fresno State College.
1963. Arizona State University at Tempe, Arizona.
1964. California State College at Hayward.
1965. San Fernando Valley State College.
1966. University of Santa Clara.
1967. University of California at Santa Barbara.
1968. University of San Francisco.
1969. California State College at Fullerton.
1970. University of Southern California.
1971. Arizona State University at Tempe, Arizona.
1972. California State Polytechnic University.
1973. University of California at Davis.
1974. California State University at Long Beach.
1975. California State University at San Jose.
1976. California State Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo.
1977. San Diego State University at San Diego, California.

Officers of the Society have included the following:

1952-53. Robert L. Brackenbury, President. Lawrence G. Thomas, Vice President. Lester B. Sands, Secretary. Arthur B. Fallico, Board Member. Darrell F. X. Finnegan, Board Member.

1953-54. Lawrence G. Thomas, President. Darrell F. X. Finnegan, Vice President. Joe Apple, Secretary. Morris Bigge, Board Member. Samuel Burkhard, Board Member.

1954-55. Darrell F. X. Finnegan, S.J., President. Morris L. Bigge, Vice President. Willard W. Smith, Secretary. Thomas Hunt, Board Member. Frederic Lilge, Board Member.

1955-56. Morris L. Bigge, President. Thomas Hunt, Vice President. Glenn Austin, Secretary. George F. Kneller, Board Member. Daniel McGloin, Board Member.

1956-57. Thomas C. Hunt, President. Willard W. Smith, Vice President. Clyde V. Martin, Secretary. Glenn Austin, Board Member. Arch Lang, Board Member.

1957-58. Glenn Austin, President. Willard W. Smith, Vice President. David Ferris, Secretary. Keith Oakes, Board Member. John J. O'Farrell, Board Member.

1958-59. Willard W. Smith, President. George F. Kneller, Vice President. Arch D. Lang, Secretary. Stephen Alley, Board Member. Daniel McGloin, Board Member.

1959-60. George F. Kneller, President. Arch D. Lang, Vice President. Wilbur F. Murra, Secretary. John J. O'Farrell, Board Member. Maurice P. Hunt, Board Member.

1960-61. Arch D. Lang, President (to May 1961). Joe Apple, Vice President. Julian Roth, Secretary. Louis Fischer, Board Member. M. Rose Emmanuella, Board Member.

1961-62. Julian Roth, President. Maurice P. Hunt, Vice President. Louis Fischer, Secretary. Wilbur Murra, Board Member. Herman Yeager, Board Member.

1962-63. Maurice P. Hunt, President (to November 1963). Wilbur F. Murra, Vice President. Herman V. Yeager, Secretary. Richard Dettering, Board Member. Daniel McGloin, Board Member.

1963-64. Clyde E. Curran, President. Herman V. Yeager, Vice President. Gerald McDonald, Secretary. Lester B. Sands, Board Member. Louis Fischer, Board Member.

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1964-65. Herman V. Yeager, President. Louis Fischer, Vice President. Gerald McDonald, Secretary-Treasurer. Wayne Hill, Board Member. William O'Neill, Board Member.

1965-66. Louis Fischer, President. Gerald McDonald, Vice President. William O'Neill, Secretary-Treasurer. Father O'Farrell, Board Member. Lester Sands, Board Member.

1966-67. Gerald McDonald, President. Lester B. Sands, Vice President. Kenneth Lottich, Secretary-Treasurer. John J. O'Farrell, Board Member. Lloyd Scritchfield, Board Member.

1967-68. Lester Sands, President. John J. O'Farrell, Vice President. James J. Jelinek, Secretary-Treasurer. Bernice Goldmark, Board Member. Frank Saunders, Board Member.

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1972-73. T. Frank Saunders, President. Hugh C. Black, Vice President. Robert Bruce McLaren, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Dr. Leonard Fels, Representative. Helen Isabel Nicklin, Representative.

1973-74. Hugh C. Black, President. Leonard Fels and Robert B. McLaren, Vice President. Donald S. Seckinger, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Thomas A. Reed, Representative.

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1965-66. Louis Fischer, President. Gerald McDonald, Vice President. William O'Neill, Secretary-Treasurer. Father O'Farrell, Board Member. Lester Sands, Board Member.

1966-67. Gerald McDonald, President. Lester B. Sands, Vice President. Kenneth Lottich, Secretary-Treasurer. John J. O'Farrell, Board Member. Lloyd Scritchfield, Board Member.

1967-68. Lester Sands, President. John J. O'Farrell, Vice President. James J. Jelinek, Secretary-Treasurer. Bernice Goldmark, Board Member. Frank Saunders, Board Member.

1968-69. John J. O'Farrell, President. Morton Fierman, Vice President. James J. Jelinek, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Clyde E. Crum, Board Member. Leroy Troutner, Board Member.

1969-70. Morton Fierman, President. William O'Neill, Vice President. James J. Jelinek, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Hugh C. Black, Board Member. Edwin Carr, Board Member.

1970-71. William O'Neill, President. James J. Jelinek, Vice President. Robert Bruce McLaren, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Thomas A. Reed, Board Member. Leonard Fels, Board Member.

1971-72. James John Jelinek, President. T. Frank Saunders, Vice President. Robert Bruce McLaren, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Homer Bronson, Representative. Wayne Hill, Representative.

1972-73. T. Frank Saunders, President. Hugh C. Black, Vice President. Robert Bruce McLaren, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Dr. Leonard Fels, Representative. Helen Isabel Nicklin, Representative.

1973-74. Hugh C. Black, President. Leonard Fels and Robert B. McLaren, Vice President. Donald S. Seckinger, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Thomas A. Reed, Representative.

1974-75. Robert B. McLaren, President. William H. McGowan, Vice President. Donald S. Seckinger, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. James L. Jarrett, Representative. Helen I. Nicklin, Representative.

1975-76. Dr. Hobert W. Burns, President. Dr. John B. Connely, Vice President. Dr. Donald S. Seckinger, Secretary-Treasurer. Dr. James John Jelinek, Editor. Dr. Michael Praetorius, Representative. Dr. Robert J. Rossi, Representative.

1976-77. Dr. John B. Connely, President. Dr. Donald S. Seckinger, Vice President. Dr. Nicholas Appleton, Secretary-Treasurer. Dr. James John Jelinek, Editor. Dr. Francis T. Villemain, Representative. Dr. Michael Praetorius, Representative.

APPENDIX C.

PROGRAM.

TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE FAR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY.

December 2-4, 1977.

San Diego State University, San Diego, California.

Friday, December 2.

Registration. 11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. at Aztec Center (See campus map.)

11:30 a.m. to 1 p.m. 1977 Executive Board Meeting and Lunch, Aztec Center.

1:30 p.m. Welcome. Dean Tomas Arciniego, School of Education, San Diego State University.

1:30 to 2:45 p.m. General Session I. (Meeting Rooms to be Posted at the Registration Desk.) "One Response to Cultural Pluralism," Robert L. Brackenbury, University of Southern California.

2:45 to 3:15 p.m. Coffee Break.

3:15 to 5 p.m. Concurrent Sessions.

A. "Maurice Friedman's Touchstones and Education," Donald S. Seckinger, University of Wyoming.

6 to 7 p.m. Cocktail Party. Ruebens on Harbor Island.

7 to 9:30 p.m. Banquet and Presidential Address. Ruebens on Harbor Island.

Saturday, December 3.

9 to 10 a.m. General Session II. "German Secondary Schools: Perspectives and Questions for Americans," William B. Lee, University of Southern California and Wayne Dumas, University of Missouri, Columbia.

10 to 10:30 a.m. Coffee Break.

10:30 a.m. to Noon. Concurrent Sessions.

A. "Philosophical Analysis: Wither or Thither?" Darold Beckman, Whittier College.

B. "Laying to Rest Our Ghosts: John Dewey as a 'Progressive Educator.'" Hugh Black, University of California, Davis.

C. "Educational Philosophy -- What For?" Frederick S. Ellett, Jr., University of California, Los Angeles.

12:15 to 2:30 p.m. Luncheon and Business Meeting. Gatekeeper Restaurant.

3 to 5 p.m. Concurrent Sessions.

A. "Appreciation: Another Look," Nicholas Appleton, Arizona State University.

B. "Education: Basic Skills," Colleen Decker, Pima Community College.

C. "The Learning of Philosophy by Children, Youth, and Adults: An Approach to the Counteraction of Apathy Toward Philosophy," James John Jelinek, Arizona State University.

5:30 to 6 p.m. 1977 Executive Board Meeting.

Sunday, December 4.

9 to 10:00 a.m. Concurrent Sessions.

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A. "Indiana Education," R. F. Blake and T. Frank Saunders, University of Arizona.

B. "Educational Philosophy: Toward an Integral View," Aleta You Mastny, San Antonio College.

C. "The Political Function of Educational Philosophy: A Reconsideration," William F. O'Neill, University of Southern California.

10 to 10:30 a.m. Coffee Break.

10:30 to 11:45 a.m. Concurrent Sessions.

A. "The Development Ethic: Experiences of the World Bank Group," Charles Merrifield, California State University, Hayward.

B. "An American Aristotle? Lester Frank Ward's Views on Eugenics and Racial Struggle," Stephen M. Yulish, University of Arizona.

11:45 a.m. Adjournment.

Nominating Committee.

Hugh Black, University of California, Davis.

Gerald McDonald, University of Santa Clara.

Donald S. Seckinger, University of Wyoming.

Program Committee.

John B. Connely, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo.

James John Jelinek, Arizona State University.

Jack D. Mooers, San Diego State University.

Donald S. Seckinger, University of Wyoming.